The Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) annual reports began in 1969 and continued until at least 1995. They listed the groups infiltrated over the previous year, and offered justifications for them being targeted. They also discussed the squad’s roles in major protest events. Other material in the reports consisted of public order forecasts and personnel reviews. The appendices contained brief financial overviews and records of vehicle purchases.
The annual reports provide a good insight into who the SDS was targeting overall. Still, some of the annual reports’ claims about groups that were 'penetrated’ should be treated with caution.
They were authored, or at least signed off, by the most senior officer, usually the chief inspector, and then provided to other senior officers within the Metropolitan Police.
These were internal Metropolitan Police documents, with only a summary of the contents forwarded to the Home Office via correspondence. These summaries have been published with the annual reports by the Inquiry.
The SDS annual reports are distinct from the Metropolitan Police Special Branch annual reports, a number of which the Inquiry has also published.
The contents and format of the body of the SDS annual reports (1969-1995) are remarkably consistent.They listed the groups infiltrated and gave justifications for them being targeted. They also discussed the roles the SDS played in major protest events.
Other material consisted of public order forecasts, personnel reviews, reports on the welfare of the undercovers and the security measures taken. The appendices contained brief financial overviews and records of vehicle purchases.
When the Inquiry published the annual reports, it included the correspondence with the Home Office that requested a renewal of funding alongside a summary of the reports.
Groups Targeted
The SDS annual reports usually begin with a list of 'groups penetrated’. The first report had 16 groups listed.
The number of groups tended to increase over the years and, by 1991-1992, the report claimed 78 groups had been infiltrated.
In the reports from the 1970s, the groups were divided into primary targets and those on whom information was received less directly. This practice continued until 1976.
From 1973, the groups were also split into different political persuasions, such as Trotskyist, Maoist, and anarchist. Other categories reflected the ‘area’ of campaigning such as ‘Irish’ or anti-apartheid. Later, categories such as 'animal rights/liberation', ‘anti-nuclear’ or 'anti-fascist' are also introduced.
Some groups were effectively double counted. For instance, front groups of organisations such as Workers Against Racism were identical in membership to their parent group the Revolutionary Communist Tendency. Other groups did not exist in any meaningful way. For example, according to activists, the Anarcho-Utopian Mystics was just one person and other groups appear to be a name of convenience for a single event.
The total number of the groups infiltrated (or claimed to have been) is not always clear as many group names have been redacted by the Inquiry. In general, these are groups that were infiltrated by undercover officers whose cover name and real name have been restricted by the Inquiry. In one report, it appears that as many as 20 groups have had their names redacted.
From the 1990s, rather than appearing in a separate list as before, the groups are listed alongside the undercover officer targeting them. The number of groups listed as infiltrated declines. This is partially due to the increased number of officers whose deployments are completely restricted by the Inquiry - and therefore heavier censorship by the Inquiry of any details of those groups.
Analysis
Following the list of groups is a thematic analysis of their activities. More significant groups were given a paragraph or two to themselves, while smaller ones might be subsumed into a more general overview of that political movement, e.g. Maoists or Anarchists. These analyses include whether the past year had seen an increase or decrease in public disorder and made a similar forecast for the coming year.
Major protests are often described, often with an accompanying claim that the SDS provided intelligence that assisted in managing the public-order situation, for instance, the clash between police, fascists and anti-fascists known as the Battle of Lewisham.
Managers’ profiles on this website give more detail on the annual reports. For instance, HN34 Geoff Craft’s profile provides a detailed discussion of the annual reports of 1975 and 1977.
It is not unusual for the authors of the annual reports to make pejorative descriptions of the groups. For instance, the reason given for the difficulty in spying upon anarchists is the 'distasteful nature of the way of life of such people’.
Another part of the report seeks to justify the unit's continuation. Between 1969 and 1989, the justification was that the unit provided information on public order and subversion – that the SDS claimed could not be obtained by any other means. Much of the original emphasis was on public order and monitoring groups deemed subversive.
Following the end of the Cold War, which reduced MI5's need for information regarding subversion, ‘criminality’ – especially regarding animal liberation groups – became more of a focus, though public order remained a consistent theme.
From the 1990s, analysis included statistical analysis of the number of reports produced by the SDS as well as performance-management data.
Secrecy and Security
Another consistent feature is the emphasis on the efforts given to maintain the secrecy of the unit:
The security of the operation is an ever-present concern because a slip in this area could not only endanger the future of the Squad but could also cause embarrassment to the Commissioner.
Many of the annual reports mention this fear of embarrassing the commissioner. Some reports mention particular issues in passing, but usually obliquely. For example, the exposure of HN45 ‘Dave Robertson’ is referenced only as the unfortunate withdrawal of several undercovers from the field. Hence, it is rare that SDS annual reports refer directly to officers being compromised or having issues such as the Blake or Scutt affairs ; rather they focus on the security needs of the unit such as safehouses.
Personnel
The reports also include a review of personnel. The reports between 1969 and 1982 only mention the number of officers and their ranks, while later ones provide more detail.
From 1969, there was a maximum of 12 undercover officers, most commonly of detective constable (DC) rank, but also detective sergeants (DS). There are two back-office staff members of either DC or DS rank. There was usually a chief inspector in charge, except between November 1969 and February 1972, when the most senior officer was an inspector.
The number of detective constables preparing to take their sergeant exams is also mentioned.
As highlighted above, in 1983, the annual report gave a much more detailed account of the officers, including their names and the groups they infiltrated. From 1984 to 1988, it returned to simply listing the number and ranks of the officers.[[1988]] From 1989, reports gave more details about the officers.
The welfare of the undercover officers is also addressed. However, the annual reports never refer directly to any specific problems with officers, whether regarding actual or potential compromises – or other personnel issues such as disciplinary matters.
Visits to the SDS Safehouses by Senior Officers
In the 1980s and 1990s, visits by senior officers including the commissioner, deputy and assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan Police are recorded in almost every annual report between 1980 and 1992. In 1993, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary also visited the SDS.
Finance
The undercover officers’ cover accommodation, and safe houses are discussed. The costs of these overheads and of cover vehicles are also examined in a financial statement appended to the main report.
As mentioned, when releasing the reports, the Inquiry has often included them with a bundle of material with correspondence with the Home Office, which funded the SDS. This practice continued with reports the Inquiry published until they reached 1988.
This can give the erroneous impression that the full SDS annual reports were being provided to the Home Office.This is not the case; only a summary of its contents, taking the form of a funding request, was included in the letter to the Home Office civil servants.
Exceptions to this occurred in 1983 and 1986 when the Home Office requested more details of SDS operations.
These letters summarising the contents of the annual reports and requesting renewal of direct funding were signed by senior Metropolitan Police officers, usually the assistant commissioner for C Division, whose remit included Special Branch.
The letters from the Home Office were signed by senior civil servants, such as James Waddell and Robert Armstrong , who held the position of under-secretary of state.
Overall, the correspondence demonstrates that the SDS’ existence was known to and had been approved by successive home secretaries and commissioners of police for the Metropolis from 1968 until at least 1995.
The annual requests for the continuation of the unit continued until 5 May 1989. After this point, the Home Office asked only for notification 'that any significant change to the squad's role, targeting and operational practice would require further consultation’.