



#Spycops when the public is the enemy

Representations
from Core Participants

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Introduction

Spycops when the public is the enemy

For more than four decades, the Metropolitan Police (MPS), the Security Services, the Government, and the British state maintained a veil of silence regarding political policing. They colluded and conspired together to conceal from public scrutiny the illicit and fundamentally undemocratic system of state-sponsored surveillance carried out by British police officers. The endorsement of political policing extended to the highest echelons of Government, perpetuating a culture of secrecy and unaccountability.

The discovery of this level of political policing owes itself to the courageous women – mainly grouped in the organisation Spies Out of Lives - who were deceived into engaging in intimate relationships with undercover officers (UCO's). Their unwavering determination and advocacy compelled Theresa May to announce a public inquiry in 2015, which has begun to lift the veil of secrecy and expose these covert operations. Shamefully, UCO's infiltrated campaigns advocating for family justice, a grievous violation of trust and privacy. To compound the scandal, UCO's were deployed to spy on the *Stephen Lawrence Family Campaign*, exacerbating the sense of betrayal and injustice.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) successfully concluded Tranche 1 (covering 1968-1982) on 22nd February, 2023. It has set a target to finalise and complete its investigations by 2026. So far the disclosure, accompanying the live testimony from non-state Core Participants (CPs), UCO's and police managers has begun to expose a colossal scandal of unprecedented magnitude. The Inquiry Chair released an Interim Report based on the findings from Tranche 1 on the 29th June 2023. As we outline below in the conclusion to this introduction there are some positive signs in this Interim Report, however, there are some problems with the Chair's conclusions, and there are stark omissions.

The Public Interest Law Centre (PILC) represent 11 Core Participants at the Undercover Policing Inquiry. Our legal team consisting of James Scobie KC (Garden Court chambers), Piers Marquis (Doughty Street chambers) and Paul Heron – (PILC Senior Solicitor) provided three opening statements and closing submissions to the Inquiry. The PILC legal team has also read tens of thousands of disclosed documents –

many of which are now available on the UCPI website (www.ucpi.org.uk)

In Tranche 1 of the Inquiry we represented three of Core Participants. Lindsey German was a former leading member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a founder of the Stop the War Coalition (StWC). 'Mary' was a member of the International Marxist Group (IMG) and a supporter of workers' rights. She was deceived into a sexual relationship with an UCO. Finally we represented Richard Chesum who was an activist in the Troops Out Movement (TOM). We applaud them for their years of political campaigning, and for their integrity throughout this process.

Tranche 1 structure

Tranche 1 of the UCPI covers the years 1968 to 1982. Due to the impact of Covid-19 the Tranche was split into parts.

- The first part involved all parties providing an Opening Statement. The opening statement from the PILC team can be seen from pages 7 to 18.
- The second part Tranche 1 covered the early stages of the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), its establishment and initial work. Our second statement to the UCPI can be seen from pages 19 to 32.
- The third part of Tranche 1 looked at the development of the work of the SDS and our statement can be seen at pages 33 to 52.
- The fourth part of Tranche 1 represent our concluding remarks to the Inquiry and can be seen at pages 53 to 83.

Political Policing and the Special Demonstration Squad

In our submissions to the Inquiry we argued that the Metropolitan Police established the SDS in July 1968 as a direct response to the growing anti-war movement in Britain concerning the war in Vietnam. In that same year, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) organised two significant demonstrations in March and October. There is no doubt that the first

demonstration caused alarm amongst leading police officers, senior civil servants and those in the Cabinet.

The disclosed documents from the Inquiry, show that UCO's were deployed to attend VSC meetings. Their role involved attending, then discreetly observing from the back, taking notes, and relaying information to their MPS managers. The monitoring of the VSC continued as it prepared for the subsequent major anti-war demonstration in October 1968.

However, as our submissions illustrate the Security Services were taking an interest in the work of the SDS as early as August 1968. A document dated 2 August 1968 reveals that they already had an interest in the political policing meetings that were between MI5 and the MPS to discuss "arrangements to cover the demonstration in Grosvenor Square on 27th October." From this point and throughout the 1970s, MI5 increasingly assigned tasks for the SDS, tasks relating to infiltrating campaigning organisations and hoovering up information. Regular meetings were held between police managers and MI5, enabling the latter to begin to dictate the deployment of undercover officers and specify who they should target.

What the disclosure provided were important insights. The SDS, initially modest in size, expanded its influence and obtained funding from the Home Office during Harold Wilson's Labour government. By the early 1970s, the SDS adopted a strategy of deep undercover operations, aiming to gather extensive information. Infiltration of organisations lasted up to four to five years. UCO's assumed the identities of deceased children to establish fabricated backgrounds and cover stories. The SDS's annual reports provide clear details of the expenses incurred by UCO's for accommodation and vehicles, with government approval granted on a yearly basis. Between 1968 and 2008, the SDS successfully infiltrated and monitored over 1,000 groups, including political parties, anti-racist organisations, and peace groups.

Our submissions to the Inquiry

In Tranche 1 of the Inquiry we represented three Core Participants. Both Lindsey and Richard gave live evidence to the Inquiry.

It was clear from the disclosure that the TOM was a targeted organisation subjected to political policing, but it went beyond mere attendance and note-taking by UCO's sitting at the back of meetings. We argued that in the early 1970s the new strategy of the SDS involved infiltrating groups and sabotaging their activities. The infiltration of the TOM serves as a case study illustrating the modus operandi of political policing. Our arguments can be seen in the first and second of our submissions to the Inquiry reproduced in this report.

In 1969, the British government dispatched troops to Northern Ireland initially due to concerns about the potential violence from loyalist groups targeting working-class Catholic communities. It was argued by the British Government that this would be a short-term, temporary solution. However, the outcome turned out to be quite different. The deployment evolved into the longest continuous military campaign in British history. Despite initially being welcomed by Catholic communities, the British army eventually came to be viewed as an occupying force.

On January 30 1972, soldiers from the Parachute Regiment launched a brutal armed assault on the predominantly Catholic-nationalist Bogside area in the city of Derry. Thirteen unarmed civilians were killed in the assault (with a fourteenth dying later). It wasn't until 2010 that the Saville Inquiry report concluded that the killings were "unjustified" and "unjustifiable."

From the very beginning, the TOM became a primary target of political policing. It was subjected to infiltration by numerous undercover officers. The initial police officer to penetrate the TOM was HN298, known as 'Mike Scott.' However, Scott concluded that the organisation had no subversive intentions and did not endorse or employ violence to achieve its goals. Despite the absence of any public order justification, the targeting of the TOM persisted for decades. In fact, senior officers, civil servants, and the Home Office requested that the infiltration continue despite Scott's conclusions. The next undercover officer would assume the new approach to infiltration, that is, not only gather information on the TOM but also attempt to assume a leadership position within the movement.

In February 1975, a new officer infiltrated the group. This officer, 'Rick Gibson' (real name Richard Clark), was assigned by his SDS superiors - likely at the behest of MI5 - to join the TOM and establish a new branch. By July 1975, Clark had become the public face of the TOM's newly formed South East London branch and presided over its inaugural public meeting. Not only did Clark establish a new branch of the TOM, but as the disclosure showed he also created targets for surveillance. Until they encountered Clark, none of the branch members had Special Branch files in their names. However, Clark meticulously reported on the personal lives of individuals like 'Mary' and Richard Chessum, who were TOM members targeted by Clark. The disclosed reports delved into various aspects of their lives, ranging from physical attributes and health issues to holiday plans and hairstyles.

As we stated in our written and oral submissions to the Inquiry, in March 1975 Clark was elected as the Secretary, the highest position, in the South East London branch of the TOM. With growing confidence,

he began strongly criticising other members and even had meetings with Gerry Lawless, the leader of the movement. By September 1975, Clark skilfully positioned his way onto the Organising Committee of the TOM, a national position, and eventually secured a place on the National Secretariat. This meant that a police officer was now part of the national organising and decision-making body of the TOM's seven-person national committee. Using his newfound authority, Clark exploited his position to divide and sabotage the movement. He advocated for the removal of the TOM press officer from the secretariat and strategically positioned himself on the Press Committee, likely to control media coverage.

As the disclosure shows, by March 1976, Clark had reached the highest point within the TOM and whilst the elected National Secretary was on paternity leave, Clark became the Convenor and head of the movement. During this time, sectarian violence escalated in Northern Ireland, and the British army assumed an increasingly oppressive role. Despite the urgent need for the TOM to campaign and address external issues, Clark instead created a state of paralysis within the group. He postponed a trade union delegation that was planned to observe the situation in Northern Ireland, manipulating his position to delay it. Furthermore, he used his authority to criticise other members of the TOM. By the time Lawless returned, several members of the leadership body had resigned, with some citing a noticeable lack of conviction from the TOM's leadership.

As we concluded, Clark's deployment marked a significant shift in strategy for the SDS. UCO's were now being assigned to infiltrate campaigning organisations for significantly long periods of time. For instance, over a span of 40 years following 1968, the SDS dispatched 35 different officers into the SWP, with a focus on the London region.

Targeting socialist organisations and trade unions

After the Vietnam War came to a close in the mid-1970s, rather than winding down, as we argued in our submissions, the SDS underwent a significant transformation. It evolved into an expansive surveillance operation, actively monitoring socialist groups. The SDS redirected its attention from purported public order concerns and started catering to different entities, including Special Branch, MI5, and various government departments. Notably, the SWP serves as a prominent example of an organisation that was infiltrated by the SDS in its campaign against them.

Starting in 1968, the SDS deployed 35 officers to the SWP, primarily located in London. Each officer had a maximum service period of four years, suggesting

that there were usually more than six officers actively engaged with the SWP at any given time. This arrangement continued for over 40 years, during which undercover officers held positions of authority at various levels within the SWP, including branches, districts, and the national level. MI5 displayed a long-standing interest in the career progression of SDS officers within the SWP and explicitly expressed its wish for a permanent undercover officer to be embedded in the SWP headquarters.

For a significant duration, undercover officers skilfully cultivated enduring bonds with SWP members, cunningly masquerading as trusted companions and even engaging in intimate relationships. They insidiously infiltrated their homes, callously breaching the trust bestowed upon them, all the while exploiting these connections to gather intelligence.

Comprehensive reports from the SDS reveal the meticulous documentation of vast quantities of information on numerous members, encompassing intricate details about their private lives, ranging from their physical attributes and occupations to their travel arrangements and affiliations with trade unions.

The scope of the reporting and the scale of individuals subjected to surveillance is truly astonishing. A striking example of this occurred during the 1980 annual Easter Rally in Skegness, where the SDS compiled a detailed list of over 1,000 attendees from various parts of the UK. This meticulous record included the names, addresses, and in most cases, the Special Branch file numbers of each individual. Similarly, at the SWP's National Delegate Conference in 1978, a comprehensive list was created, featuring just under 300 names along with their addresses, trade union affiliations, educational institutions where SWP members were present, and corresponding file references. This report, spanning 171 pages, provided detailed analysis of administrative and financial matters.

However, it is noteworthy that despite this extensive documentation, there is a glaring absence of any information directly pertaining to public order concerns. We will return to this theme below – suffice to say that despite SDS being established to provide information to prevent public disorder, this never materialised. As we, alongside other legal colleagues argued, the primary motivation behind infiltration was never truly about maintaining public order. Instead, it was a deliberate political choice made by the British state to undermine socialist organisations engaged in political campaigning.

The annual march to the Conservative Party conference organised by the Right to Work Campaign had been a significant and highly visible demonstration since the late 1970s. The campaign, supported by the SWP and endorsed by numerous trade union

branches and national executives, aimed to shed light on the issue of mass unemployment and factory closures across the UK. From the late 1970s until 1984, the SDS had two officers, known as “Colin Clarke” and “Phil Cooper,” holding key positions in the Right to Work Campaign office. Interestingly, Phil Cooper was a serving Metropolitan Police officer who controlled the campaign’s bank account.

In the SDS’s 1980 Annual Report, they attempted to claim credit for thwarting alleged “small events” along the march route by using their ‘advanced knowledge.’ According to the report, their infiltration of the group allowed them to gather information and maintain public order. However, as we argued, internal SDS reports consistently indicated that the march itself was not considered a significant threat to public order. These reports also revealed that the SDS had no discernible impact on the occurrence of any disorder during the event.

After spending five years embedded within the SWP, “Colin Clarke” underwent a thorough debriefing by MI5. He admitted that although the SWP strongly opposed government policies, they did not seek to subvert state institutions. None of the individuals under surveillance posed a threat to national security. The initial assessment by Roy Creamer, a detective sergeant in the SDS, still holds true to this day: “While we were in search of information, there was simply nothing substantial to report... There were no hidden conspiracies or covert activities taking place.”

And yet – the SDS kept going. Kept monitoring and hoovering up information. They were increasingly tasked by MI5 and successive Government’s continued signing the cheques!

Monitoring socialists but leaving fascists alone

During the 1970s, the National Front emerged as a neo-Nazi group that participated in parliamentary elections while also resorting to street-level violence and attacks. Their strategy involved organising demonstrations in working-class communities with a significant Black and Asian population. They wanted to divide communities and feed on those divisions. As we argued in our submissions the National Front’s activities directly or indirectly contributed to a surge in racist attacks across London and the rest of Britain. Shockingly, between 1975 and 1981, a total of 51 Black and Asian individuals were killed in racially motivated murders.

Whilst the managers of the SDS were fixated on infiltrating socialist groups, they approached the National Front quite differently. This disparity in their approach meant that valuable police resources

could have been better utilised to prevent and solve politically motivated crimes. Multiple community organisations, including the SWP, repeatedly urged the police to prioritise efforts against the National Front. These requests and increasingly desperate demands were ignored.

We illustrated in our submissions that in September 1978, the secretary of the Brick Lane mosque in east London released a report entitled “Blood on the Streets.” This report documented a shocking 33 racially motivated assaults on the Brick Lane community during the first four months of 1978 alone. The assaults included brutal incidents such as hammer attacks, stabbings, individuals sustaining punctured lungs, and vicious beatings that rendered victims unconscious in broad daylight. The attackers often employed bricks and sticks during these clearly racist attacks. Despite clear evidence and even confessions pointing to racial motivations behind these attacks, as we argued in our submissions to the Inquiry, the police persisted in denying any such motives. Instead, they implied that the prevailing sense of terror in local communities resulted from actions carried out by left-wing activists.

Ironically, and despite SDS officers finding themselves compelled to protect themselves against National Front assaults while operating covertly as members of the SWP – police managers chose to ignore what was staring them in the face! As a result (not surprisingly given the approach of Police managers) these occurrences were rarely acknowledged or discussed by SDS managers. Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh, one of these managers, recollected a deliberate “high-level policy decision” to abstain from infiltrating the National Front. Consequently, the MPS consciously refrained from deploying any undercover officer directly into the National Front. In fact, it was only by chance, rather than intentional planning, that a lone officer accidentally ended up infiltrating the neo-Nazi group. The Workers Revolutionary Party infiltrated by a UCO, then sent that same UCO to infiltrate the National Front!

This introduction only provides a flavour of the submissions from the PILC legal team to the UCPI. We would encourage you to read the submissions contained in this report to get a clear picture of not only what our legal arguments were, but the impact it has had on the people we represented.

The Interim Report on Tranche 1

The UCPI published its Interim Report “Undercover Policing Inquiry - Tranche 1 Interim Report” on 29th June 2023.

Two major arguments have been presented in defence of the operations conducted by the SDS by the lawyers for the MPS. First, it was claimed that the SDS provided vital and detailed information to prevent public disorder. Secondly, it was argued that the SDS supplied essential and detailed information to counteract ‘subversive’ activities by groups and individuals purportedly seeking to overthrow the government.

The Interim Report dismisses both of these arguments. Regarding the prevention of public disorder, the report clearly states that the deployments of the UCO’s made minimal contributions to policing public order. In fact, only a small percentage of the reports (approximately 8% between 1975 and 1978) addressed matters that could be loosely associated with public disorder. Even in those cases, the assistance provided by the SDS was negligible, as evident from the report’s specific remarks on incidents such as those in Southall and Lewisham. Furthermore, the Interim Report asserts that if assistance was genuinely needed, alternative methods could have been employed. Ultimately, the report concludes that the actions taken by the SDS were unjustifiable, as the desired outcomes did not outweigh the means employed (p.96).

Regarding the issue of ‘subversion,’ the Interim Report concludes that hardly any groups posed a genuine threat to the safety or well-being of the state, in other words, they were not subversive. The Chair of the report holds the opinion that out of the numerous infiltrated groups, only three could be considered to have met the aforementioned criteria—Provisional Sinn Fein, along with two unnamed groups that were discussed in closed hearings. Consequently, it can be inferred that NONE of the Non-State, Non-Police Core Participants fulfilled the required criteria.

During Tranche 1 Richard Chessum and Lindsey German provided live testimony in person. Both individuals were actively involved in activism and campaigning during the 1970s and were subjected to surveillance, resulting in extensive files being opened on them. Not only were those actions of the SDS completely unjustified, we are deeply concerned that Richard Chessum’s case led to his blacklisting. We are disappointed that at this stage the Interim Report has stayed silent on his blacklisting specifically, and the issue of blacklisting generally – which we had raised in our submissions to the Inquiry.

On behalf of our clients, we presented arguments stating that the highest-ranking officials within the MPS, Home Office, and Security Services were fully aware of illegal and unethical practices by no later than 1975. These authorities were well aware that the justifications put forth regarding public order and subversion were non-existent. Regarding the individ-

uals appointed to the most influential positions of responsibility, it is worth noting that the Security Services and senior officers of the Metropolitan Police were aware that undercover officers (such as “Rick Clark”) would engage in activities that inevitably destabilised organisations. The Interim Report stays largely silent on the taking of positions by UCO’s. This in our view is a major weakness. There can be no argument against the fact that there was a fundamental change in strategy by UCO’s – they began to take positions in the organisations, and we suspect this came from the top.

The Interim Report acknowledges that there were no justifications, based on public order or subversion for the SDS to exist. However, it not only continued to exist after its initial founding, but throughout the 1970’s it expanded and thrived. The UCPI must provide an explanation as to why the methods and practices of the SDS persisted during this period, and even beyond 1982?

Our clients firmly believe that the only plausible explanation is that a deliberate decision was made at the highest levels for the SDS to continue to engage in surveillance, monitoring, and infiltration of socialists, anti-racists, and social justice campaigners for political and ideological motives.

We will continue to argue that the long-term strategy of the state was political policing, aimed at blacklisting individuals and groups, and creating a comprehensive database of files. No other explanations can suffice.

Trade unionists, socialists, anti-apartheid activists, communists, anti-racists, and individuals advocating the withdrawal of troops from Ireland were extensively monitored and documented by the SDS. Officers like Rick Clark willingly exploited and manipulated people, invading their personal lives and employing sexual tactics to enhance their own credibility. They abused friendships and subverted the efforts of genuinely dedicated activists.

It is important to note that “Rick Clark’s” actions were not those of a renegade officer; they were sanctioned and directed from the highest echelons. All of his reports were forwarded to MI5. In a testimony provided to the Inquiry by ‘Witness Z,’ MI5 confirmed that the impetus to investigate these organisations often originated from the prime minister and Whitehall.

In 1976, the government authorised the continued operation of the SDS. This authorisation was approved by Robert Armstrong, later known as Baron Armstrong of Ilminster, who held the position of cabinet secretary and headed the Home Civil Service. Prior to this, between 1970 and 1975, he served

as the principal private secretary to two prime ministers, Edward Heath and Harold Wilson. Clark's involvement formed part of a larger strategy adopted by the establishment, resulting in the surveillance of approximately 900,000 individuals, initially tagged in 'slips' then many opened into Special Branch files. The overall strategy was financed and overseen by a collective of state institutions, ranging from MI5 to Special Branches. The Home Office and the Foreign Office were also deeply involved in this endeavour.

Specifically, the Foreign Office provided funding for the Information Research Department (IRD), a unit dedicated to anti-communist propaganda and surveillance operations. Furthermore, the Foreign Office channelled funds into a front organisation known as the Industrial Research and Information

Services (IRIS), which engaged in efforts to influence trade union elections. IRIS operated under the guise of conducting industrial research while clandestinely pursuing political objectives.

The Chair of the UCPI has failed to properly engage with the reason the SDS was established. If it was not there to deal with public order, or 'subversion' – then what were the reasons? We say it was political policing. It was Stasi-like and it was ideological reasons. In our concluding remarks to the Inquiry we stated, "In their defence, the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy, but it was not a defence of democracy, it was the undermining of democracy in defence of the establishment".

It was ideologically driven political policing – we stand by that.

**Paul Heron, Senior Solicitor,
Public Interest Law Centre, 19 July 2023.**

Opening Statement on behalf of Lois Austin; Richard Chessum; 'Mary'; Dave Nellist; Hannah Sell and Youth against Racism in Europe

Delivered to the Inquiry on: 06/11/2020

Introduction

We represent two core participants in Tranche 1, Richard Chessum and "Mary", and core participants in later tranches, Youth Against Racism in Europe (YRE), Hannah Sell, Lois Austin and Dave Nellist the former Labour Member of Parliament.

Their evidence will span the decades between 1974 and the early 2000s and demonstrate that the most invidious of the practices and tactics utilised by the SDS, were in place *at the very outset* and have been allowed or encouraged to proliferate over more than 40 years.

Throughout that time, the State has targeted peaceful, democratic campaigns, in the full knowledge that the individuals spied upon were not criminally motivated in any way.

It has used subterfuge and deceit to interfere with democratic organisations, slowing progress towards better lives for its citizens.

It has infiltrated legal non-violent political parties, spying on Members of Parliament, elected to serve their constituents.

It has invaded the privacy of its citizens. It has betrayed the trust of its citizens.

It has sexually violated and exploited its citizens. Richard Chessum and "Mary" will give evidence that will rebut any suggestion that these tactics developed over time or that they were the work of "rogue" officers without direction from above. The bulk of the tactics that have outraged and disgusted society to the extent that this Inquiry had to be called, were being used as far back as 1975.

They were not aberrations. They were repeated time and time again. They were systematic and systemic. When you have the same tactics being used over a period of at least four decades it renders it incredible that those tactics were not widely known within the highest levels of Government. And then the question arises: to what extent were they encouraged, endorsed or instigated by the highest authority?

When tactics like these are being used for more than 40 years, there are only two alternative scenarios.

Either they were known about in Government, instigated, endorsed and allowed to flourish or, successive Governments were unable or unwilling to prevent a secret police force functioning with impunity and without oversight or authority for at least four decades.

Which of those two scenarios is the most frightening and outrageous?

What the State has also done, from 1968 up until today, is to do everything it can to make sure that the fact and details of this do not come to light. That approach has continued right into the preparation of this Inquiry. For five years the victims that we are representing have been demanding information. The delay has been unconscionable and adds to the punishment they have already been subjected to. The disclosure that we have received from this Inquiry has been piecemeal, limited and late. For vast swathes of the subject matter relating to our Core Participants, there has been nothing at all.

Is it the State that is being deliberately obstructive? Or is it the Police? Can the State not control its Police force to the extent of forcing it to properly comply with the remit of this Inquiry? Or is it the Inquiry itself which is failing?

The impact of this lack of sharing of information is that non state non police Core Participants have been excluded from the investigative process. If this Inquiry wants us to assist, it needs to include us. Currently we are in the dark. The overwhelming feeling amongst the non-state Core Participants, is that they always will be.

We will deal with the detail of the lack of disclosure, and the approach of the Inquiry, later.

For now, it needs to be pointed out that this opening statement is made in the terms that it is, despite the almost complete and apparently deliberate, vacuum of information from the State.

A Focus on lack of criminality: Purpose of and need for policing

The subject matter of the Inquiry, let us start with the basics. This is an Inquiry into the Police who should exist to safeguard citizens and to prevent and deal with crime.

None of the people that we represent are criminals.

Between the five of them they have a grand total of two fines. Even those incidents arose from community minded interventions; one to prevent a racist altercation and the other to prevent a 77 year old decorated ex-paratrooper, from being tried and imprisoned because he couldn't pay his poll tax. Two fines that reflect a tendency to criminalise peaceful democratic protest and civil disobedience, a theme that recurs across the Non State Non Police Core Participants more generally.

All of our core-participants are decent people with a common commitment to helping others.

The limited disclosure that we have seen, in relation to our Tranche 1 clients only, are SDS and Special Branch files covering the period of 1974-1976. They confirm the contentions of both Richard Chessum and "Mary" that there is not even a suggestion that either of them were involved in criminality in any form. Across those files there is not even a concern raised about them being potentially involved in any threat to public order.

Even as far back as 1970, there was a clear recognition from the Police, that not all targets were either engaging or likely to be engaged in acts leading to public disorder. The police knew that they were targeting innocents.

It must have been crystal clear to Rick Gibson (HN297), the officer that spied on Richard Chessum and "Mary", that both were vigorously anti-violence and that neither were concerned with any form of criminality.

And yet, they were both subjected to intrusion in their personal lives, with far-reaching ramifications in both of their cases. "Mary" was sexually violated by an officer acting on the orders of the State. She has had to live with the fact of that violation and the fact that it was sponsored by the State. Richard Chessum's life has been irrevocably, unfairly, and detrimentally altered.

In common with so many of the non-state core participants, they were subjected to the wholesale use of deceit, manipulation and exploitation, by the State; using a police force whose purpose is purportedly, to deal with crime.

The infiltration of peaceful democratic organisations and the curtailment of democratic activity

The Metropolitan Police Service's position is that the SDS was conceived to limit the impact of public disorder in the aftermath of the 1968 demonstrations in Grosvenor Square.

It will be suggested that, originally, the SDS was a justified means of achieving a legitimate aim, in the context of public order.

Even if that were so, it is clear that within a very short time it had transformed into something else. It became a tool, used by the State, to curtail the activities of peaceful, democratic organisations. The aims of those organisations were and are supported by significant sections of society, but they happened to be contrary to the policies of the State.

All of our Core-participants campaigned for social justice, in defence of human rights, for peace, for an end to discrimination, they campaigned for better conditions for working people, better housing, better opportunities for women. All of these campaigns were run on an open and democratic basis, none of them were secret.

Dealing with "Mary" and Richard Chessum specifically, as the spying on them happened so long ago, we can look back at the causes that they campaigned for. And we can ask ourselves: What were those causes? What were their aims? Were they helpful? Would they have improved peoples' lives? Would they have saved peoples' lives?

The Troops Out Movement argued that the withdrawal of the British military from Northern Ireland was an essential precursor to peace. They argued that the bombings, the sectarian murders, the carnage that blighted the lives of the people of Northern Ireland and Britain would not end until the British troops were out. Was that a just cause? Hasn't history given the answer to that? During the 1990s 'peace process', successive British, Irish and US governments, and all the main Westminster political parties, accepted that a 'de-militarisation' process of Northern Ireland was an essential step towards peace.

They campaigned against mass incarceration without trial - internment, and other draconian State measures in Northern Ireland and Britain. They argued that these sweeping repressive powers acted as a recruiting Sergeant for those disposed towards violence, fuelling and prolonging the conflict. Was that a just cause? Hasn't history given the answer to that? They campaigned for justice in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday, arguing again that State violence such as that just served to fill the ranks of the Provi-

sional IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries. Ensuring the cycle of violence continued. Decades later, the inordinately protracted Saville Inquiry provided some of the answers. The State was forced to apologise. Too little, too late.

They campaigned for the Anti-Apartheid Movement, against the racist, segregationist policies of the South African Government, against atrocities like the Sharpeville massacre, against a legal system that actively discriminated against non-whites in South Africa, at a time when the British State was supportive of what was going on over there. Was that a just cause? Hasn't history given the answer to that?

They campaigned against institutional racism in the Police force, a fact confirmed by the MacPherson Report.

In each case, ask yourself were they/have they been proved to be on the right side of history? But in each case, the State interfered with, spied on, reported on and actively sought to undermine their campaigns. In each case prolonging the violence.

The use of Specific Tactics:

i. The targeting of non-criminal, political organisations:

The methods used by the SDS, were tactics. They were devices designed to achieve an end. For the most part it is clear that they were developed at an early stage and used and re-used over the decades. Those tactics, alone and cumulatively, amounted to a strategy. It is the evidence of their re-use that goes to the heart of the question of the extent to which they were accepted, endorsed, encouraged and authorised by those in the highest authority.

The first, and most fundamental, "tactic" to address is that, apparently in pursuance of protection of public order, organisations were targeted *that posed no threat to the public*. The Troops Out Movement posed no threat. They were an open, public campaigning group that drafted alternative White Papers on legislation. They organised public meetings and lobbies. They organised demonstrations, in accordance with the right to demonstrate. They spoke with elected representatives in local council and parliament. They did what any campaign group does, from Shelter to the Child Poverty Action Group. The difference is policy. Their aims were contrary to the stated policies of the State.

The infiltration of, and sustained spying on, the Troops Out Movement was not to prevent crime or public disorder. The police were used to infiltrate and influence political movements. They used exploita-

tion and deceit to discredit and curtail the progress of those political movements.

This was not criminal policing. It was political policing.

And this tactic was in place at the very latest by 1974, if not significantly before. As with the other tactics that the SDS employed, it became embedded as a strategy.

ii. The infiltration of left and left leaning political movements only:

A notable theme that stretches across our core-participants and once more over the decades, is that the infiltration of political movements was overwhelmingly confined to movements to the left of the political spectrum; trade unions, socialists, anti-racists, internationalists and others.

From "Mary" in the early 1970s: who was involved in campaigning against Fascists, who at the time had united under one organisation, the National Front. She had been driven to campaigning by a firm conviction that the State were doing little or nothing to prevent extreme right-wing organisation. She watched National Front members smash up a meeting in East Ham whilst police officers stood by. Her conviction is given credence when one looks at the activities of the SDS. There was no infiltration of right-wing groups *at all* in those early days.

Richard Chessum, Lois Austin, Hannah Sell, Youth against Racism in Europe, and Dave Nellist MP were and are all committed anti-racist campaigners.

Looking back now over 40 years of SDS infiltration of activist groups, we do not know exactly how many groups were infiltrated, because we have not been told. It seems that there were over a thousand and only the tiniest of fractions, perhaps only three, were from the right wing.

Wouldn't a unit that was genuinely prioritising public order and violence, be putting resources into groups that actually go so far as openly advocating violence?

But rather than concentrating on organisations that fracture community cohesion, the concentration has been on individuals and organisations, like all of our Core Participants, who have spent their lives campaigning for peace, workers' rights, better living conditions, wages, jobs, environment. What does that say about the nature of the British State and its priorities?

Again this tactic has been in place since 1974 at the very earliest. It was part of the strategy.

iii. Political Police Officers: The obtaining of high office in targeted organisations:

The infiltration of non-threatening and non-extremist organisations coincided, in the early 1970s, again if not before, with the introduction of another tactic. This one had been specifically prohibited in the first days of the squad, for good and obvious reasons.

In the Tranche 1 phase 1 disclosure that was served on the 30th of September this year, a document was provided that had been penned by Chief Inspector Dixon, who founded the “Squad” and was its earliest commanding officer. That document, entitled “the Penetration of Extremist Groups”, “attempts to lay down basic principles” for this type of operation. In fact it dealt primarily with practical issues rather than ethical considerations, however, in a section marked “Scope of Activities” it did lay down one fundamental principle:

“A firm line must be drawn between activity as a follower and a leader, and members of the squad should be told, in no uncertain terms, that they must not take office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak in public or initiate activity”.

No rationale is given for this clear policy decision. But one would hope that it was designed to ensure that the police would not influence, or at least would not be seen to be influencing, the direction of the infiltrated political movements.

Interestingly all of the early SDS officers who have provided statements pre-1974, maintain that they had not taken any positions of office within any organisation.

Within a few short years this policy had not only been abandoned but had been completely overturned. By 1974-1976, with the full knowledge of his superiors, HN297 - Rick Gibson, had first assisted in establishing the South East London branch of the Troops Out Movement, moved on to become the London Organiser, member of the Secretariat and Convenor of the Secretariat and then the Joint National Secretary of the whole movement.

He was speaking at and chairing meetings (not only of the Troops Out movement but also at the Marxist discussion group Big Flame). He was producing promotional material. He had access to national membership lists. He had the potential for influencing the direction of the movement as a whole.

We know from one SDS report that Gibson reported to his superiors that he had used his position to launch a “scathing attack” on sectarianism within the movement. He was effectively using his position to

discredit others within the organisation and assist in sowing discord.

It is apparent that he used his advance knowledge of the locations of public meetings to enable uniformed officers to attend the meeting venues and tell the proprietors (falsely) that the Troops Out Movement was an illegal organisation. The venues were encouraged to cancel the meetings. Gibson used his position to curtail the progress of the movement.

This political policing was undertaken with the full knowledge of his superior officers. They in turn submitted reports up and along the chain of command, passing the information beyond the “Squad” itself and across, at the very least, the different departments of Special Branch and to MI5

We do not know what material we have not had access to, be it because of redaction, non-disclosure, misplacing or shredding. We have not yet seen anything in relation to our core participants in later tranches. But what is clear from the material we have seen, is that rationalised policies designed to limit police activity and prevent the police from exerting covert political influence, had been abandoned.

And that abandonment of policy was not the work of a “Maverick” officer, it was done with the full knowledge and endorsement, not just of the Commanding Officers of the SDS but of Special Branch as a whole and the Secret Service at the very least.

Any suggestion that it went no further than that, that the Metropolitan Police Service, with the consent and knowledge of the Secret Service, were acting independently of Government, just is not credible.

By 1975, the *only* ethical policy on the scope of the SDS activity envisaged by Chief Inspector Dixon had been entirely scrapped. The scrapping of that policy gave police officers the platform to stifle, inhibit and derail the progress of legitimate, democratic political activity.

The inhibition of that activity amounts to the inhibition of democracy itself. This is State interference with the right to organise, campaign, demonstrate and to progress to a better world. Political policing of the very democracy that Britain is supposed to be proud of.

It is clear once again, that what went wrong here, went wrong at a very early stage.

iv. Exploitation of trust and friendship relationships:

Again, the statements provided by the Pre-1974 officers maintain that none of them formed close relationships with any of their targets. Whether that is true or not remains to be seen.

But by 1974 it certainly was not true.

Richard Chessum had been a lay preacher with the Methodist Church, a member of the Christian Socialist Movement. In the 1960s he worked at the South London Mission.

He was actively involved in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an international movement of people who commit themselves to active non-violence as a way of life.

He worked for the mid Bedfordshire Labour Party and for CND. He was the Secretary of his local United Nations Association.

He wanted to help people in this country and beyond and he dedicated his life to doing that.

He is a thoroughly decent, caring and intelligent individual who campaigned for peace and a better way of life for others.

He has spent the last 17 years setting up a Charity for Asylum seekers, helping thousands of homeless and destitute people.

He came to the attention of Special Branch because he wrote an article for a newspaper and after that he was systematically spied upon, along with his sister and his then girlfriend (who later became his wife).

He was targeted by Rick Gibson because he ran the Socialist Society at Goldsmith College in South East London. Prior to the involvement of Rick Gibson there was not a branch of the Troops Out Movement in South East London. Richard Chessum was encouraged by Gibson to set up a local branch.

Gibson inveigled his way into a friendship with Mr. Chessum and cultivated that friendship to exploit him.

They socialised together, spending time in pubs, going to football matches together, eating with him as a guest in his home on many occasions, invited in to break bread, spending time with him and his partner.

The whole time Gibson was reporting back the intricate details of Richard Chessum's life to the State. Exploiting and betraying the trust given to him by a decent man. For what purpose? Why?

That tactic was in place from 1974 and used over and over again in the decades that followed.

v. Blacklisting:

That friendship and the details of Mr Chessum's life, however innocuous, were passed back amongst Special Branch and the Secret Service.

Despite his clear and acknowledged lack of involvement in any criminality, despite his decency and intelligence, and despite his university level education he was refused job after job over the next two decades.

He applied for teacher training courses and was refused. He could not secure any lecturing positions. Applications for research posts were rejected. Overqualified though he was, he applied for a job sorting mail at the Post Office. He scored 86% on the entry test. And then again, he was refused. When he asked why, he was told that they were "Not at liberty to say". That is Orwellian.

Blacklisting was always a fear of campaigners. Such was the concern that members of the International Marxist Group used pseudonym Party Names precisely because they were aware that political opinions could lead to economic blacklisting; Richard Chessum was "Churchill" and "Mary" was "Millwall".

That fear was not unfounded. In 2009 the Information Commissioner established that thousands of files had been held, blacklisting workers purely on the basis of their views. Peter Francis has admitted that he and other Undercover officers passed information directly to blacklist companies working for private industry and big business.

What was not known was the extent to which SDS officers passed on information about decent citizens that helped to ensure that they would basically never work again. Their whole lives were fettered and restricted. Decent people were prevented from being productive and fulfilling their potential, simply because of their political opinions. The unlawful victimisation of citizens because of their politics is a scandalous use of police surveillance and public funds.

Richard Chessum does not know if he was blacklisted. He knows that a Special Branch file was opened on him simply because he wrote a letter to a newspaper. He knows that he could not secure employment for most of his working life, despite his qualifications. We have raised this issue with the Inquiry. So far we have heard nothing.

vi. Sexual exploitation and targeting:

"Mary" was a Student at Goldsmith College. She was a member of that College's Socialist Society. Another victim of a tactic of infiltration of places of learning by Special Branch and the Secret Service.

She was involved in campaigns for student welfare, providing creches at the college, expressing support for Trade Unions, hospital workers and miners. She had a certificate in nursery Education. She was committed to helping others.

She knew Richard Chessum through Goldsmith College. She also campaigned for the Troops Out Movement. And so, she was also spied upon by Rick Gibson.

But in her case, she was also sexually exploited by Rick Gibson.

He made advances on her and initiated a sexual relationship with her.

“Mary” is clear, unsurprisingly, that had she known that he was a police officer there is no way that she would ever have consented to any form of relationship with him.

He used her for sex, to consolidate his history, cement his reputation and get closer to a group of activists. Sex was used as a tactic of undercover policing. There can be no doubt about it.

Sexual exploitation and manipulation were used by the State to obtain information and disrupt political activity by decent people. This is exploitation of the most intimate kind. It is nothing less than State Rape.

And it was not a one-off. Gibson was involved in *at least* four different sexual relationships with activists in his time in the Troops Out Movement and Big Flame.

At least one of those was a long-term relationship, with a victim whose emotional well-being was seriously exploited as well as her body.

After Gibson was “outed” as an undercover officer, he wrote to her, explaining his reasons for having to “go away”. He was lying of course. This was an exit tactic, that we will hear has been used time and time again.

The exit tactic was used to further deceive the many, many women who have been sexually and emotionally abused at the hands of the State over the following decades. It is the last in a series of lies, and it was designed only to hide the fact that this is what the State was doing.

Any presumption that sexual targeting started much later in the history of the squad, or that it was an occasional occurrence, or that the officers were Mavericks, has been shattered.

Sexual targeting and the accompanying exit strategy were tactics that were in place from 1975 at the very latest. They were repeated time and time again, to the

extent that they became part of the DNA of political policing in Britain.

vii. Theft of the identities of deceased children:

Unconcerned as they were with the questionable morality of targeting the living in the way they did, the SDS also had no qualms about targeting the dead.

In terms of policy in 1968, all that has been disclosed on the theft of the identities of deceased children, is Conrad Dixon’s paper. Amongst the heavy redactions in the section on “Identity and Background” it states:

“On joining the squad an officer has to supply an autobiography covering his new identity, and after the various inconsistencies have been eradicated he obtains the necessary papers to confirm it”.

That entry suggests that the burden of identity creation is placed on individual officers, with some input from superiors or others to “eradicate inconsistencies”.

It is an interesting placement of responsibility, away from those in charge, onto the individual officers themselves. That is a theme that we expect to see repeated throughout this Inquiry.

It is also interesting because it is so very short on detail. With no explanation or guidance as to exactly how new identities are to be forged and how the necessary papers are obtained.

Interestingly every one of the witness statements of the officers deployed in the very early days (served as part of T1P1) states that they did not use the identities of deceased children. Some express disgust that such a tactic would be utilised. Disgust, no doubt, that the State would sink to such a level, languishing in the sewers.

The heavily redacted SDS Tradecraft Manual, that has been published as evidence, shows that by 1995 the theft of the identities of deceased children and research into the families of those children had long been an established, routine practice. It was expressed in robotic terms and exposed a lack of even basic humanity.

The Manual cautions *“we are all familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his “own” death certificate”.*

That SDS officer was HN297 Rick Gibson who was discovered by members of the Big Flame group at the time of his infiltration of the Troops Out Movement and his association with Richard Chessum and “Mary”.

The response of SDS officers and managers is shocking. The discovery of the death certificate should have been a “wake-up” call. It was the opportunity for them to realise that what they were doing was appalling and unlawful. It was their opportunity to stop. Instead they doubled down on the tactic. They embedded it into a strategy to provide officers with a new identity. Rick Gibson’s discovery did not become a lesson in their immorality. It became a lesson in how not to get caught. It was a lesson in maintaining secrecy whatever the cost.

Once more by 1975, without any question of a doubt, what went wrong had certainly gone wrong at this early stage. The interference with democratic organisations, the sexual violation of activists and the theft of dead children’s identities.

viii. Provocation of criminality:

Both Richard Chessum and Mary categorically state that, as far as they were aware, Rick Gibson did not engage in encouraging or provoking activists to engage in criminality.

Certainly, by the early 1990s that position had changed.

Hannah Sell and Lois Austin joined the Labour Party and the Labour Party Young Socialists when they were teenagers. They have spent their lives working and campaigning within the Labour movement generally and particularly as leading figures in Militant Labour, which became the Socialist Party. For decades they have effectively dedicated their lives to campaigning for a fairer society.

In the early 90s, they were aware of the rising racist attacks across Europe but particularly from their perspective in London. They helped set up Youth Against Racism in Europe; a campaigning group aimed at a united response to racism and racist violence.

It was a mass protest movement, advocating peaceful change, combating racism with socialist ideas rather than violence and campaigning around the concept of ‘jobs and homes, not racism’.

A significant part of their campaign was against the British National Party in Tower Hamlets and South East London. In the latter, the British National Party set up their headquarters in Welling. They began recruiting locally, even outside of schools, and the incidence of racist attacks increased significantly and escalated in severity.

In February 1991 Rolan Adams was murdered. In July 1992 Rohit Duggal was murdered. In April 1993 Stephen Lawrence was murdered. That is real crime that needed to be prevented. That is a job for the police.

YRE campaigned to close down the BNP Welling Headquarters, lobbying the local Council and organising large demonstrations to show that the violence and racism was not acceptable and that the closure of that office had widespread public support.

It was in this context that they were infiltrated by the Undercover Officer Peter Francis.

Peter Francis’s deployment lasted for five years. It started within YRE but followed Hannah Sell and Lois Austin over the years into Militant Labour. Francis was followed into Militant Labour, which was by then known as the Socialist Party, by another officer, Carlo Neri.

Tactically, Francis and Neri followed the SDS play-book to the letter. They used the whole array of dirty tactics that had been in play for at least 20 years. Both targeted organisations that were endeavouring to improve society.

Both obtained officer positions within an organisation, which entitled them to go to regional and national conferences. Neri as Branch treasurer of the Hackney Socialist Party, involved in recruitment. Francis as Branch Secretary for Hackney Militant Labour. They both attended regional and national conferences.

Francis at the very least, stole the identity of a deceased child.

Both formed close relationships with decent people and betrayed their trust. Eating with them, drinking with them, confiding in them, spending weekends away together.

Both had exploitative sexual relationships with members of the groups they were targeting. Each had at least two such relationships. Francis admitted to journalists that sexually exploiting activists was indeed a “tool to maintain cover and glean intelligence”; it was a tactic.

But where they were fundamentally different to Rick Gibson was their willingness to encourage and even engage in criminality.

Francis has described himself as being a “natural fighter” having a “very aggressive” dimension to his personality.

Hannah Sell and Lois Austin, within YRE, argued that defeating racists and fascists was a political task, that needed patient campaigning in working-class communities. YRE was prepared to defend itself against attack from fascists, and on occasion had to do exactly that. But the group’s aims and methods were political.

Peter Francis, on the other hand, repeatedly tried to persuade YRE activists to engage in violence with fascists. He encouraged activists to attack others, not only in direct opposition to the ethos and aims of YRE but also completely contradicting the stated aims of the SDS and the purpose of the Police Force that is supposed to protect us.

Hannah Sell has no doubt that he was consciously trying to get them to do things that they could be arrested for.

A few years later in 2003, Carlo Neri took things much further than Peter Francis had ever done. He took anti-fascist members of the Socialist Party to show them a charity shop in West London, that was being used as a front for raising money for fascists.

He told them that it was owned by a well-known Italian fascist, who had been convicted in his absence in Italy for being a member of the political wing of the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, a fascist terrorist group. That group was implicated in the Bologna bombing of 1980, which killed 85 people.

The shop was on a residential street. On more than one occasion Neri suggested that they firebomb the premises. Burn it down.

Not only were these undercover police officers encouraging crime, they were encouraging serious crime. They were prepared to criminalise decent people. In a case of that kind, a serious arson attack, they were prepared to have law abiding people imprisoned for a very significant period of time. They were also prepared to put the lives of local residents at risk. Again, this was not an isolated example. This was not the first or only time that an undercover officer incited arson.

Provocation of serious criminality would not just discredit organisations, it would destroy them. Why were undercover officers encouraging criminality? Was it to discredit? Was it because the SDS were trying to justify their existence, creating crime where there was none? Was it another extension of the strategy used to keep their cover?

It raises another issue: As with all of these tactics and strategies: Has the use of these tactics been stopped since the Inquiry was ordered in 2015? To what extent are they all still ongoing? At the current time, the Government is seeking to introduce legislation that, if it remains in its current form, would establish a framework for legitimising the use of criminality in undercover work. Why is that?

And why now? Is it an attempt to undermine these proceedings and fetter any recommendations that are made?

ix. Infiltration of Political Parties and Elected Representatives.

The other aspect of Francis and Neri's deployments that differed from most of the early SDS activity, was their infiltration of a political party rather than a campaigning group.

This goes beyond State interference with democratic organisations on single issues and goes to the heart of electoral democracy. The infiltrations included putting officers into the Labour Party, the opposition to Government. This is interference with democracy full stop.

Francis and Neri infiltrated and interfered with Militant Labour and the Socialist Party, which we say is the tip of the iceberg. Bearing in mind the leading role of Militant supporters in Liverpool City Council, the poll tax campaign and anti-racist campaigns, we contend that political policing by SDS and MI5 was sanctioned at the highest levels.

This political interference goes back historically at least to the mid to late 1980s.

Dave Nellist was the Labour Party Member of Parliament for Coventry South East from 1983 to 1992. He was always, avowedly, a socialist member of the Labour Party.

He was a constituency MP who was well known for his support of the *Militant* newspaper and a member of the Socialist Campaign Group, of Labour MPs, which included Jeremy Corbyn, Tony Benn and Dennis Skinner.

He was thoroughly committed to his constituents, spending a significant part of his time in his constituency concentrating on local issues. Alongside that local commitment he nevertheless managed to maintain one of the highest voting records in Parliament, throughout his nine years as an MP.

It was widely known throughout his time in Parliament that he only retained part of his MP's salary for himself and his family. Every year he lived off the average wage of a skilled worker in Coventry. The rest of his salary was donated to the Labour Movement and to socialist causes.

He organised the opposition to increases in MP's pay, forcing a vote in July 1987, arguing that Members of Parliament should live at the same standard as those they represented. 36 MPs voted against the pay rise, whilst more than 400 voted for it.

Eventually, in 1992, he was expelled from the Labour Party as a result of his dedicated opposition to the Poll Tax and his support of the estimated 14 million people

who could not or would not pay that tax. His constituency party was suspended and another Labour candidate was imposed on Coventry South East.

Ironically that was the year that he was awarded the “Backbencher of the Year” Award by the Spectator.

Later in 1997 he helped launch the Socialist Party alongside Hannah Sell and others.

But whilst he was a serving Labour MP, MI5 contacted the West Midlands Police Force and having been tasked to infiltrate Militant they targeted Dave Nellist.

We know this only as a result of the police admissions on a documentary programme “True Spies” broadcast back in 2002. An agent supposedly tasked to infiltrate Militant, in fact “cultivated” Dave Nellist, getting close to him, helping him and accompanying him to meetings. The clear inference is that an undercover officer was planted within his Labour Party constituency office.

The targeting of Dave Nellist is different to that of other MPs. He was not targeted on the basis that he was associated with a campaigning group. He was a constituency MP who happened to support the Militant newspaper. His constituency office where he worked on behalf of the people of South East Coventry was infiltrated by the West Midlands Police. He was a serving Member of Parliament in opposition to the Government of the day.

Apart from the fact that this was a blatant attack on the functioning of our democracy, this infiltration raises other issues.

The first is that the targeting was at the behest of MI5. We know that from the very outset, in 1968, the SDS was supplying material to the Security Service. Peter Francis maintains that he supplied MI5 with files in relation to members of Militant. He states that he outed an ineffective MI5 officer who was spying on Militant. Some critical questions arise that need to be answered. How engaged was MI5 within the Socialist Party? Why is the State putting agents into political parties?

The State may not like the policies of the Socialist Party, but their remit is to protect us from terrorism and criminality. We choose who we want to elect. That should be the essence of Parliamentary Democracy.

This is not the only example of MI5 operating covert surveillance of organisations within which Militant supporters had won elected positions. When cabinet papers from 1984 were released under the thirty year rule they revealed that Cabinet Secretary Lord Armstrong, at the behest of MI5, presented a paper

expressing concerns about the election of Militant supporters in the civil servants’ trade union, CPSA. Lois Austin is a full time official for the Public and Commercial Services Union, the PCS, which is the current incarnation of the CPSA.

The result was the establishment of the Orwellian-sounding ‘Interdepartmental Group on Subversives in Public Life’, with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recorded as stating that the civil service should be ‘very ready to sack subversive trouble makers...’ This was government-sanctioned victimisation of democratically elected trade unionists. Meetings of the Interdepartmental Group were attended by the Metropolitan Police Deputy Assistant Commissioner and officials from the security services.

As for Dave Nellist: at what stage did the Security Service and the police start to work so closely together that MI5 was asking the West Midlands Police to infiltrate a serving Member of Parliament?

How were the West Midlands Police in such a position as to be able to manage that kind of a deployment? This Inquiry has prioritised questions in respect of the London based SDS. But the West Midlands Police were able to put an officer into an MP’s constituency office. They were spying on one of their own elected representatives. This goes beyond the SDS. Political Policing was taking place nationwide.

How did this specific infiltration happen? The Chief Constable must have been asked. Who was that officer accountable to? How could such an assault on democracy be sanctioned without asking high authority? What authority?

Did the West Midlands write to the Home Office for authority in respect of this “request”? If not, why not? Is it really conceivable that they did not?

Which Home Secretary did they ask? Between 1983 and 1992. Was it Leon Brittan? Douglas Hurd? David Waddington? Kenneth Baker? Who was it?

And how could a Home Secretary endorse this kind of policing, without recourse to the Prime Minister? Is it really credible in any way that this could be the work of a “Rogue” or “Maverick” Minister of State, without the highest authority being engaged?

And this brings us to the key question in this Inquiry. How high did this go?

The involvement of the State:

We know that at its conception the SDS was authorised and funded by the Home Office.

We know from SDS officer witness statements, that there was a clear feeling amongst the rank and file of the Squad, that the unit had been ordered by the Home Office and that the Home Secretary, James Callaghan, had himself been put under pressure from above, to “do something”. (HN343).

We know that there was clear concern from the outset that the existence of the squad could cause “acute embarrassment” for the Home Secretary. The Home Office needed assurance that a “careful watch” be kept to “guard against disclosure.”

In 1969 Commander Smith of Special Branch wrote “The Home Office view may be that the exceptional methods as practiced by the Squad are only justified in special circumstances when the importance of the product outweighs the political danger run by the Government should its existence and methods of operation be officially exposed”.

There was clear recognition of Home Office, and Government, involvement.

And there was clear recognition that the Government was terrified of exposure.

We also know from the witness statement of HN45, “David Robertson”, that Special Branch would go to extreme lengths to make sure that responsibility for the unit was never discovered. When his deployment was discovered by campaigners, the fear of exposure within the Metropolitan Police was so extreme that both the Head of Special Branch and the Deputy Commissioner went to speak to him in person. They instructed him to say that he was acting “completely off his own bat”. You carry the can.

Is “can carrying” going to become a recurring theme?

Richard Chessum, “Mary”, Lois Austin, Hannah Sell, YRE and Dave Nellist show that all of the tactics in the playbook were in use for more than four decades. By now the tactics have become engrained devices, endemic to the whole system of undercover policing.

Are we really going to be told that all of this was off the officers’ own bats?

Thus far, the disclosure from the Inquiry has consisted of material from Police files only. On the face of it, there have been no internal Government documents sourced from Government files, provided to us.

We do not know what, if any, work the Inquiry has actually done on researching how far up the chain this went. How far have Home Office and Government files been accessed in relation to the SDS? Does anyone seriously think you are going to find the

answer to the ultimate question of accountability by asking the Police to provide you with this material?

Accountability should be the ultimate aim and responsibility of this Inquiry. You have the access and resources. To date, we have seen nothing to suggest that that responsibility has been undertaken to any safe and satisfactory level. This has to be done.

It can be done. In other cases, it has been done. We refer particularly to the ongoing appeal of Ricky Tomlinson and the Shrewsbury 24. Campaigners have unearthed de-classified material in the National Archives that shows the extent to which the Government, to the very top, including the Prime Minister, Ted Heath, was interfering in and curtailing the activities of Trade Unions.

This Inquiry has access to more than any campaigner could ever have access to. It can be done.

The question is: will it be done?

And so far, the indications are that it will not be.

On behalf of all of the Non-State Non-Police Core Participants, Ruth Brander will be dealing in detail with the Inquiry’s approach to disclosure and procedural issues very shortly. So, we will simply highlight some of the main issues that have impacted on our Core Participants so far.

It has been 5 years since this Inquiry was announced.

Our Core Participants in the later tranches have not received a single statement or a single page from the police files that were kept on them.

Richard Chessum and “Mary” in Tranche 1, phase 2, due to be heard at the end of January next year have not received a single witness statement in relation to the infiltration that they were subjected to.

They have been told that witness statements exist. They have been given the cover names of three further undercover officers that spied on them and asked if they can comment on those individuals. Gary Roberts (HN353) David Hughes (HN299/342), Jim Pickford (HN300). Both Richard Chessum and “Mary” have made it clear that after 45 years it is difficult to remember the names and have asked if they could see photographs to see if they can assist. We are talking about photographs from 45 years ago, of two men who were presumably in their 20s then and would be in their 70s now, and one of whom is deceased. We are talking about those photographs being shown to our two Core-Participants who were victims of their spying, who are also both of advanced years and who have lived blameless lives. Nothing has been forthcoming.

So “Mary” in particular, has been told that other officers infiltrated her life but other than being given their unremarkable cover names, has no idea who they could be.

How can assistance be given to the Inquiry in respect of the activities of these officers, if the Inquiry will not give us access to the material that we need to assist them?

The documents that we have been allowed to see in respect of the Troops Out Movement and SDS spying on Richard Chessum and “Mary” are heavily redacted, with chunks of material blacked out. In any event they are nothing more than sanitised, second-hand reports of ‘intelligence received’. There is no first-hand original material at all. There is little or nothing in relation to policy. Where is it? If the Inquiry does not have it, why don’t they have it? And what does that tell us of the approach that the Police and Government are taking to disclosure? Who is monitoring the Police’s approach to providing material to this Inquiry? Why has there not been a specialised team of independent investigators to assist the Inquiry?

The files we have seen do show us one thing of importance. In respect of *one group*, the Troops Out Movement, they show that many tens, if not hundreds of citizens were being spied on and were the subjects of Special Branch files. Just one group. It is estimated that over a thousand groups were infiltrated. How many innocent people have been spied upon? How many people have had the course of their lives changed irrevocably because the State did not like their politics?

This spying was conducted on an industrial scale. But how many of these individuals have been contacted and told that they were direct or indirect targets of undercover policing? How many have been asked for their accounts? We cannot ask them; we know who some of them are, but for us to have even had sight of the material in the first place we have had to sign Restriction Orders preventing us from disclosing their contents. How is this an open Inquiry, seeking to get to the truth of what we contend are State crimes committed over decades, on its own people?

We have not even been told the names and number of groups that were targeted. We have had documents provided with names of organisations blacked out. How can the public get any idea of the magnitude of what is State-sanctioned criminality and gratuitous abuse of its powers?

Instead of being open with us, we are faced with numerous anonymity applications restricting the identities of police officers. Having had their rights to privacy abused by the State for such a long time, those we represent are well aware of the need to protect the privacy of the families of some of these officers. But many of the applications refer to harm, suggesting an element of danger that simply does not exist. The Police are trying to steer this Inquiry to a conclusion that there was criminality that had to be prevented. This is nothing more than an attempt to justify the unjustifiable.

We expect to see more of that. In the same way that we expect to see investigations into accountability going no further up the chain than some undercover police officers and their direct superiors being cut loose and rendered expendable.

If the democratic rights of ordinary citizens are to be protected, this Inquiry has to go further than that.

It has to concentrate on the victims; properly include them, provide them with the material and representation that they need to be able to genuinely assist. Otherwise they are being treated with a disdain that mirrors the behaviour of the State and the SDS.

It has to lift the veil of secrecy that was the trademark of the SDS and those in Government that ordered it. Otherwise, it will become simply another tactic in the strategy of concealment and deceit.

It has to behave in an objective, open and democratic way. Otherwise it is simply mirroring the approach taken by the State and the SDS.

It has to genuinely deal with Accountability. It has to properly investigate where and with whom the responsibility lies. It has to delve into the State’s fear of discovery. It has to ensure that it does not end up like the superior officers of “David Robertson”, trying to find a way to make the foot-soldiers “carry the can”.

And when it has concluded, we seek not just a condemnation of the methods, but an end to all political policing. For a police force which is democratically controlled and accountable to the communities that they should be serving.

[James Scobie QC | Garden Court Chambers](#)
[Piers Marquis | Doughty Street Chambers](#)
[Paul Heron | Public Interest Law Centre](#)



Opening Statement in Tranche 1 Phase 2

on behalf of Richard Chessum and 'Mary'

Delivered to the Inquiry on: 23/04/2021

We represent four Core-Participants who are directly affected by Undercover officers whose evidence is to be heard in this Phase.

Richard Chessum and 'Mary' were spied upon by Detective Constable Richard Clark. We are using his real name because it is one of the few that the Inquiry has disclosed. Every other officer that we refer to, and there are many, is referred to by their cover name.

We also represent Lindsey German and John Rees. They were spied upon, at the very least, by 'Phil Cooper' and 'Colin Clark'. The evidence of other officers impacts directly on the *Socialist Workers Party*, the organisation in which they held Central Committee Roles.

We were directed to provide this written Opening Statement by the 14th April 2021. That direction was made on the basis that the Inquiry would disclose the evidence of these officers by the 4th March 2021. That was not done.

The material in respect of Clark was not provided until the 1st April 2021

At the time of writing, the Inquiry has still not served a witness statement from 'Colin Clark'. It has not served a single page of disclosure in respect of 'Phil Cooper'.

We have asked that these officers be put back to the next phase, to give those who were spied upon a chance to contribute. The Inquiry has refused. That has denied these people the opportunity to provide an opening statement before the evidence is given. The Inquiry has denied itself the opportunity of looking at that evidence from the perspective of those that were spied upon, rather than those doing the spying.

It is obvious to anyone, and plainly to this Inquiry, that late or non-disclosure inevitably restricts the ability of Non-State Core-Participants to review the material, investigate the detail and ultimately put forward their side of the story. Is this a deliberate policy?

Despite the limitations that have been forced on us, we will:

- 1: show that the Special Demonstration Squad went far beyond its original remit. That DC Clark manipulated the democratic processes of an organisation to place himself in a high position of responsibility. From there he was able to destabilise and attempt to decapitate the organisation.
- 2: to achieve that he used and exploited the trust of law-abiding citizens, including four women victims, of his manipulative sexual relationships.
- 3: show that those in positions of power in the Metropolitan Police were fully aware of his tactics.
- 4: show that his deployment served to direct those undercover officers that followed to take up organisational roles, which then became the norm.
5. show that ultimately, authority for all of this came from the highest level of Government. Prime Ministers were aware of the activity and remit of the Special Demonstration Squad.

We will also draw attention to the evidence showing wide-spread blacklisting of individuals because of their political views, and invite the Inquiry to properly scrutinise this evidence and deliver a degree of belated justice to the victims.

We will also demonstrate that the Inquiry has the evidence to effectively challenge these officers, when they try to justify their behaviour. We urge the Inquiry to take the perspective and experience of the ordinary people that were spied on, and directly make that challenge. It has a duty to do so.

DC Richard Clark:

In December 1974, Richard Chessum and 'Mary' were students at Goldsmith's College. 'Mary' was studying to become a teacher. Richard was finishing off a Sociology degree. Both were members of the College's Socialist Society. Intelligent people committed to helping others.

'Mary' was 27 years old. She had come to the UK having grown up in South Africa. She had witnessed the state violence and injustice of the Apartheid

Regime. She campaigned on issues of anti-racism, women's liberation, civil liberties and free speech. She was an elected Student Union Officer and devoted much of her free time to campaigning and helping others.

Richard Chessum, was 32. He had been a Methodist lay preacher, working full time at the South London Mission. He was involved in the Fellowship of Reconciliation, an international movement committed to active non-violence to change the world for the better. He had worked as a political officer for his local *Labour Party* and been involved in the *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*. He demonstrated against the war in Vietnam and against Apartheid. He joined the *Anti-Internment League* and organised the lobbying of MPs in the aftermath of the shooting of unarmed civilians by the British Army on Bloody Sunday.

At the same time - in December 1974,¹ DC Richard Layton Clark was deployed into Goldsmith's College by the Special Demonstration Squad. He was 29 years old, married with children. A police officer for five years.² He stole the identity of a deceased child, Richard Gibson, from the records at Somerset House. He enrolled at the College on a Portuguese language course.

Clark's target was the *Troops Out Movement*. An interesting target from the perspective of this Inquiry, because it did not fit with the stated aims of the Special Demonstration Squad.

The movement posed no public order risk at all. Its aims were publicly stated and straightforward:

- i. Self-determination for the people of Ireland and
- ii. the withdrawal of British Troops from Northern Ireland.

Their methods were lobbying Members of Parliament, drafting alternative legislation, and raising awareness with the occasional low-key demonstration, talks and film-screenings.

The *Troops Out Movement* had already been infiltrated, as recently as 1974, by (HN298) 'Mike Scott' who concluded that "*It had no subversive objectives and as far as I am aware did not employ or approve the use of violence to achieve its objectives*".³ 'Scott' was right. There was no history of any public order issue related to the Movement, either before Clark's deployment or in the many years that followed.

So, what was the justification?

DC Clark is dead. Therefore, we don't have a witness statement from him or the opportunity to ask him questions.

However, we have had sight of disclosed reports that he wrote. Reading those alongside the evidence of Richard Chessum and 'Mary', we can gain significant insight into how he worked.

Step 1 - Identifying a Target Organisation:

First, his remit was meticulously planned. Shortly before he was deployed, he wrote to the national office of the *Troops Out Movement*. He told them he was a student at Goldsmiths and asked about any local South East London branch that he could join. He already knew that there wasn't one.

Richard Chessum had previously been involved with the *Anti-Internment League* and so was known to some in the national office of the *Troops Out Movement*. He had not become involved because he was studying hard and had recently been ill. He had not joined and had no plans to do so. Nonetheless the national office contacted Richard Chessum, and a meeting was arranged between him and Clark.

By February 1975, using the Socialist Society as a tool, Clark had succeeded in creating an entirely new branch of the *Troops Out Movement*. There were five founder members of that branch; Mary, Richard Chessum, Richard Chessum's partner, another student and DC Richard Clark.⁴

Clark had completed Step 1. He was in the *Troops Out Movement*. But rather than infiltrating a branch, he had actively established one. He generated something to spy on. He encouraged and organised demonstrations, such as the picketing of the local Woolwich barracks⁵ and the homes of local MPs.⁶ This created the potential for the public order problems that the Special Demonstration Squad supposedly existed to prevent.

He created targets to spy on. Neither 'Mary',⁷ Richard Chessum⁸ nor his partner⁹ had Special Branch files in their names until they became involved with Clark. Richard Chessum had come to Special Branch's attention before, because he had merely written a letter to the *Black Dwarf* publication,¹⁰ but there was no file on him. In all three of their cases their Special Branch files were tagged with 1975 as the year of their creation i.e. after they had met Clark.

What was the result of Clark's work?

Richard Chessum and 'Mary' had their personal lives reported and monitored to an extent that was both sinister and ridiculous. Details of their private lives passed up the chain of command and along to MI5. Their physical appearances, commentary on

their body size,¹¹ addresses, personal relationships, place of work, hairstyles,¹² immigration applications,¹³ health issues,¹⁴ what theatre productions they went to,¹⁵ where they were going on holiday to and who with,¹⁶ right down to the brand of cigarette they smoked.¹⁷

There was no reason for any of this. None of these people posed a threat to anyone. They were targeted first, because of their politics. Secondly, because they were useful, and Clark used them.

Step 2 - Developing an identity and building trust

Clark aimed to get himself into a position of trust and responsibility. He managed to do exactly that.

What were his difficulties? He had no back history. He had just appeared. So, before he could engineer himself into a key position he needed to establish a background for himself and a place in the social network of political activists. That was Step 2.

He did that by exploitation. 'Mary' is unequivocal. Clark used sexual advances on activists as part of a way of ingratiating his way into the group as a whole and building a backstory. He certainly did that with her. Clark initiated a sexual relationship with 'Mary' having been invited by her into her home.

But, it was not just 'Mary'. In total he had sexual relationships with *four* activists that we know of. A pattern emerges from his reports. We can see that Clark exploited each one of those women to assist him with his infiltration of the *Troops Out Movement* and on at least one occasion to gain a tactical advantage. The other three women were, a 'friend of Mary's' (who, for the sake of anonymity we'll call simply "Mary's flat-mate") and two activists from the organisation *Big Flame* that was an additional target of Clark's in the latter part of his deployment. We will address these relationships as we go through the timeline of DC Clark's deployment.

The sexual relationship with 'Mary', and the establishment of a close friendship with Richard Chessum were part of a tactical strategy and helped him achieve Step 2.

Step 3 - taking positions and moving up the hierarchy of a target organisation

As one of the founder members of the South East London branch of the *Troops Out Movement* Clark used it to gain access to the national movement. This was Clark's Step 3. It was to prove quite difficult, but he managed it with an astonishing level of ruthlessness.

By the **18th March 1975** Clark had got himself elected as the Secretary¹⁸ - the top position in the branch. He and Richard Chessum were then elected as voting delegates to the *Troops Out Movement* Liaison Committee conference. That move gave Clark access to the Movement at a national level and exposure to the leadership, with the added credential of being a branch Secretary. It ensured that he would be accompanied there by Richard Chessum, a man with a proven track record of genuine commitment. Clark's cultivated friendship with Richard Chessum gave him credibility.

On both the **2nd¹⁹** and **7th²⁰ April 1975** Clark got himself elected as a delegate to the London Co-ordinating Committee of the Movement and the All London meeting. On the last of those occasions he had chaired the branch meeting which had taken place at Richard Chessum's home. He was becoming known at a National level.

At a branch meeting on the **21st April 1975²¹** he pointedly took an opportunity to, in his own words, "... severely criticise" another section of the Movement. It was a move that appeared to ensure that he was elected as the branch's delegate to the National Co-ordinating Committee of the *Troops Out Movement*.

The **16th June 1975²²** was a key date. There was political division within the *Troops Out Movement*. That was replicated in the South East London Branch. The group *Workers' Fight* had mobilised their members to the branch, in an attempt, as far as Richard Chessum was concerned, to take control of it. There was significant political infighting at the meeting. Despite this, Clark was - once again - elected to be a delegate for the next London Co-ordinating Committee but this time he was elected along with a member of *Workers' Fight*.

Where previously his position as a founder member had guaranteed his delegate roles, the influx of *Workers' Fight* members could make things problematic for him. If they succeeded in completely taking over the branch then Clark would no longer be able to attend the London and National meetings. He would fail at Step 3.

On the **23rd June 1975²³** again Clark and the member of *Workers Fight* were elected, this time as delegates to the National Co-ordinating Committee.

Four days later²⁴ Clark attended a private meeting organised by the head of the National *Troops Out Movement*, Gery Lawless. There were only 10 people in attendance. They were people that were seen as key to supporting Lawless's position in the National Movement against *Workers Fight* and the *Revolutionary Communist Group* to take control of the organisation as a whole. Clark was one of the 10. He

had used his attendances at the London and National Committee meetings to get close to Lawless and was now seen as a key supporter. In his report Clark noted that the group *Big Flame* had also formed an “uneasy alliance” with Lawless.

On the **7th July 1975**²⁵ at a branch meeting, there was an “unprecedented” turnout with a number of additional attendees from *Workers Fight* and the *Revolutionary Communist Group*. One of those additional attendees was ‘Mary’s flatmate’, who was a member of *Workers Fight*. She had attended various *Troops Out Movement* pickets over the preceding weeks but this was her first attendance at a meeting. The chances of Clark continuing to be elected as a branch delegate to the London and National meetings were rapidly reducing as it was.

Two months later, on the **16th September 1975**²⁶ there was another meeting of the South East London Branch. This one was overwhelmingly attended by members of the *Revolutionary Communist Group* and *Worker’s Fight*. There was an election for delegates to attend the London Co-ordinating Committee meeting 3 days later. This particular Committee meeting was going to be an important one, because it would select delegates that could stand for National Positions. The two South East London branch delegates would be potential candidates for those positions. One member of *Workers Fight* was elected as a delegate. For the remaining position: Clark stood against Richard Chessum, and he was elected by an additional two votes. This is significant as we believe that one of those votes was from ‘Mary’s flatmate’, a member of *Workers Fight*, who, conveniently, Clark had been having a sexual relationship with.

The next day,²⁷ at a *Big Flame* meeting, Richard Chessum lamented the takeover of the South East London branch by members of *Workers Fight*. Clark was present.

Sure enough, on the **19th September 1975**²⁸ at the London Co-ordinating Committee that Clark was a delegate to, he was elected to the Organising Committee for London. It was a National position. He had now passed beyond branch level politics.

Clark had first stood against his friend Richard Chessum, and in doing so an Undercover Officer had deprived the Movement of a National Officer who genuinely had the interests and aims of the Movement at heart. Clark had replaced a decent man, Richard Chessum, with himself, an undercover police officer. To get there he had secured the support, we believe, of at least one member of *Workers Fight*, a female activist who he just happened to have been sleeping with.

By the **29th September 1975**²⁹ the *Workers Fight* takeover of the branch was complete with all 5 of the

delegates elected to the TOM National Conference being from that group (including Mary’s friend). It no longer mattered to Clark because he had already passed beyond the branch, he would be going to the National Conference by reason of his new National Officer role. On the **13th October 1975**³⁰ he resigned the position of Branch Secretary. He no longer needed it, and made what he himself called, in his report to his police superiors, “a scathing attack” on *Revolutionary Communist Group* and *Workers Fight*. Richard Chessum remembers that resignation differently. He recalls Clark simply saying a few words in a laid back and matter of fact announcement. But that apparently ‘principled resignation’ would demonstrate to the national leadership of the *Troops Out Movement* (particularly Gery Lawless) that he was on their side, that he was part of the “clique run by Gery Lawless”.

In his new role on the Organising Committee of the *Troops out Movement*, Clark quickly became the London Organiser, nominated for the position by Gery Lawless himself.³¹ Shortly afterwards he was again nominated by Lawless, this time for a position on the National Secretariat.³² He obtained this position and was then one of only seven people in charge of the whole movement.

He continued his relationship with Richard Chessum, primarily because he had friends in *Big Flame*. That organisation had been notoriously difficult for the Special Demonstration Squad to infiltrate, but Clark was targeting it. He continued to attend meetings at Richard Chessum’s home³³ and reported on him. He recorded that Richard Chessum had started a new job at the London Electricity Board³⁴ - this information was passed to MI5. Mary and her flat-mate largely disappeared from Clark’s reporting, now that they had served their purpose.

Clark busied himself with activities in the *Troops Out Movement*. He became an organiser of the national rally,³⁵ where he failed to secure the attendance of any of the proposed headline acts. They included John Lennon,³⁶ who also had a Special Branch file open in his name, and Peter O’Toole, who may or may not have had a file held on him.

Clark also pushed for the removal of the *Troops Out Movement* Press Officer from the Secretariat³⁷ and then secured himself a position on the Press Committee.³⁸ He arranged speakers for the Movement’s public meetings. He even helped to arrange what was called “...a strong contingent of Stewards” to prevent attacks from the *National Front*.³⁹ That was a legitimate protective measure. Yet we expect to see those from *Youth Against Racism in Europe*, *Anti-Nazi League* and the *Socialist Workers’ Party*, criticised for the same thing in a later part of the Inquiry. By March 1976,⁴⁰ when Gery Lawless had to stand down for paternity leave, Clark took his position as

Convenor of the Secretariat. He was then in charge of the whole movement for several months.

What did Clark do in this leading position?

We do know that he proposed, and persuaded delegates to vote for, postponing a long-planned *Troops Out Movement* Trade Union delegation to Ireland.⁴¹ A Press-statement was then prepared explaining that decision, presumably by Clark in his additional position on the *Troops Out Movement* Press Committee. We know that he used his position as National Convenor to “severely criticise” another individual member whose name has been redacted⁴² and was involved in the censuring of Sean Matgamna, a very prominent member of the *Troops Out Movement*.⁴³ In the course of his stewardship at least one prominent organisation withdrew its affiliation.⁴⁴ There was also serious dissent with the *International Marxist Group* over decisions taken in respect of the trade union delegation to Northern Ireland.⁴⁵ By the time Gery Lawless returned four months later, two members of the Secretariat had resigned.⁴⁶ Remember this was a serving Metropolitan Police officer, working undercover, making day to day decisions for a campaigning organisation.

Clark had also entirely re-positioned his loyalties. Having been an ardent supporter of Lawless and using his support to manoeuvre himself into the Secretariat, he now turned against him.

In reports to his superior officers, Clark referred to “typical Lawless tantrums”⁴⁷ and on the **25th July 1976**⁴⁸ he took the highly unusual and hugely risky step of holding a meeting at his own police cover flat. The meeting, with *Big Flame* members, was “*attempting to offer some form of resistance to the leadership (i.e. Lawless’s supporters) within TOM.*” They were discussing an internal coup, decapitating the *Troops Out Movement* of its long-time head.

On the **2nd September 1976** a further meeting with *Big Flame* took the coup project further.⁴⁹ Clark noted in his report at the time: “*Independent elements within the TOM have over recent months become increasingly frustrated at carrying out the doctrine of the “Lawless clique”... Big Flame members in TOM have been instrumental in bringing together some of the more influential members of the organization in the hope of formulating a common policy with which to fight the leadership at the next National delegate conference, due to take place in late November.*”

Clark described the meeting as a “*significant beginning*”; “*the major aim of those represented would have to be the defeat of the present leadership and the replacement of them by independent members*”. The

new leadership was proposed at that meeting. It included four redacted names and Clark himself.

What were his motives? Was it to de-stabilise and decapitate the *Troops Out Movement*? Was he trying to ingratiate himself with *Big Flame*? Perhaps his plotting was a means of doing that. He had spent the summer trying very hard to infiltrate them, chairing meetings, listing himself as a “member” in reports.⁵⁰ Clark also embarked on sexual relationships with two female members of the *Big Flame*. For him, sexual relationships were a tried and tested tactic of getting exactly where he wanted to go. He had used Mary to give himself a background and authority; her flat-mate to ensure a vote to get him up to National level in the *Troops Out Movement*, and two *Big Flame* activists to try to cement his position in that group, in the process firming up support for his coup.

However, with *Big Flame*, Clark had over-reached himself. We do not know exactly what his mistake was. Was it holding a meeting in his unlive-in undercover flat? Or was it (as another officer has suggested) that he gave different accounts of his background to *Big Flame* activists he was sleeping with?⁵¹ Perhaps it was that his Machiavellian approach was just too obviously dishonest? Perhaps, as Richard Chessum suspects, *Big Flame* were canny enough to recognize that Clark had no political background knowledge. Whatever it was, members of *Big Flame* also went to Somerset House and they found Rick Gibson’s birth certificate, and then they found his death certificate.

They confronted Clark with both. Richard Chessum tells of how he heard about this confrontation from his friends in *Big Flame*. How he went white and nearly started to cry. His ambitious plot to unseat Gery Lawless was over.

What was the fall out? Clark took flight and disappeared from the political scene altogether. Richard Chessum later saw a dossier that *Big Flame* had prepared, that included a letter from Clark written to one of the female activists, saying that he “had to go away”. Clark’s exposure is significant for one other clear reason.

When he walked out, there was no threat of physical violence towards him, and no attempt at retribution. A stand-out theme across the groups that were infiltrated over the decades is that none of them were interested in violence, unless they had to defend themselves. If there was ever a reason and an opportunity for violence against an Undercover Officer, this was it. It was not how these groups, who stood for principles, conducted themselves. This example highlights the Special Demonstration Squad attempts to justify their infiltrations, and their

applications to have their identities hidden. They look desperately inadequate.

Were the Commanders and Commissioners of the MPS aware of what was going on?

Clark's taking of high office was known to his superiors all the way up to the Commander of the Metropolitan Police Service.⁵² The early principle of the Special Demonstration Squad that "*members of the squad should be told, in no uncertain terms, that they must not take office in a group, chair meetings, draft leaflets, speak in public or initiate activity*"⁵³ had been completely abandoned.

Equally, the fact that he engaged in sexual relationships with activists was no secret either. Two officers, to date, have been honest enough to disclose that they knew of DC Clark's behaviour.⁵⁴ One of those officers has gone further and admitted that sexual relationships were talked about at the weekly officer meetings⁵⁵ and that his supervising officers would have been aware because they were present. He recalls two separate occasions when Clark's sexual relationships were raised at those meetings. He thinks that other officers and managers were present on both occasions.⁵⁶

It was inevitable that they would talk about it. Police officers, in an almost exclusively male environment. Relaxed with their guards down, amongst their own, in the late 1970s when institutionalised sexism was endemic. To suggest otherwise would be to turn a blind eye to reality.

It is refreshing to see that at least officer 'Coates' told the truth. How many will pretend that they did not hear? Or were out of the office on those days? Or simply, when presented with simple questions, get angry and indignant that they are being asked at all? Counsel to the Inquiry has an abundance of material to test these officers thoroughly. Should officers lie on oath, as sadly is anticipated, one wonders how the Inquiry will deal with such dishonesty.

Senior officers knew about Clark taking prominent roles and interfering in the democratic process of the *Troops Out Movement*. They also knew he was sexually abusing female activists. Despite this he left the force with a special medal, a Detective Inspector's pension and his conduct certified as "exemplary".⁵⁷

There is only one explanation for this. His conduct was deemed acceptable. It continued for years. The Category H women are testament to the decades of sexual misconduct at the hands of these officers. Following Clark, the taking of positions of responsibility and trust in these organisations, was common place.

Many of the officers we will hear from say that they cannot remember being elected to the position of trust, that they plainly were elected to. Or they will say that they did not really have a choice but to be elected - it just happened. Or they say that the role was not really a position of trust at all. The institutionalised dishonesty creeps into every aspect of their evidence.

Political Policing and Positions of Trust

'Mike James' (HN96) started his deployment in the *Socialist Workers Party* where he was elected to a position on the Hackney District Committee.⁵⁸ After two years he moved on into the *Troops Out Movement*, where Clark had been 4 years before.

'James' is an interesting officer because he's one of two that give different accounts of the position they reached. In his impact statement, a document arguing the case for his continued anonymity, he described himself as the "National Secretary"⁵⁹ of the *Troops Out Movement* i.e. the top role. Once his anonymity was secure, he shifted, and tried to play down and minimise the importance of his position.

He was the National "Membership and Affiliation Secretary"⁶⁰ of the *Troops Out Movement* for a good 18 months.⁶¹ He is one of the officers that seems to suggest he just happened to fall into these roles⁶² rather than actively pursuing them. But he was on the top level of the organisation, the National Steering Committee, which he occasionally chaired.⁶³ He was one of nine people with a direct influence over the direction of the movement⁶⁴ and he controlled the lifeblood of any organisation, its membership. He was also on a number of additional committees, specifically tasked with organising demonstrations.⁶⁵

But it was not just Clark or 'James'. Once the dam had cracked there was a flood of undercover police officers taking roles in the organisations they infiltrated. In some case officers took national leading roles. What resulted from this was not just information, but also the opportunity to have a say in the direction of the organisation, and ultimately to seek to derail that organisation.

(HN348) 'Sandra Davies' has already said that she did not remember being elected to the Executive Committee of the Women's Liberation Front. She did not remember voting to oust the founding leader and create a completely new group, the Revolutionary Women's Union.⁶⁶

(HN155) 'Phil Cooper' and (HN80) 'Colin Clark' were so close to the Central Committee of the *Socialist Workers Party* that they were able to access the Headquarters of the organisation.⁶⁷ 'Phil Cooper' was so involved that, in his own words, he got to

sleep with “groupies”.⁶⁸ We don’t yet know exactly how prominent they became within the organisation, because 6 weeks after the deadline for disclosure the Inquiry has still not provided us with their documentation.

(HN200) ‘Roger Harris,’ does not remember being the Contacts Organiser for the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists*,⁶⁹ a branch which was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the *Workers’ League*.⁷⁰

(HN300) ‘Jim Pickford’ chaired meetings, attended national conferences as a delegate, wrote articles, ran classes, argued against individuals being granted membership.⁷¹ He was granted position of Branch Treasurer, he booked halls for meetings.

(HN13) ‘Barry Loader’ was described by his own superior officer in an internal memo as “an active and trusted member of the *Communist Party of England (Marxist-Leninist)* who is to attend the National Conference.”⁷²

(HN353) ‘Gary Roberts’ claims he was never in a position of responsibility for the *International Marxist Group*.⁷³ However, his cover was as a full-time degree course student at Thames Polytechnic (with his fees paid for by the Metropolitan Police). Whilst in that cover, he became the *Vice President* of the Student’s Union. He was a delegate at National National Union of Students conferences and attended the *International Marxist Group* caucuses at those conferences,⁷⁴ involved in the selection of “revolutionary” candidates.

He does not remember being trusted enough by the *International Marxist Group* to be asked to be a delegate on overseas trips including to Romania (then in the Eastern bloc), France and Belgium “*on behalf of the International Marxist Group leadership*”.⁷⁵ He says he must just have been the driver. He has no recollection of being on any of the many committees that his reports say he was clearly on.⁷⁶⁻⁹

(HN354) ‘Vince Miller’ was elected a District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch of *Socialist Workers Party*. He resigned from his position to mark the “*Disorder and ineffectiveness*” within the branch. Resignation combined with strong criticism is deliberately de-stabilising to the organisation.

(HN296) ‘Geoff Wallace’ was elected as the “Flame” organiser for the Socialist Workers Party (Hammer-smith and Kensington branch)⁸⁰ and a *Socialist Workers Party* Organiser.⁸¹ He attended the London Regional Delegates conference and was one of three organisers of the *Anti-Nazi League* Carnival.⁸² We do not know what he would have to say about any of

this because there is no statement from him, not because of death or ill-health but because the Inquiry has not got hold of him because he’s abroad. In the age of telecommunications it seems strange they have not been able to track him down, in an Inquiry of this importance.

(HN351) ‘Jeff Slater’ cannot remember being the *Socialist Worker* newspaper Organiser for the North London District of the *International Socialists*.⁸³

(HN356) ‘Bill Biggs’ was the branch Treasurer of South East London *Socialist Workers Party*,⁸⁴ chaired meetings⁸⁵ and became the *Socialist Worker* Organiser for the branch. At an aggregate meeting for the South East District he voted (as a delegate) on a proposal to condemn a decision taken by the Central Committee.⁸⁶ He spoke as a Guest speaker at another branch’s meeting⁸⁷ and was the branch Treasurer for *Socialist Workers Party* (Brixton branch).⁸⁸

(HN126) ‘Paul Gray’ became *Socialist Worker* Paper Organiser for Cricklewood branch⁸⁹ and then for the whole of the North West District.⁹⁰ He was on the District Committee⁹¹ which had control over all of the branches that the District covered. He was re-elected in 1979⁹² and 1980.⁹³ He chaired meetings.⁹⁴ He was on the Organising Committee of the West Hampstead *Anti-Nazi League*⁹⁵ and the North-West London *Anti Nazi League* Co-ordinating Committee.⁹⁶ He was also a delegate to the *Camden Against Racism Committee*.⁹⁷

He says he does not remember any of the last roles. He says his role as Socialist Worker Paper Organiser was collecting newspapers and dropping them off basically he was just a delivery boy with a van.

That is a major difference from the story he gave when he was trying to secure his anonymity. Like ‘Mike James’ above, ‘Paul Gray’s’ risk assessment plays up his role and in his case states that he was *a key organiser in the Grunwick dispute*,⁹⁹ a strike with National coverage and importance.

With his anonymity secure he has rowed back from that now.

So, what is the truth?

Socialist Workers’ Party and political policing

It is clear in respect of the *Troops Out Movement*. Both Clark and “James” reached the very top. None of the officers in the *Socialist Workers Party* have been very helpful about what their positions of trust and responsibility involved. Of course, at the

time they made their statements there were no Core Participants or witnesses from the *Socialist Workers Party* in this Inquiry. They could safely describe their roles as they wanted, with no risk of their credibility being undermined.

That position changed on the **2nd March 2021** when three former Central Committee members of the *Socialist Workers Party* secured Core Participant status. Between them, Lindsey German, John Rees and Chris Nineham had four decades of experience on the Central Committee from 1979 to 2009.

Because they are late comers, and the disclosure from the Inquiry has been woefully late, they will not be able to be as involved as they need to be until Phase 3. However, they can assist at this stage, in respect of the structure of the Party and the roles that the infiltrating officers obtained.

The last four officers that we have mentioned, Wallace, Slater, Biggs and Gray all had positions as *Socialist Worker* Organisers. Critically, they were **organisers**, but they were more than that. The *Socialist Worker* was the organisation's newspaper. It was the scaffolding of the whole organisation. The newspaper was a major source of income for the organisation and key to recruiting new members. It was the political mouthpiece of the organisation, through which they communicated their politics with the public. The sale of the paper was also a regular flashpoint for public disorder, with sellers regularly attacked by members of the National Front. The *Socialist Worker* newspaper was understood by these officers to be the central component of the organisation as a whole. The role of organising that paper was absolutely pivotal.

At branch level the organiser was second only to the Branch Secretary. At District level the role was even more critical. The District newspaper organiser, along with the District Secretary, would be the link between the Central Committee and the members. These two roles were responsible for setting the political line within their district every single week;¹⁰⁰ they decided what the paper sellers in their district would speak to the public about. The *Socialist Worker* newspaper organisers had responsibility, trust and authority. They had a direct role in shaping the progress of the Party.

These officers knew that. 'Paul Gray' even reported to his superiors¹⁰¹ that he had been spoken to in public by the National *Socialist Worker* Organiser. He was told that "every organiser should know exactly where each paper was sold every week and that spot checks should be made on members to see that paper sales were being carried out". Gray was given a list of selling techniques and told to visit all of the branch offices regularly and "constantly remind them that to sell [the paper] is the most important duty of a SWP member".

At that time, the state of the *Socialist Workers Party* nationally was at "an all-time low".¹⁰² Membership and paper sales were down. The North-West London District, where Gray was second in command was characterised by "apathy". A year later, having done the job for two years¹⁰³ he was replaced.¹⁰⁴

This is one clear example of an officer taking a role of responsibility and trust and wilfully undermining the organisation, by not doing the job properly.

Three things stand out:

- 1: From Clark onwards, every officer in this phase took a position of trust. The only exception was (HN304) 'Graham Coates.' He was unable to take a position in any hierarchy simply because he infiltrated anarchist groups and they did not have hierarchies.
- 2: In different ways these officers all impacted on the progress or direction of the organisations they infiltrated. From taking a role that deprived a genuine member of the chance to do a committed job, to de-stabilising and even de-capitating the organisations.
- 3: There is a distinct lack of honesty about the role they played or the extent to which their superiors were aware.

Blacklisting - a direct effect of political policing

The question of Blacklisting. We have raised this in Richard Chessum's statement and our first Opening Statement. To date there have been no answers. We just have the bare fact of the correlation, between

- 1: Clark opening the File and passing Richard Chessum's details to MI5 and
- 2: his subsequent inability to secure any significant job.

Despite his education, decency, intelligence and lack of criminality, the door was closed on teaching, lecturing and research jobs and even sorting mail.

What we have seen in this new phase of disclosure are countless examples of civilians having the details of their employment passed up the chain to MI5. Each time, their political affiliation is included next to the note of their employment, union memberships are also regularly noted.¹⁰⁵ People targeted are those in the public sector or public service jobs, such as working for local council,¹⁰⁶ NHS doctors, hospital workers,¹⁰⁷⁻⁹ a senior priest,¹¹⁰ post office workers¹¹¹ a job applicant with HM Customs and Excise,¹¹² a social worker and a probation officer¹¹³ and numerous teachers.¹¹⁴ Reports on a traffic

warden and a public office clerk even include details of their sexuality.¹¹⁵

Many of the officers say that these were just little details to “up-date” files. Occasionally there will be an officer who gives a more realistic answer, equating the Undercover Officer interest in employment with preventing problems in workplaces - problems like the democratic right to strike¹¹⁶ - people campaigning for fair pay, health and safety conditions.

Both Special Branch and MI5 were specifically asking for employment details on individuals.¹¹⁷ The Special Demonstration Squad obliged. We know that at least one member of the *Socialist Workers Party* was sacked from a Government body simply because of her political opinion.¹¹⁸ Both her name and the nature of the Government body have been redacted by the Inquiry. We also know that both MI5 and Special Branch were confident that her sacking would not be traced back to the Undercover Officer that had caused it.

Attempts by officers to justify their deployment:

With information being freely and regularly being passed from the Metropolitan Police’s Special Demonstration Squad to MI5, this brings us to our next point in this opening statement - the question of justification.

There was no public order rationale for the infiltration of the *Troops Out Movement*.

There was no rationale for the spying and reporting on Richard Chessum and ‘Mary’.

There have been attempts by Officers to justify infiltrations of campaigning and political organisations. Many of those justifications relate to the *Socialist Workers Party*.

Because of time limitations, we will have to address most of the detail at the beginning of Phase 3. However, some aspects have to be raised now, so that the Inquiry has them in mind for the future.

As far as Graham Coates was concerned, the *Socialist Workers Party* were “very dull”.¹¹⁹ These deployments were not designed for officers’ entertainment. It is assumed he means “dull” from a policing perspective.

‘Mike James’ said that the *Socialist Workers Party* were not engaging in subversive activities¹²⁰ - that most members were “entirely peaceful”¹²¹ - that there were some elements that looked “to engage in violence at events”¹²² but he accepted that these were

involved in a breakaway group.¹²³ The *Socialist Workers Party* **did not promote violence**.

The Party had a rigorous policy of expelling members who engaged in squadist confrontational violence.¹²⁴ ‘Mike James’ knew that the breakaway group, *Red Action*, had actually been expelled, because he had reported on it.¹²⁵

Generally, we accept these particular assertions of these two officers. But where officers go beyond that, for example as we set out below, we dispute their evidence. We hope that it will be appropriately challenged by Counsel to the Inquiry.

In respect of one particular officer we do make some observations.

‘Paul Gray’ has made a number of remarks about the *Socialist Workers Party*, in particular about levels of subversion and violence, that are plainly not true. First, of course, they are contradicted by a number of his fellow officers.

Secondly, they are entirely unsupported by evidence. He gives a grossly exaggerated account of the demonstration in Grosvenor Square in 1968,¹²⁶ when he was a uniformed officer. He then asserts that he experienced the same level of violence in the course of his undercover deployment.¹²⁷ He is clearly lying.

In the hundreds of pages of his reports, there is no reference to him witnessing any violence.

‘Paul Gray’ claims that his lack of reported violence is because the SDS only provided advanced intelligence.¹²⁸ He says they did not provide reports on violence or disorder that they had *witnessed*, only on violence or disorder that they were *expecting*.¹²⁹ That is a very convenient explanation for a total lack of such evidence. It is simply a lie.

It is clear that SDS officers *did* give retrospective intelligence about public order events. We can see that from officers who did witness such events.¹³⁰

It is also clear that despite his denials, ‘Paul Gray’ *did* give retrospective intelligence. From a policing perspective it is common sense. It would be valuable intelligence if targets were actually involved in violence or disorder. The difficulty that ‘Paul Gray’ faces, is that his retrospective reports show no violence or disorder at all.¹³¹ One report shows a single arrest for nothing more than obstructing a police officer.¹³²

There are no reports of violence witnessed, nor of any expected violence either.

His allegations are post event attempts at justification. ‘Gray’ is “*extremely angry*”¹³³ that there has been

disclosure of how the SDS operated, and that this has led to this Inquiry.¹³⁴

He says that his time undercover had no impact whatsoever on his “welfare”¹³⁵ but that answering questions for this Inquiry *is* impacting on his welfare.¹³⁶ That is because he now has to justify the fact that, in reality, he busied himself with pointless and personally intrusive reporting.

In one report on a member of the *Socialist Workers Party* he spent two whole paragraphs detailing private sexual behaviour.¹³⁷ Another is solely dedicated to reporting on a member who was employed as a Tax Officer and, and as he notes, was “believed to be a homosexual”.¹³⁸

For someone so interested on reporting the sexual relationships of others, he is surprisingly silent on the sexual relationships that his fellow officers had with activists. He was in the Special Demonstration Squad with ‘Vince Miller,’ ‘Mike Hartley,’ ‘Alan Bond’ and ‘Phil Cooper.’¹³⁹ He emphatically denies any knowledge of their sexual activity¹⁴⁰ and maintains that the conduct of his contemporaries was “*exemplary*”.¹⁴¹

One of the features of this phase is the number of reports on school children.¹⁴² ‘Gray’ reported on more children than any other officer.¹⁴³ Recording the minutiae of their lives and sending them on to MI5. Almost all of these reports have photographs of the children attached. He reports on a 15 year old school-girl,¹⁴⁴ 15 and 13 year old school-girls and their parents.¹⁴⁵ In two separate reports he describes the photographed school-boys as “*effeminate*”.¹⁴⁶ In one report he comments on how much time a school-boy spends at his girlfriend’s house.¹⁴⁷

The closest ‘Gray’ ever comes to reporting on violence is his note that a school-boy had a fight with his brother.¹⁴⁸

These children were either the children of *Socialist Workers Party* members or children who were engaged enough with their society to be part of the *School Kids Against the Nazis*.

And to justify this he reverts to type and suggests that these children were either subversive¹⁴⁹ or violent.¹⁵⁰ On behalf of Lindsey German and John Rees, who were well aware of the actual activities of *School Kids Against the Nazis*, we dispute that entirely.

In the course of ‘Paul Gray’s’ deployment, *Column 88* were threatening to burn down the homes of SWP members.¹⁵¹ The National Front were attacking Bengalis in Brick Lane, smashing up reggae record shops and graffitiing mosques.¹⁵² They were burning down Indian restaurants¹⁵³ and murdering young men like Altab Ali and Ishaque Ali in Whitechapel and Hack-

ney.¹⁵⁴ Whilst they were doing that, Gray and his so called “*exemplary*” SDS colleagues were writing about what *they refer* to as “*jewish*” finance of the *Anti-Nazi League*,¹⁵⁵ a “*negress*” activist,¹⁵⁶ an activist with a “*large jewish nose*”¹⁵⁷ and “*coloured hooligans*”.¹⁵⁸ Language and views that are beneath contempt.

Instead of investigating the racist firebombing that killed 13 young black people in New Cross,¹⁵⁹ the Special Demonstration Squad were reporting on school children and providing MI5 with copies of *Socialist Workers Party* baby-sitting rotas.¹⁶⁰

The question of Government and Cabinet Knowledge:

Several of the Phase 2 officers refer to visits to the SDS safe-house by the Commissioner of the Met Police. One refers to congratulatory messages straight from 10 Downing Street.¹⁶¹ Another, who himself went on to become a Detective Chief Inspector, was told “*that the continuation of the unit was one of the first decisions that a new Home Secretary had to make*”.¹⁶²

That anecdotal evidence is supported by the 1976 authorisation for the Special Demonstration Squad’s continued existence.¹⁶³ It was signed off by Robert Armstrong, later Baron Armstrong of Ilminster. He was Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Home Civil Service. Between 1970 and 1975 he had been the Principal Private Secretary to two Prime Ministers, both Ted Heath and Harold Wilson. It is difficult to imagine a more highly placed Civil servant.

In the statement provided to Phase 2 of the Inquiry by ‘Witness Z,’ the Security Services themselves confirmed that “*the pressure to investigate these organisations often came from the Prime Minister and Whitehall*”.¹⁶⁴

So there can be no doubt now that the existence and functioning of the SDS was known of, and authorised, at the very top.

It is interesting that every annual application for funding refers to the officers fully recognising “the political sensitivity”¹⁶⁵ of the unit’s existence; accompanied by assurances that all necessary steps have been taken to ensure security.

Authorisation is only ever granted “*in view of the assurances [given] about security*”.¹⁶⁶ In other words, as long as you can promise us we will not get caught, you can carry on.

This fixation on security is important. First, successive Governments were well aware of the need to keep the extent to which they were spying on law-abiding civilians, absolutely secret.

Secondly Governments were repeatedly told that a significant part of this “security” effort involved the creation of water-tight cover stories and false identities.¹⁶⁷ From at least 1975 every officer is clear that the use of a dead child’s identity was the only authorised way to create a viable back-story. There is no realistic way that Government could not have known that this method had been comprehensively adopted.

The conclusion of that aspect of this Inquiry must be that the Government endorsed the use of deceased children’s identities, and that the Metropolitan Police used them specifically to ensure that Government was protected. That is a damning enough conclusion in itself.

But the inevitable consequence from that is critical. The Metropolitan Police were protecting the Government from, what they referred to in the 1977 Annual Report, as “*embarrassment*”.¹⁶⁸ There is nothing embarrassing, for a Government, about spying to prevent crime. But the de-stabilising of democratic movements, the wholesale and widespread intrusion on law-abiding

civilians, and their exploitation for political advantage. That is worth keeping secret.

This Inquiry has been set a challenge - to get to the truth. This means asking difficult questions, again and again... to uncover the truth.

Ordinary people have been involved in campaigns for a better society, for social equality, anti racism, anti-fascism, against apartheid and for trade union rights. The best of reasons, and the best of traditions. We hope the Inquiry is ready, willing and equipped to meet that challenge. The Inquiry must be fearless and unflinching in the pursuit of the truth. The people of this country expect nothing less.

[James Scobie QC | Garden Court Chambers](#)
[Piers Marquis | Doughty Street Chambers](#)
[Paul Heron | Public Interest Law Centre](#)

14th April 2021.

Section notes

- | | | | |
|----|--------------------------------|----|---|
| 1 | MPS-0724140 | 28 | MPS-0728755 |
| 2 | MPS 0724152 | 29 | MPS-0728761 |
| 3 | HN298 Statement paragraph 167. | 30 | MPS-0728732 |
| 4 | MPS-0728678 | 31 | MPS-0728736 20th of October 1975. |
| 5 | MPS-0728676 | 32 | MPS-0728762 |
| 6 | MPS-0728704 | 33 | UCPI0000009283 |
| 7 | UCPI0000012136 | 34 | MPS-0731417 |
| 8 | UCPI0000012122 | 35 | MPS-0728772 |
| 9 | MPS-0728701 | 36 | MPS-0728774 |
| 10 | MPS-0728205 | 37 | MPS-0728774 |
| 11 | MPS-0728938 | 38 | MPS-0728779 |
| 12 | UCPI0000012136 | 39 | MPS-0728776 |
| 13 | UCPI0000012136 | 40 | MPS-0728785 |
| 14 | MPS-0728205 and UCPI0000012135 | 41 | UCPI0000012332 and UCPI0000012328 |
| 15 | UCPI0000006936 | 42 | UCPI0000009684 |
| 16 | UCPI0000012737 | 43 | UCPI0000009733 |
| 17 | MPS-0728938 | 44 | UCPI0000009790 |
| 18 | MPS-0728710 | 45 | UCPI0000009790 |
| 19 | MPS-0728718 | 46 | UCPI0000009790 |
| 20 | MPS-0728721 | 47 | UCPI0000010704 |
| 21 | MPS-0728730 | 48 | UCPI0000010775 |
| 22 | MPS-0728667 | 49 | UCPI0000021388 |
| 23 | MPS-0728669 | 50 | UCPI0000012396, UCPI0000009748, UCPI0000009775,
UCPI0000009822, UCPI0000009818, UCPI0000010803,
UCPI0000010825. |
| 24 | MPS-0728675 | 51 | Closed Officer Gist paragraph 23. |
| 25 | MPS-0728697 | 52 | MPS-0732954 |
| 26 | MPS-0728753 | | |
| 27 | MPS-0728754 | | |

- 53 MPS-0724119
- 54 Closed officer Gist paragraph 23 and HN304 statement paragraph 146 (a)
- 55 HN304 paragraph 146 *“joke remarks were occasionally made in SDS meetings which I took at face value and believed to be based on truth. I assumed that the women involved were activists, but cannot say whether this was the case or not. My supervising officers would have been aware of these remarks because they were present at the meetings when they were made.”*
- 56 HN304 paragraph 146 (a) and 146 (b).
- 57 MPS-0742190
- 58 UCPI0000013376
- 59 HN96 statement paragraph 200.
- 60 UCPI0000018080
- 61 HN96 statement paragraph 206.
- 62 HN96 statement paragraph 201.
- 63 UCPI0000018365
- 64 UCPI0000018080
- 65 HN96 paragraph 96 and UCPI0000018381
- 66 UCPI0000027021 and UCPI0000010908
- 67 UCPI0000027519 and Chairman’s ruling 40, paragraph 4.
- 68 Statement of Brian Lockie paragraph 7. Statement of David Reid paragraph 7.
- 69 UCPI0000007328
- 70 UCPI0000009608
- 71 UCPI0000012685
- 72 MPS-0730696
- 73 HN353 statement paragraph 36.
- 74 HN353 statement paragraph 66.
- 75 MPS-0730694
- 76 UCPI0000010685
- 77 UCPI0000010777
- 78 UCPI0000008235
- 79 UCPI0000010744
- 80 UCPI0000017698
- 81 UCPI0000016921
- 82 UCPI0000011981
- 83 UCPI0000012014 (and his statement at paragraph 45).
- 84 UCPI0000011996
- 85 UCPI0000013021
- 86 UCPI0000013229
- 87 UCPI0000013688
- 88 UCPI0000015441
- 89 UCPI0000011354
- 90 UCPI0000013123
- 91 UCPI0000013111
- 92 UCPI0000013536
- 93 UCPI0000013949
- 94 UCPI0000013135
- 95 UCPI0000011497, UCPI0000011412, UCPI0000013006
- 96 UCPI0000013135
- 97 UCPI0000012960
- 98 HN126 statement paragraph 167
- 99 HN126 statement paragraph 240.
- 100 Along with any full-time Organiser, if the District had such a position.
- 101 UCPI0000013435
- 102 UCPI0000013385
- 103 HN126 statement paragraph 174
- 104 UCPI0000015183
- 105 UCPI0000013156, UCPI0000013227, UCPI0000021245, UCPI0000016795,
- 106 UCPI0000017609
- 107 UCPI0000017789, UCPI0000012378, UCPI0000012378
- 108 UCPI0000021640
- 109 UCPI0000015384
- 110 MPS-0728739
- 111 UCPI0000013100, UCPI0000015005
- 112 UCPI0000015005
- 113 UCPI0000013171
- 114 UCPI0000021635, UCPI0000021636, UCPI0000011379, UCPI0000015483
- 115 UCPI0000018061 and UCPI0000016202
- 116 See for example HN351 re: individuals applying for or gaining employment at HM Customs or Royal Mail. “I can only comment that Special Branch would have been interested in employment that was taken up by IS members because they may have created problems within their workplaces by arranging strikes and the like”.
- 117 MPS-0739241
- 118 UCPI0000029219
- 119 HN304 statement paragraph 55.
- 120 HN96 statement paragraph 174.
- 121 HN96 statement paragraph 175.
- 122 HN96 statement paragraph 175.
- 123 HN96 statement paragraph 177.
- 124 “Squadists” – in ‘Mike James’ own words – “...small groups breaking away from the main body at demonstrations and violently confronting the ‘enemy.’” UCPI0000018238
- 125 UCPI0000018238.
- 126 1968. HN126 statement paragraphs 242 to 243.
- 127 HN126 statement paragraph 245.
- 128 HN126 statement paragraph 245.
- 129 HN126 statement paragraph 246.
- 130 For example see Closed Gist officers paragraph 35.
- 131 UCPI0000015467
- 132 UCPI0000012951.
- 133 HN126 statement paragraph 322
- 134 HN126 statement paragraph 323
- 135 HN126 statement paragraph 315
- 136 HN126 statement paragraphs 315, 324,
- 137 UCPI0000015536
- 138 UCPI0000015603
- 139 HN126 statement paragraph 298
- 140 HN126 statement paragraph 301
- 141 HN126 statement paragraph 324
- 142 See for example: UCPI0000021558, UCPI0000009576 and UCPI0000009734.
- 143 UCPI0000011275, UCPI0000011361, UCPI0000011406, UCPI0000021266, UCPI0000021267, UCPI0000013607, UCPI0000021004, UCPI0000021011, UCPI0000017113, UCPI0000017991,
- 144 UCPI0000017113
- 145 UCPI0000018230
- 146 UCPI0000021266, UCPI0000021267,
- 147 UCPI0000013607
- 148 UCPI0000021004
- 149 Simply because they were associated with the SWP and/or had a Special Branch file see HN126 paragraph 154.

- 150 HN126 statement paragraphs 207,
151 UCPI0000011244
152 UCPI0000011814
153 UCPI0000010947
154 UCPI0000011380
155 UCPI0000011970
156 UCPI0000010659
157 UCPI0000021776
158 MPS-0733369
159 UCPI0000016467
160 UCPI0000012021 and UCPI0000012025
161 Closed Officer Gist paragraph 37
162 HN354 statement paragraph 175.
163 MPS-0730742
164 UCPI0000034308, Paragraph 56
165 See for example MPS-0728980 paragraph 14 and MPS-
0728985 paragraph 7
166 MPS-0730718
167 Examples:
1979: MPS-0728963 paragraph 7: *“careful attention is paid to establishing the background of officers...”*,
1980: MPS-0728962 paragraph 10: *“Supervisory staff place great emphasis on the need to ensure that an officer’s cover is as secure as possible before he enters the “field”. Subsequently, operational officers have to devote a considerable amount of time to their cover backgrounds, as the groups to which they belong become increasingly security conscious.”*
1981: MPS-0728985: paragraph 7: *“Careful attention is paid to ensuring that every operational officer’s cover is as secure as possible before he enters the field”.*
1982: MPS-0730904: paragraph 8: *“Each new operational officer is carefully selected, thoroughly schooled in a “cover story” [redaction for one line] provided with appropriate documentation to substantiate his “new” existence.”*
168 MPS-0728981 paragraph 10



Opening Statement in Tranche 1 Phase 3

on behalf of Lindsey German

Delivered to the Inquiry on: 10/05/2022

Introduction

We represent three core-participants in Tranche 1 of this Inquiry.

We addressed the key issues on behalf of Richard Chesum and “Mary” in our Phase 2 opening statement.¹

In this statement our focus is on Lindsey German, who was a member of the Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) from 1972 and had roles on the Central Committee of that Party for more than thirty years.

We will demonstrate

- 1: That there was no justification for the infiltrations of the Troops Out Movement and the Socialist Workers’ Party, on the grounds of preventing public disorder.
- 2: That there was no policing justification at all. The true purpose of these infiltrations was political and economic.
- 3: That neither of those purposes were legally justified and Government knew that to be the case.
- 4: That Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) intelligence was used to blacklist law-abiding members of the public.

We have a limited time available to us, and so we ask listeners to consider this opening statement alongside the written published version, which is more detailed and fully referenced. Where we refer to the unlawfulness of police activity, we endorse the legal framework provided on behalf of the Category H core-participants.

Purpose of the SDS – Justification

The SDS was created to specifically deal with the potential public order threat of a single demonstration in 1968. Its role was to provide uniformed police with intelligence pertinent to their policing of that demonstration. It should have ended there.²

It quickly became an intelligence trawl of left-wing political groups, growing ever more indiscriminate and ever more intrusive.

Increasingly, the Squad’s focus shifted away from anything that could genuinely be described as police work. Suggestions that the SDS were involved in ‘law and order’ are not borne out by the reports that they generated. References to “disorder” became standardised, annually regurgitated in the SDS reports. It was part of a paper-trail pretence to justify Home Office funding and authorisation.

Even though, in Chief Inspector Craft’s words, the SDS Annual reports were an exercise in “*pointing up the value of the SDS in terms of public order*”³ the references to disorder in those reports were ever decreasing⁴ and increasingly contrived.

The 1975 Annual SDS report, made so little reference to disorder,⁵ that Commander Rodger of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch commissioned “a complete review of the [SDS]... its activities and objectives”⁶ Rodger noted that “over the past seven years [disorder at demonstrations] has dwindled considerably”. The response to the review came from the Chief Superintendent of the SDS, Rollo Watts. Watts accepted the decline⁷ but nevertheless attempted to justify the continuation of the SDS.⁸ He argued that the decline in disorder had been matched by a reduction in the number of undercover officers, from twenty-six down to twelve.⁹ That was not true. There had been no reduction in the number of officers¹⁰ at all. The number had remained consistent, but the lengths of the deployments had increased.

At the same time that public disorder was decreasing, the recipients of SDS intelligence (or “customers” as D.I. Angus McIntosh called them)¹¹ were changing.

At the outset, SDS intelligence was destined for uniformed officers, so that they could arguably be better equipped to deal with disorder.¹² Even there, as Detective Sergeant Roy Creamer put it, whilst the SDS “were looking for information, there was simply nothing to tell of; it was a case of ‘no news is good news’.”¹³

As time went on, the intelligence was increasingly sent elsewhere, to “customers” with little or no involvement in public order issues; other Special Branch departments, MI5, other (generally unnamed) Government Departments,¹⁴ “external agencies”¹⁵ or “liaison partners”.¹⁶ Those “customers”

also specifically tasked the SDS,¹⁷ i.e. told them what to get and where to get it.

By the end of the 1970s, the SDS management were having regular face to face meetings with MI5,¹⁸ including over games of sport (that are redacted for some reason).¹⁹ They were also having monthly meetings over lunch, with the Home Office²⁰ (although the name and specific role of the Home Office representative in question, appear to have been forgotten). Other (un-named) government bodies were not liaised with directly. It was considered more appropriate to keep them at “arm’s length”.²¹

By April 1980 SDS and MI5 were meeting for “drinks” every fortnight.²² By August 1980 meetings were described as “routine”.²³

At the same time, the volume of reports increased exponentially, from 200 information reports in 1969,²⁴ to almost ten thousand by November 1971,²⁵ with “thousands being produced on an annual basis” thereafter.²⁶

In all of this reporting, there is a remarkable lack of reports on public order issues. The explanation offered for this by the SDS, is that the Metropolitan Police have destroyed or lost their material, and the documents that we are able to examine were sourced from MI5.²⁷ It follows, they say, that the reports we can see, are bound to give a skewed impression, because Special Branch did not send their public order reports to MI5.

That is a very convenient, risible, explanation. And it does not fit with the evidence. As public disorder was declining, liaison with other “agencies” was increasing, along with the number of reports generated. Certainly by 1976 “*Most of the information obtained by the SDS ultimately went to the Security Service*”.²⁸

In relation to Lindsey German and Richard Chessum, the SDS were doing nothing in relation to policing at all.

They did not report on law and order.

They had no regard to the law at all.

They were political and economic police, with echoes of the STASI.

The Socialist Workers' Party - Policing the National Front

First we are going to look at the fallacy of a public order justification.

Lindsey German was a member of the Central Committee of the SWP for more than 30 years.

During that time the Party was by far the most infiltrated organisation by the SDS. There were at least twenty-four SDS officers that infiltrated them.²⁹ Many of those, we now know, took positions of responsibility of some sort at branch, district or national level.³⁰

They formed relationships with members that lasted for years, tricked them into friendships and sexual relationships.³¹ They entered their homes, betrayed their trust and exploited them for intelligence purposes. We can see the intelligence that they gained in the reports. They reported on, and disseminated, the details of thousands of members; their personal lives,³² physical appearances,³³ homes,³⁴ children,³⁵ finances,³⁶ jobs,³⁷ holiday plans,³⁸ weddings,³⁹ sexuality,⁴⁰ paternity,⁴¹ relationship statuses,⁴² intelligence level,⁴³ trade union affiliations,⁴⁴ health,⁴⁵ childcare arrangements,⁴⁶ vehicles,⁴⁷ studies,⁴⁸ and opinions. There is a striking lack of reports on criminality, public disorder or violence.

Even in the Annual Reports, where the SDS desperately tried to justify their continued existence, it is difficult to find a rationale.

The Right to Work Campaign, and its annual march to the Conservative Party conference was an important, and high-profile demonstration supported by the SWP and endorsed by hundreds of trade unions.

In the 1980 SDS Annual Report,⁴⁹ the SDS attempt to claim credit for the suggestion that “small ‘events’” on the route of that march “[were] frustrated by advance information” because the Right to Work Campaign was “so effectively penetrated by the SDS”. In fact, their own internal report⁵⁰ had always indicated that the march itself was ‘not seen as a great threat to public order’. In another internal report the SDS attributed the lack of disorder on the march to the presence of “local and national media”.⁵¹ The SDS infiltration had no impact whatsoever on disorder on that march. But they presented a different picture to the Home Office. Whether that was for their own benefit (to secure funding) or the Home Office’s (to have a policing related explanation to hand, should they ever need one) is not entirely clear.

The SDS also attempt to claim credit for the lack of disorder at the culminating demonstration. Inevitably, there is no reference to the discussions that Lindsey German herself had with the infiltrating officer, (HN80) ‘Colin Clark’, about “taking steps to ensure that no one did get arrested... to ensure the safety of everyone through good stewarding”.⁵² Equally, there is no reference at all to the fact that the SWP took great care in stewarding their events,⁵³ and that ‘Clark’ himself was an SWP steward at their National Conferences.⁵⁴

The 1981 SDS Annual Report,⁵⁵ makes references to “pickets, occupations and marches as protests against unemployment and cuts in public expenditure” and the ‘anti-Tory’ demonstration at the march’s culmination. But it makes no reference to any disorder.

Previous Right to Work Campaign marches did not even feature in the Annual Reports. The only references to genuine disorder were in respect of processions organised by the National Front.

In terms of justification there were clearly better methods of policing that kind of disorder.

1. The infiltration of the SWP does not appear to have generated any intelligence of use. In the thousands of pages of reporting on SWP activity, there is a distinct lack of anything that actually concerns public order. Some officers have been open about the fact that their reporting showed no risk.⁵⁶ There is nothing that could not have been sourced using lawful methods of policing.⁵⁷
2. Any confrontations stemmed from documented, historically confirmed, attacks by the far right on minorities and leftists⁵⁸⁻⁶⁰. We highlighted some of the murders, beatings, arsons and threats in our last statement to the Inquiry.⁶¹ In her statement, Lindsey German highlights that in the six years between 1975 and 1981, fifty-one black and Asian people were killed in suspected racist murders.⁶²

One method of preventing disorder, would have been removing the root of the risk. Police resources would have been better spent preventing and solving real politically motivated crime. There were repeated calls, by the SWP and others, for the police to do exactly that.⁶³

But they did not. In the 1979 Special Branch Annual Report⁶⁴ reference is made to the murder, in May 1978, of Altab Ali. The language used by the police to describe that murder, is illuminating. They said: *“This death, although not attributable to any racist attack, was nevertheless used by the extreme left to influence an already deteriorating situation in the Bengali community”*.⁶⁵

Those words were written over a year after Altab Ali’s murder. At the time that they were written, there was no doubt whatsoever that the murder was racially motivated. One of the suspects had told the police *“If we saw a Paki we used to have a go at them...I’ve beaten up Pakis on at least five occasions.”*

In September of 1978, Altab Ali’s former employer, the secretary of the Brick Lane mosque, had published a report. It was called “Blood on the Streets”. It detailed the number of racist attacks on the community in Brick Lane in just

the first four months of 1978. There were thirty-three. It listed hammer attacks, stabbings, punctured lungs, slashed faces, airgun shot wounds, people beaten with bricks and sticks and knocked unconscious in broad daylight.⁶⁶

But the police denied racial motivation, even when it had been confessed. They then suggested that the terror in local communities was somehow the fault of left-wing activists.

3. If there is going to be infiltration, why were the National Front not infiltrated? There has been a suggestion that Special Branch already had “excellent sources in the far right”.⁶⁷ They clearly did not. Any sources that they did have were not doing a very good job of preventing the almost daily disorder and violence that the National Front and their ilk were perpetrating on London’s streets.

Certainly in 1975, the SDS knew, that *“Most of the public order problems were concerned with the activities of the National Front”*.⁶⁸ Special Branch knew that National Front members were responsible for *“several brutal attacks on members of ethnic minorities”* and they knew that this brutality heightened opposition to them.⁶⁹ SDS officers experienced the National Front violence themselves, although we rarely see it reported. The recent evidence of HN21⁷⁰ emphasis the point. He said *“You would be selling the papers and then suddenly from out of the blue some National Front or National Party people would turn up and try and have a go at you... Physically... I had a fight with someone who was trying to attack me... they were quite big and you know some of us were puny creatures. So, it wasn’t in our interests to confront them physically... From the SWP side, it was mostly shouting. From the Far Right thing, it was mostly physical violence”*.

But there was no infiltration.⁷¹ D.I. Angus McIntosh (HN244) recalls that there was a *“high level policy decision”* not to infiltrate the far right.⁷² A policy decision is the only explanation that makes sense. What was that policy?

Far right demonstrations were deliberately provocative of violence by their very nature. They targeted minority areas with as large a show of force as they could muster; the same minority areas they were targeting with extreme levels of politically motivated violence.

There is no justification for the violations of individual rights perpetrated by the SDS. But at least if they were infiltrating a political organisation as criminally violent as the National Front, they might have an argument that their work was in some way connected to policing.

4. Listening to the communities themselves. They were frightened. As well they might be. The National Front was an avowedly Nazi party.⁷³ The people of Southall, Lewisham and Wood Green, did not want their community cohesion fractured by fascist demonstrations. They called for bans, or at least re-location. They were ignored.

The SDS Annual Reports of 1981 and 1982 note that confrontations with the far right did not happen in those years. On both occasions the SDS put that down to the Commissioner banning National Front processions, because they were deliberately provocative of disorder and violence.⁷⁴ They always had been. The National Front marches in Southall, Lewisham and Wood Green were all deliberately provocative of disorder and violence. Surely, Special Branch's "excellent sources" could have pointed out the inherently obvious. If police had listened to the communities they were supposed to be serving, the disorder at Southall and Lewisham would never have happened. Instead, they are used as excuses for the wholesale infiltration of the SWP.

5. The Metropolitan Police themselves, contributed to or caused public disorder at demonstrations. The only SDS report on the Lewisham disorder was retrospective, and highly critical of policing methods.⁷⁵ At Southall, the National Council of Civil Liberties were also highly critical of policing methods.⁷⁶ One undercover officer, HN41⁷⁷ was warned off attending the Southall demonstration by his managers. His explanation for this warning was that "the uniform police were going to clamp down on the demonstrations" and the "dangers" would be "more than normal".⁷⁸ The pre-planned, dangerous "clamp down" would explain the account of, former SWP member, Joan Rudder.⁷⁹ She had been helping injured demonstrators when she was ordered out of a house and made to run a gauntlet of police officers, who beat her until her head split open.

At Red Lion Square, Lindsey German witnessed police officers throwing demonstrators over railings onto an underpass.⁸⁰

At both Southall and Red Lion Square, police actions caused the deaths of demonstrators.

The *World in Action* documentary of the Right to Work Campaign March in 1980⁸¹ demonstrates the issue. The marchers travelled the length of the country with a low-key police escort. The exchange between the marchers and that escort was good-natured and even jovial. The SDS report on this march, had listed the time and place of the arrival⁸² in London and made it clear that there were no public order concerns. But

when the march arrived in Southall, it was met by a legion of police.⁸³ They flanked the roads, in the same way that they had done, two years before, on the day they killed Blair Peach.

6. Finally, it was understood, that the police were doing nothing about far-right violence and disorder or were complicit in it. That was not paranoid or imagined. It is not just racist language evident in some of the reporting.⁸⁴ Or the widespread perception that the Police protected the National Front.⁸⁵ Or the massively disproportionate stops and searches of young black people. Or the subsequent findings of institutionalised racism in the police.

One of the most interesting documents to have been disclosed in this phase⁸⁶ deals with the Chief Superintendent of Special Branch directing two senior SDS officers (DI Riby Wilson and HN332) to meet with Lady Jane Birdwood⁸⁷ at her home in 1968. Lady Birdwood was described as "politically well-informed" and "well-known to Special Branch for her anti-communist views and activities". The SDS officers "thanked for her interest" and asked her to pass on any information that she "or her friends with similar interests" may have. Lady Birdwood and her "friends" were far-right activists, and well known as such at the time. She was a racist and an antisemite. She became periodically associated with the National Front, the British Movement and the British National Party,⁸⁸ stood as a far-right candidate in three elections⁸⁹ and was later convicted for multiple offences of inciting racial hatred. Why infiltrate the far right if you can have tea with your "excellent sources" on their "lawn"?

It is apparent that nothing was done about the far-right violence. It was almost as if there was a reason for not doing anything. A divided society is useful to the establishment,⁹⁰ even at the expense of public order. Historically, far-right movements prosper at times of economic crisis. Immigrants are blamed for unemployment and that is a distraction from the failing policies of Government.

What is never mentioned in the SDS Annual Reports is the SWP emphasis on positive methods of undermining fascists. Every day, local, activity to protect minorities and themselves. The organisation of estate residents to paint out NF graffiti, set up telephone links for mutual support and warnings against racist attacks,⁹¹ organising a protection rota to protect minority residents.⁹² And then, there is Rock Against Racism,⁹³ that the SWP had a crucial role in.⁹⁴ That did more to unite people and prevent disorder and violence on the streets than the SDS ever did. The joint leader of the National Front admitted that it had been effectively destroyed⁹⁵ by

the campaigns of the Anti-Nazi League, again contributed to by the SWP.

There was no anti-Government or anti-State disorder. There was nothing that could have been said to have been “violent subversion” or “revolutionary violence”.

Public Order Issues and the Troops Out Movement

We dealt with public disorder issues in respect of Richard Chessum and the Troops Out Movement in our last Opening Statement. Quite simply, there were none. The undercover officers and their management do not even pretend that there were any public order concerns.⁹⁶⁻⁷

Political and Economic Policing – The Real Rationale

So, what was the real rationale?

The SDS was a part of Special Branch; their roles and motivations are inseparable.

The role of Special Branch was reviewed in 1970, by what were called ‘Terms of Reference’, described as originating from the Home Office⁹⁸ and prepared “*in collaboration with the Security Service and other interested parties*”.⁹⁹

The ‘Function’¹⁰⁰ of the Special Branch was to gather intelligence, secretly and overtly, for two purposes. The first of those, was easily justifiable from a policing perspective, to assist in preserving public order; which was a police function. The second was assisting the Security Service, in two identified roles:

- a) in respect of espionage and sabotage, which again were clearly relatable to police functions as both are covered by the criminal law and
- b) more pertinently as far as this Inquiry is concerned, *from actions of persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State.*

The specific ‘Tasks’¹⁰¹ of the Branch included “*consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about subversive or potentially subversive organisations and individuals*”.

The ‘Terms’ were accompanied by an Annexe which clearly instructed senior officers that it was “*important that Special Branches should have a clear idea of what constitutes ‘persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State’*”.¹⁰²

However, they then failed to provide those senior officers and their Special Branches with any definitive idea of what “subversive” actually meant.¹⁰³

This may have been the source of some discomfort for Chief Constables,¹⁰⁴ because ill-defined MI5 lackey work is not what the police are supposed to be about. However, a good officer, conscious of the principles of policing, could interpret the ‘Terms’ consistently with Special Branch’s pre-existing responsibility, which was “*the prevention of crimes directed against the state*”.¹⁰⁵

That responsibility, preventing **crime**, was also enshrined in the legal definition of “subversion”, widely published, accepted and acknowledged from 1963, when Lord Denning had reported on the roles of MI5 and Special Branch after his Inquiry into the Profumo Affair.¹⁰⁶

‘[...] [subversives are those who] *would contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means.*’¹⁰⁷

That definition is clear. It speaks very obviously of the “overthrow” of the body appointed from those **elected** by the mandate of the people. And it poses no difficulty for a police officer because, from a policing perspective, what is “**unlawful**” and what it not, is defined by the Criminal Law.

Applying that definition to the ‘Terms’; police officers can still do their work professionally. They can collect and record information about criminal, or potentially criminal, organisations and individuals, or investigate criminal backgrounds to demonstrations or industrial disputes.¹⁰⁸ All of those activities had to be conducted within the limits on police powers imposed by the law.¹⁰⁹ What they cannot do is “*pry*” into political opinions and private conduct, because as Lord Denning said, that would be “*in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police*”.¹¹⁰

Unfortunately, because the ‘Terms’ were deliberately¹¹¹ opaque, officers were encouraged to be flexible in their interpretation of “subversion”. The Security Service certainly considered themselves to have an unfettered discretion to define it as they wished.¹¹²

And in 1972, MI5 unilaterally re-defined it.¹¹³

“Subversion” became “*activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means*”.

That definition is very different. It prioritises the well-being of the State, which, of course, is not democratically elected. It could arguably encompass any democratic movement, which seeks to amend

the basis of democracy or change the established order. But most importantly, from a policing perspective, it no longer makes reference to the *law*. “Violent means” are well covered by the criminal law. But political and industrial means are not.

Because the ‘Terms’ did not include a definition and were not adapted to compensate for the whims of the Security Service, the police were now encouraged to depart entirely from the basic principles that underpin policing. To covertly¹¹⁴ collect information about individuals who were simply *potentially* subversive.¹¹⁵ People who the police knew had no involvement, whatsoever, in any kind of unlawful conduct.

The Security Service have attempted to add some legitimacy to their unilateral re-definition, by referring to it as “*the Harris definition*”,¹¹⁶ “*formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich, Minister of State at the Home Office in a debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975*”.¹¹⁷ What they neglect to mention is that they had briefed Lord Harris with that definition in advance of that debate.¹¹⁸ His assertion that this definition was “*generally regarded*”¹¹⁹ as appropriate, actually means nothing more than “*This is how MI5 defines it*”. But MI5 cannot change the law. Having a Lord repeat a briefed definition in a debate, does not change the law.

In fact, Lord Harris had continued his speech, with an implicit endorsement of the Lord Denning definition “*It is fundamental to our democratic traditions that people should be free to join together to express and further their views, whatever others may think of those views, provided they do not break the law*”.¹²⁰ That re-iteration of fundamental policing principles has been comprehensively ignored.

The clear shift in the activity of the SDS, in terms of their “customers” and reporting, coincided with the introduction of the “MI5 definition” (read alongside the 1970 ‘Terms’) and then the selective false legitimacy of a Lord’s debate. Policing public order became policing the political, like Richard Chessum and the Troops Out Movement. And the political and industrial like Lindsey German and the Socialist Workers’ Party.

The Home Office and Security Service expanded police powers without democratic or electoral scrutiny and without any regard to the law.

It is worth noting that in the course of the Lord’s debate, four of the speaking Lords described themselves as subversive,¹²¹ forcefully pointing out that revolution need not be violent. Almost anybody could be described as “potentially subversive”.

The police could and did, “*pry*” into the political opinions and private conduct of law-abiding citizens,

doing away with our freedom of political thought, and association, of free assembly and expression. These were the “Secret Police” that Lord Denning spoke of.

This was the reason why Government was so terrified of the people finding out about the SDS.¹²² The correspondence that accompanies every SDS Annual report, emphasises the Home Office’s constant need for reassurance about “security”,¹²³ avoiding “embarrassment”,¹²⁴ and the “political sensitivity”¹²⁵ of their continued funding of this Stasi-like unit.

Government Knowledge

The Home Office documents provided in this phase of the Inquiry show the extent of their collusion with the Security Service; the hidden cogs of the state manoeuvring, the duplicity, the avoidance of accountability and the creation of a veil of plausible deniability. They encouraged the “considerable increase in the size and responsibilities of Special Branches in the 1970s”.¹²⁶ Special Branches that, working with MI5, were “more heavily involved in those aspects of their duties which are more *sensitive politically*”¹²⁷ i.e. spying on innocent people.

They were particularly concerned about criticism from within Parliament and from investigative journalists;¹²⁸ that Special Branches were “over-secretive and under accountable”, and “interest themselves in, and record the activities of, people who are merely undertaking proper political or industrial activity”.¹²⁹

It is interesting that the members of Parliament and journalists that they were concerned about, had no idea of what was really going on. The criticism and public outrage came from incidents such as police taking photographs of demonstrators,¹³⁰ or asking an arrested student to be an informant,¹³¹ or carrying out checks on Aeroflot passengers.¹³² This was nothing compared to what the Home Office were actually funding the SDS to do.

The Home Office’s first inclination in response to these legitimate concerns was to lie about it; saying “It may be possible to discount much of this criticism as either misguided or mischievous”.¹³³ While knowing that not only was it all true, but they were signing off secret authorities for SDS officers to do far, far worse. We ask the Inquiry to be conscious of this level of duplicity when engaging with Government about their authorisation of the SDS.

A number of senior police officers were distinctly unhappy about what they were being told to do. In 1974 Commander Gilbert was of the view that “... *for the most part work done [for MI5] had little or no relevance to SB’s proper charter and... tied up staff, of*

which he was chronically short... in totally unproductive activity".¹³⁴

Chief Constables raised concerns that MI5 sought more intelligence from Special Branches than they needed.¹³⁵ The work they were doing for MI5 was damaging police relations with the public.¹³⁶ Most importantly that the Chief Constables had no idea whether there was even Ministerial approval of, or authority for, the work that they had been doing on behalf of MI5¹³⁷ for the past ten years.¹³⁸ They knew that the 'Terms', the "MI5 definition" and the artifice of the 1975 Lords Debate did not constitute lawful authority in a democracy. And they knew that no Minister would be willing to formally put their name to this.

When the Home Office concede in internal documents that there is not *"a water-tight basis on which to justify the work of police officers in investigating and recording the activities of subversives"*,¹³⁹ what they mean is "It is not lawful". The Home Office knew that there was no justification. They asked themselves a question:

*"How can the work of police officers (which all members of Special Branches are) in investigating subversion, as currently defined, be justified given that the definition covers some activities which are not, as such, unlawful?"*¹⁴⁰

But they could not answer it. There was no legal justification.

And of course, they were only referring to what Special Branch was doing; the anti-democratic incursions of the SDS were far more invidious.

The Home Office attempted to retrospectively legitimise Special Branch activity by re-formulating the 'Terms',¹⁴¹ but they failed; ultimately the Security Service blocked any attempt to update or amend them.¹⁴²

A more honest and straightforward way of having police investigate the activities of political and industrial activists would have been to pinpoint the behaviour that Government was concerned about and attempt to legislate to criminalise it as appropriate. But, of course, that could never have happened; fundamentally because the activists were not doing anything wrong. Parliament and the people would not have stood for the criminalisation of their fundamental rights. So, the Government orchestrated the increased police powers, by guile and duplicity, unlawfully and anti-democratically. It is a sad irony that Government activity was far more proximate to Lord Denning's definition of "subversion" than any of the organisations that the SDS infiltrated.

In passing, to suggest that knowledge stopped at the Home Office and went no higher is beyond comprehension.

In our Phase 2 Opening Statement we stressed the links between SDS sign-offs and Ted Heath and Harold Wilson.¹⁴³ James Callaghan had been the Home Secretary who presided over the inception of the SDS in 1968. He had personal meetings with Conrad Dixon¹⁴⁴ and was well aware of the SDS remit. One of his last acts as Home Secretary in 1970 was to oversee the introduction of the Terms of Reference.¹⁴⁵ It is not credible to suggest that, when he was Prime Minister between 1976 and 1979, he did not check on the progress of his two creations. Equally it would be stretching credibility to suggest that Prime Ministerial knowledge ended in 1979 with Margaret Thatcher.

Undoubtedly, the civil servants wringing their hands about the illegality of Special Branch activity (such as Sir Robert Armstrong,¹⁴⁶ Sir James Waddell¹⁴⁷ RJ Andrew¹⁴⁸ and David Heaton¹⁴⁹) were the same civil servants signing off the funding for the SDS.¹⁵⁰ Firmly reminding the SDS managers of the need for security.

The Impact

The SWP was an open,¹⁵¹ democratic centralist,¹⁵² organisation that held predominantly open and publicised meetings.¹⁵³ It had an open membership,¹⁵⁴ and a democratically elected structure,¹⁵⁵ with positions of responsibility open to all members.¹⁵⁶ It published its aims, campaigns and political theories in an open way.¹⁵⁷ The Metropolitan Police even had subscriptions to the publications.¹⁵⁸

Those theories were socialist, and revolutionary. It is important to set the record straight in respect of a fundamental misconception: the Socialist Workers' Party were not arguing for any kind of "putsch against the state".¹⁵⁹ There was no talk of guillotines or bombing campaigns. The aims of revolutionary socialism are to transform society from within, re-addressing the balance of power away from the minority that holds it, to the majority that should. That process has to be democratic by definition.

They campaigned on issues such as sexual discrimination, racism, low-pay, unsafe working conditions, unemployment and poverty. All of which needed transforming. They focused on building a mass movement and broad-based campaigns¹⁶⁰ with the aim of helping to create a better society.¹⁶¹

Transforming society for the benefit of the majority by the majority should not be seen as a threat to the "safety of the well-being of the State". Using an open,

democratic organisation to try to create a broad-based democratic movement should not be seen as an attempt to “undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy”.

But, transforming society on the issues that the SWP were campaigning on, would ultimately have a detrimental impact on the establishment.

And that explains the timing of the 1972 MI5 re-definition of “subversion”.

1972 was the year of three major industrial disputes, Saltley Gate, the Dock Strike and the Building Workers’ Strike.¹⁶² All were designed to better the living conditions of the workers, all were examples of unified people power, all were successful and ultimately all impacted negatively on capitalism.

It also explains the obsessive focusing of the SDS on the personal details and employment of trade union affiliation of their targets, and the massive data trawl of leftists (rather than rightists) that the operation had become.

‘Colin Clark’ (HN80) and ‘Phil Cooper’ (HN155)

MI5 had had a long-standing interest in SDS officers rising up the hierarchy to the SWP Headquarters.¹⁶³ They made it clear to the SDS management that their “*ideal would be a permanent well-placed employee in... headquarters, not necessarily too high up in the organisation*”.¹⁶⁴

The SDS did **exactly** as they were told. ‘Colin Clark’¹⁶⁵ and ‘Phil Cooper’¹⁶⁶ both became the National Treasurers of the Right to Work Campaign and both were close to the Central Committee. In headquarters, but not too high up. The fact that they took those positions in direct succession to each other meant that for six years, between 1978 and 1983, MI5 had their “permanent” source, exactly where they wanted it.¹⁶⁷ This tasking was not a public order related tasking; that is why the SDS struggled, in their Annual reports,¹⁶⁸ to attribute any disorder to the Campaign.

In the words of the SDS themselves, the Campaign was “*an organisation to fight for the rights of Trades Unions, individuals and groups of workers, against the oppression of management and Government, in particular at this time of high unemployment and anti-union legislation*”.¹⁶⁹ The aim, again in the SDS’s own words, was for “*pressure [to] be brought to bear against management and... government, when fighting short time working, redundancies and unemployment, or demanding improved pay and/or conditions*”.¹⁷⁰

That description, given by the SDS, is an accurate assessment of the SWP engaging in militant trade

unionism. Militant trade unionism¹⁷¹ was an area that neither MI5 nor Special Branch were permitted to investigate. However, the infiltrations into the SWP, targeted as they were, were designed to do exactly that.

‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’s’ roles were different to those who had obtained positions of responsibility in the Troops Out Movement.¹⁷² ‘Rick Gibson’ (HN297)¹⁷³ and ‘Mike James’ (HN96)¹⁷⁴ had left that organisation de-stabilised and ineffective after their successive leaderships.¹⁷⁵

There is some evidence that ‘Cooper’ was deliberately creating discord within SWP headquarters;¹⁷⁶ and was doing so with the connivance of MI5 and SDS senior officers. But the Security Service disclosure is silent on the detail and of course the police do not know where their papers are.

Primarily, ‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’ took their positions to harvest intelligence on the SWP’s organisational structure, administration, finances and membership. That is what they did. They used their attendance at almost every National Delegate Conference and Annual Skegness Rally from 1977 to 1983 to speak to hundreds of members and gather personal details. They used their access to the Party Headquarters and computer system to steal the organisation’s data, and the data of its members.¹⁷⁷ As ordered by MI5.¹⁷⁸ ‘Cooper’ even ended up in complete control of the Right to Work Campaign bank account.¹⁷⁹

The scale and scope of the reporting, and the number of people with files opened on them, is astonishing.

Just by way of a few examples from a mass of reporting:

At the 1980 Annual Easter Rally,¹⁸⁰ at Skegness, the SDS listed over a thousand named attendees from across the UK.¹⁸¹ Their addresses, and in the majority of cases, their Special Branch file numbers, were noted alongside their names.

On a list of 198 named attendees at a peaceful Blair Peach demonstration,¹⁸² only seven were listed as having “no trace” on Special Branch files.

From the SWP’s National Delegate Conference in 1978,¹⁸³ just under 300 names were listed, alongside addresses, trade union membership and file references.

The report on the National Delegate Conference on 1978¹⁸⁴ is 171 pages long. It contains detailed analysis of administration and finance, breakdowns of branch by branch membership nationwide, an extensive list of unions that had SWP members,¹⁸⁵ and a full breakdown of educational institutions with SWP members.¹⁸⁶

The report on the 1982 Right to Work Campaign March¹⁸⁷ was more a detailed list of financial contributors than anything else, with pages and pages of photocopied cheques.

The SDS reported on people and sent their details to MI5 simply for buying copies of the *Socialist Worker* Newspaper.¹⁸⁸ On one occasion, that we know of, a 15 year old boy had his personal details recorded and sent to MI5 because he read the *Socialist Worker* and had been to anti-Nazi demonstrations.¹⁸⁹

‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’s’ reporting covers the same themes as other undercover officers. Their indexes contain more reports on personal details, such as the physical appearances and relationship statuses of female activists,¹⁹⁰⁻¹ than anything remotely disorder related.

But the real focus is on members’ employment details and trade union affiliations.¹⁹²

And that brings us to a topic that is of particular importance to Richard Chessum; but plainly impacts on the members of every leftist organisation that was infiltrated by these officers. Blacklisting, where the reports of these officers impacted on the financial well-being, security and prospects of targets and their families, wrecking countless lives.

Blacklisting and the Trade Unions

The evidence of the senior officers disclosed in this phase makes repeated reference to SDS reports being used for “vetting”,¹⁹³ which was an activity of both MI5 and Special Branches.¹⁹⁴ SDS officers had been answering specific MI5 requests for information on employment since, at least, co-incidentally, 1972.¹⁹⁵

There was a real danger of blacklisting for the SWP membership,¹⁹⁶ with individual members of the SWP losing their jobs for often spurious reasons.¹⁹⁷ At the same time there were reports that the Metropolitan Police often visited the office of the Economic League¹⁹⁸ with files about trade unionists.¹⁹⁹

Richard Chessum gave evidence²⁰⁰ as to how, despite his qualifications and decency, he was repeatedly refused employment.

The Inquiry disclosure in phase 3, gives a great deal of insight into the liaison between MI5 and Special Branch on the issue of vetting. An example is a fractious exchange of documents between the two²⁰¹ where MI5 set down a marker, that the passing of information to employers about their employees is the role of MI5, rather than that of Special Branch.²⁰² The document is clearly meant (and taken) as a rebuke. It clearly indicates that Special Branch had

been relaying employment intelligence to employers. The Special Branch response²⁰³ is phrased extremely carefully.²⁰⁴ It emphasises that there are rules to prevent them passing such information²⁰⁵ and that that provision of intelligence to employers is MI5’s job.²⁰⁶ However, it then goes on to state that it has its own contacts (predominantly former police officers) with the employers, and a “close and mutually profitable relationship” with them,²⁰⁷ before telling MI5 in no uncertain terms that “any measure tending to restrict or inhibit our enquiry work” is not acceptable to them.²⁰⁸ Stripping away the veil of plausible deniability that is a feature of most of these official documents; Special Branch says that there might be rules, but they have their ways of getting round them, and they are going to continue to do so.

This “enquiry work” between Special Branch and employers is also referred to on the face of the disclosed Home Office documents. In 1974 a number of MPs²⁰⁹ raised concerns in a meeting with the Home Secretary²¹⁰ about the relationship Special Branch had with employers and trade union management; in particular that Special Branch were passing on lists and photographs of those who attended demonstrations and meetings.²¹¹ Interestingly, the note of this meeting was passed on to Sir James Waddell²¹² who was responsible for reminding the SDS of the need for “security”. Waddell’s response, in a letter directly to the Home Secretary,²¹³ is illuminating. Unsurprisingly, it suggests reminding Special Branch of the need for “care and discretion”.²¹⁴ On the issue of whether, or not, Special Branch were passing intelligence to employers, he said this:

“We know ourselves that some employers plead to be given warning if known agitators seek or obtain employment with them. The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies²¹⁵ which might help. But when a Special Branch officer is himself seeking help from an employer, or from a trade union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in one way traffic”.²¹⁶

This is the “close and mutually profitable relationship”²¹⁷ between Special Branch and employers. The passing of intelligence gleaned from SDS operations, for the purpose of blacklisting.

These are the “customers” that so many SDS managers refer to in their statements.²¹⁸

The “employers” referred to include, not just Government Departments and the Civil Service²¹⁹ but also public corporations such as the Bank of England, the BBC, the British Council and, pertinently for Richard Chessum, the Post Office.²²⁰ Most importantly they also included ‘List X firms’,²²¹ which are private corpo-

rations, engaged in government security contracts. Of course, those firms were not only involved in government security contracts.²²² Once they had the lists of people who were concerned enough about their society as to demonstrate in order to change it, they could ensure that those people never worked again.

To give an idea of the scale, between 1970 and 1973, the top fifty firms²²³ that held government defence contracts were all household names. They covered all sectors and included, for example, British Leyland, Rolls Royce, Laird Group, British Steel, Shell, ICI, Weir Group and Standard Telephones.

We do not know how many ‘X Firms’ there were in total. But once those lists were passed on, there was nothing to stop them being passed on again, and again, amongst federations of employers. Lists that were continually updated by the SDS.

We raised these issues of blacklisting in our first opening statements. We are grateful to the Inquiry for sourcing and disclosing this material that puts SDS and Special Branch involvement in blacklisting beyond doubt.

These lists of demonstrators and meeting attendees were also passed to trade unions.²²⁴

It is important at this stage to put right another misconception. Trade Unions were not founded by people who routinely liaised with police officers to assist them in blacklisting their memberships. Trade Unions were founded by people like Eleanor Marx and Tom Mann.²²⁵ Both Marxists. The narrative that organisations like the SWP, “infiltrated” trade unions, as if they were a separate species, is false. It is terminology used by the SDS and the Home Office, (via Sir James Waddell)²²⁶ as part of their attempt to justify SDS infiltrations. This is the same Home Office, that when faced with MPs concerned about Special Branch infiltrations of unions, told them that there was none, directly or indirectly.²²⁷ That was an outright lie.

We ask that the Inquiry be very careful about adopting that narrative. If anything, the infiltrators were those that betrayed their rank and file by passing their names to employers.²²⁸

The police say there was no direct reporting on trade unions, any reporting was indirect, just a by-product. That is a bending of the truth.

Many trade unions supported the SWP campaigns, and when they did, they were reported on. Five hundred trade union branches sponsored the 1980 Right to Work march and the detail of that support was sent to Box 500 by the SDS.²²⁹

The same process was adopted on every part of the Right to Work Campaign.²³⁰ Many trade unionists joined the SWP and when they did they were

reported on.²³¹ Indeed, if a trade union subscribed to the Socialist Worker newspaper, it was reported on.²³²

These reports are littered with the trade union related intelligence²³³ that MI5 and the Home Office had been seeking since 1972.²³⁴

The bulk of reporting on the SWP membership is related to employment and industrial issues. But this was not to be used for “national security vetting” as the senior officers would try to have us believe. These reports were on probation officers and social workers,²³⁵ hospital workers,²³⁶ teachers,²³⁷ firemen,²³⁸ DHSS staff,²³⁹ workers at Ford and General Motors,²⁴⁰ bank staff,²⁴¹ caterers,²⁴² ambulance staff,²⁴³ British rail staff,²⁴⁴ post office staff,²⁴⁵ trades people.²⁴⁶ More often than not, these reports detailed nothing other than their name, employment, employer details, and trade union membership.

Special Branches were involved in blacklisting nationally. The ‘True Spies’ documentary²⁴⁷ deals with one example of Special Branch collusion with industry. The Ford Motor company made investment decisions on the basis of a “secret assurance... involving MI5 and Special Branch”. That deal meant that Ford would send lists of job applicants to Special Branch who would “strike a line” through names and return them.²⁴⁸ The deal was designed to prevent “strikes”. That is economic policing.

‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’s’ thousand strong lists of SWP members across the United Kingdom must have been incredibly useful. It is no surprise that ‘Clark’ was officially commended for his work.²⁴⁹ It is also no surprise that SDS Chief Inspector, Trevor Butler, considered the “True Spies” documentary to be “an earth-shattering breach of the “need to know” principle”.

In their Phase 1 opening statement, the Designated Lawyers assured the Inquiry that “SDS personnel were not involved in trade union blacklisting”.²⁵⁰ The evidence from Phase 3 demonstrates that the SDS did not ask and did not care what use their reports were put to.

It is clear that the SWP members were right to be afraid of being blacklisted. The answer to the problem that Government faced after the successful industrial action of 1972, was to find the workers who were prepared to stand up and take them out of the workforce.

Conclusion

The Home Office knew that the intentional vagueness of their ‘Terms’ and definitions had left officers “uncertain about the proper extent of their role.”²⁵¹ But they were not in any hurry to do anything about it.²⁵² Equally, MI5, bound as they were by their own

public²⁵³ terms of reference²⁵⁴ were doubtless happy to continue “using the SDS to gather information.”²⁵⁵

Barry Moss, who was both Chief Inspector and Superintendent of the SDS during the deployments of ‘Clark’ and ‘Cooper’ was certainly one of the officers who was uncertain about his role. His definition of subversion²⁵⁶ was so loose, that it is no wonder MI5 looked forward to “*mutually useful co-operation*” with him.

Nothing was ever done to dispel the uncertainty.²⁵⁷

As a result, the SDS continued to just “*hoover up everything*”,²⁵⁸ irrespective of the consequences for their targets. Their senior officers encouraged them to do so.²⁵⁹

Ironically, it was ‘Colin Clark’ himself who came closest to an accurate assessment of the SWP. He spent five years deployed at the heart of the organisa-

tion, with access to every detail of its aims and activities and was fully de-briefed by MI5 at the end of his deployment.²⁶⁰ He was not operating among subversives, “[The SWP] *were strongly opposed to government policy but were not seeking to subvert the institutions of the state.*”²⁶¹

None of these people posed any threat to the security of the nation. Roy Creamer had it right, all the way back at the beginning. “*Whilst we were looking for information, there was simply nothing to tell of... There were no hidden conspiracies anywhere and there was nothing hidden going on.*”²⁶²

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[Piers Marquis | Doughty Street Chambers](#)
[Paul Heron | Public Interest Law Centre](#)

25th April 2022.

Section notes

- 1 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf Pages 2 to 3.
- 2 MPS-0747215/3 Statement of Roy Creamer: “*I thought the SDS would pack up anyway [in 1969] because we had done our job with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign.*”
- 3 MPS-0747446 Statement of Geoff Craft paragraph 68
- 4 MPS-0730099/8: 1975 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Derek Kneale notes, at paragraph 31, that “*there has, over the past years, been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations*”
MPS-0728980: (April) 1976 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Geoff Craft (at paragraph 1) “*the threat of serious disorder resulting from major, organised gatherings has diminished.*”
- 5 MPS-0730099 1975 Annual Report: The only significant reference to disorder is in relation to National Front activities, which are dealt with in the section below.
- 6 MPS-0730658: February 1976 Commander Rodger (HN585) tasked Rollo Watts (HN1254), the Chief Superintendent of the SDS, to set up a study group to assist in the forthcoming request for funding from the Home Office. Watts was asked to undertake a “complete review of the Squad...its activities and objectives” because “over the past 7 years, however, this form of political activity by minority extremist groups has dwindled considerably and with the exception of Red Lion Square conflict in 1974 and possibly one or two other incidents of deliberate confrontation, upsurges in violence on the streets have become less and less frequent”.
- 7 MPS-0730745: Rollo Watt’s response (in March 1976) conceded that “Certainly, the degree of violence associated with public demonstrations has declined since the formation of the Squad in 1968.”
- 8 At MPS-0730745, Chief Superintendent Watts justifies the continued existence of the SDS, by saying that “the popularity of street demonstrations has increased [whilst at the same time conceding that they are not violent], so that public issues like abortion, unemployment, civil liberties etc. have brought very large numbers onto the streets”.
- 9 MPS-0730745: paragraph 2: “26 operational officers to the current 12”.
- 10 1968: DOC070 notes 12, mainly very short term operational officers: 1969: MPS-0728973/4: 10 operational officers, 1971: MPS-0728971/3: an increase since 1970 to (at most) 12 operational officers, 1972: MPS-0728970/3: 12 active officers, 1973: MPS-0728985/1: (at most) 12 operational officers, 1974: MPS-0730906/8: 12 operational officers, 1975: MPS-0730099/1: 12 operational officers).
- 11 MPS-0747578 at paragraph 128.
- 12 Roy Creamer is clear that at the time of his involvement in SDS (1968-69), intelligence reports would be sent to A8 i.e. uniformed branch (MPS-0747215/16 paragraph 39) and the Home Office (paragraph 43). They would only be sent to the Security Service “if important enough” (paragraph 43). David Smith: MPS-0747443 at paragraph 19, stated that SDS intelligence would go to A8 (uniformed police) and only to the Home Office and the Security Service “depending on the size of the event”.

- 13 MPS-0747215/10 at paragraph 19.
- 14 MPS-074758 paragraph 39
- 15 MPS-074758 paragraph 39.
- 16 MPS-0747658 Detective Chief Inspector Trevor Butler paragraph 42
- 17 MPS-0747578: Detective Inspector Angus McIntosh: As at paragraph 39: *As I understand it, decisions as to targeting and tasking were taken by other police departments and government departments... Tasking from external agencies, such as the Security Service of the Home Office would have come through senior Special Branch officers. Paragraph 52: "specific requests for intelligence were made by police, or other government bodies (such as the Security Service)".*
- 18 MPS-0747658: Paragraph 44: DCI Butler accepts that Security Service documents show that he attended meetings with MI5 "much more frequently" than he thought he had. Paragraph 46: *"The documents show that I had frequent meetings with the Security Service".*
- 19 MPS-0747658 paragraph 46
- 20 MPS-0747658 paragraph 49.
- 21 MPS-0747658 paragraph 50: *"I do not recall ever liaising with any other government body... As a general rule and given the covert nature of the unit, it was far more appropriate to deal with other organisations at arm's length through S squad, directly maintain only limited and discreet relationships with key individuals."*
- 22 UCPI0000028813 and UCPI0000028814
- 23 UCPI0000028816
- 24 MPS-0728973/3 SDS Annual Report 1969: sub-paragraph (d) "Over 200 information reports have been submitted, and over 1000 minor meetings attended, in addition to the coverage at major demonstrations"
- 25 See MPS-0735902 cross-referred with MPS-0747797 (Statement of Barry Moss) paragraph 17.
- 26 MPS-0747578 paragraph 191.
- 27 MPS-0747658/19: HN307: DI Trevor Butler: paragraph 68: *"The reporting the Inquiry has may appear to demonstrate a greater focus on counter-subversion but this is most likely attributable to these reports being retrieved in large part from the Security Service's archives. After SDS reports left the office they became the responsibility of S squad and we kept no copies, so I cannot comment on what happened to our public order reporting".*
- 28 DI McIntosh MPS-0747578 paragraph 205. See also for example: HN2152: MPS-0747155/14 paragraph 35: *"The Security Service were the main beneficiary of SDS reporting".*
- 29 In addition to the nine officers (listed in the footnote below) who were known, at this stage, to have taken positions of responsibility within the SWP: HN135 'Mike Ferguson', HN339 'Stewart Goodman', HN301 'Bob Stubbs', HN343 'John Clinton', HN353 'Gary Roberts', HN21, HN67 'Alan Bond', HN82 'Nicholas Green', HN33 'Kathryn Lesley "Lee" Bonser', HN95 'Stefan Wesolowski', HN90 'Mark Kerry', HN78 'Anthony Lewis', HN101, HN118 'Simon Wellings', HN304 'Graham Coates'.
- 30 'Mike James' (HN96) started his deployment in the *Socialist Workers Party* where he was elected to a position on the Hackney District Committee UCPI0000013376 'Colin Clark' (HN80) dealt with below. 'Phil Cooper' (HN155) dealt with below.
- 'Roger Harris' (HN200) Contacts Organiser for the Twickenham branch of the International Socialists (UCPI000007328), a branch which was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the Workers' League (UCPI000009608).
- Vincent Harvey, known as 'Vince Miller' (HN354) District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch
- 'Geoff Wallace' (HN296) the "Flame" organiser for the Socialist Workers Party (Hammersmith and Kensington branch) (UCPI0000017698) and a Socialist Workers Party Organiser (UCPI0000016921). He attended the London Regional Delegates conference and was one of three organisers of an Anti-Nazi League Carnival (UCPI0000011981).
- 'Jeff Slater' (HN351) Socialist Worker Newspaper Organiser for the North London District of the International Socialists (UCPI0000012014)
- 'Bill Biggs' (HN356) Branch Treasurer and Socialist Worker Organiser of South West London SWP (UCPI0000011996), chaired meetings (UCPI0000013021), a delegate to an aggregate meeting of the South East District where he voted on a proposal to condemn a Central Committee decision (UCPI0000013229), spoke as a Guest speaker at another branch's meeting (UCPI0000013688) and Branch Treasurer of the Brixton branch (UCPI0000015441)
- 'Paul Gray' (HN126) Socialist Worker Organiser for Cricklewood branch and then the North West District (UCPI0000011354). On the District Committee which had control over all of the branches the District covered (UCPI0000013123). Re-elected in 1979 and 1980 (UCPI0000013536 and UCPI0000013949). In his role as an SWP District Committee member, he was on the Organising Committee of the West Hampstead ANL (UCPI0000011497) and the North-West London ANL Co-ordinating Committee (UCPI0000013135)
- 31 HN155 "Phil Cooper": sexual relationships with "groupies". REF: Statement of Brian Lockie, paragraph 7 and Statement of David Reid, paragraph 7.
- HN354 Vincent Harvey, known as "Vince Miller". See statement and evidence of "Madeleine".
- 32 For example: UCPI0000011602, a report on an SWP member, her 10 year old "half caste" daughter, and the fact that there is no "male wage earner supporting them".
- 33 UCPI0000011140
- 34 UCPI0000017515
- 35 UCPI0000011874, UCPI0000010951,
- 36 For example: UCPI0000011210 SWP members plans to buy a house, UCPI0000011681 SWP member bank account details and UCPI0000011680 the bank account details of the wife of an SWP member.
- 37 UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000011532
- 38 For example: UCPI0000010968 an SWP member's holiday in Portugal, UCPI0000011452 an SWP member's trip to Italy.
- 39 UCPI0000011809
- 40 For example UCPI0000015431: 'gay' member of Brixton SWP and UCPI0000015145: SWP member who is an "avid reader of Gay News".
- 41 For example: UCPI0000010971 report questioning the paternity of an SWP member's two daughters.

- UCPI0000014174: RCT member “wishes to get pregnant again... not quite sure at the present as to who will sire this latest socialist offspring”.
- 42 For example: UCPI0000017523 detail of sexual relationship, UCPI0000013736: personal details of SWP “cartoonist” including his relationship status.
- 43 UCPI0000016205: SWP member “gives the impression of below average intelligence”.
- 44 See for example: UCPI0000011559: 11 SWP signatories to a leaflet supporting the Firemen’s strike. FBU, TGWU, ASLEF, NUT, UCATT.
- 45 For example: UCPI0000011924 a member’s nervous breakdown, UCPI0000021684, UCPI0000013873
- 46 UCPI0000012021 and UCPI0000012025
- 47 UCPI0000010968
- 48 For example: UCPI0000011972 An SWP member has started a short-hand typing course.
- 49 MPS-0728962/9 paragraph 19
- 50 UCPI0000014264/3 paragraph 9 signed off by DCI Moss.
- 51 UCPI0000014610, paragraph 21
- 52 UCPI0000034739 paragraph 216
- 53 UCPI0000014610/5 paragraph 25 “stewards to enforce council policy on discipline”.
- 54 UCPI0000013228.
- 55 MPS-0728995/9 paragraph 18
- 56 ‘Graham Coates’ (HN304) (MPS-0742282/44), Roy Creamer (HN3093) (MPS-0747215/39),
- 57 UCPI0000030069/1: It is also noteworthy that in 1973, a communication between MI5 and the SDS noted that there were “to some extent other [redacted] means available” for obtaining intelligence on the SWP.
- 58 Some of which were even the subject of SDS reports: Five coaches of NF attack coach of SWP (UCPI0000017776). Chingford SWP meeting attacked by NF (UCPI0000014208). Petrol bombing of SWP Centre and print-works (UCPI0000010957). See also Lindsey German’s statement UCPI0000034739/60 paragraph 159.
- 59 Vincent Harvey HN354 used NF confronting SWP paper sellers as a means of infiltrating the SWP, by offering to support the sellers: HN354 Transcript page 43.
- 60 The 1979 Annual Special Branch MPS-0727595, at page 126, noted that 20 NF youths armed with bottles and coshes had attacked an SWP meeting in Brixton. Four SWP members had been hospitalised. NF suspects in that incident had then attempted to burn down a resource centre used by left-wing activists.
- 61 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf Page 25. National Front attacks on Bengalis in Brick Lane, smashing up reggae record shops, graffitiing mosques (UCPI0000011814), burning down Indian restaurants (UCPI0000010947), the murders of Altab Ali and Ishaque Ali in Whitechapel and Hackney (UCPI0000011380), the firebombing that killed 13 young black people in New Cross (UCPI0000016467), Column 88’s threats to burn down the homes of SWP members (UCPI0000011244).
- 62 UCPI0000034739/13 paragraph 30.
- 63 See for example, SWP demonstration at Deptford Police station to call for police investigation into “the deaths of black youths in a house fire in Deptford” [presumably the New Cross fire] UCPI0000016486.
- 64 MPS-0727595 at page 85
- 65 <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-london-36191020>
- 66 <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/shine-a-light/remembering-altab-ali/>
- 67 Counsel to the Inquiry’s Opening Statement Tranche 1 Phase 2 paragraph 80, citing the 1976 SDS Annual Report.
- 68 MPS-0730099: 1975 Annual Report Para 22, authored by CI Craft.
- 69 Special Branch Annual Report 1978 MPS-0747791/3
- 70 Transcript of closed evidence: HN21
- 71 Other than by accident as an officer who had infiltrated the Workers Revolutionary Party was tasked by them to infiltrate the National Front. MPS-0730099/2 paragraph 4.
- 72 MPS-0747578/31 paragraph 92.
- 73 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/26.
- 74 MPS-0728985/9 paragraph 19 and MPS-0730904/14 paragraph 29
- 75 MPS-0732886 D.I. Willingdale’s report detailed a number of contrary potential improvements/advice including “police should be properly trained and equipped to deal with a riot situation... wedges and trudges are out of date and too many officers charge into demonstrators quite spontaneously and come to grief when isolated”, “Despite advance warning that trouble was likely in Lewisham High Street, groups of left-wing supporters and, more importantly, coloured youths were allowed to gather”, “There was an apparent lack of leadership and there seemed little police co-ordination”, “The National Front march was taken far too close to the main contingent of left-wing supporters”. To exemplify both the lack of police understanding of controlling public order and the institutionalised racism of the police, the report also called for a harsher police response and noted “Young blacks, the vast majority of whom have little time for the ultra-left, turned out at Lewisham with the sole intention of attacking the police. It must be realised that the hatred of these people for authority has no bounds and the most insignificant of incidents involving them could spark off major public disorder”.
- 76 See UCPI0000034739/38 Lindsey German’s statement at paragraph 94.
- 77 MPS-0748064/4 HN41 referred to aspects of the police planning at Southall as a “disastrous mistake”.
- 78 MPS-0748064/5
- 79 UCPI0000034746/7
- 80 ECPI0000034739/14 paragraph 32.
- 81 (UCPI) DOC071
- 82 UCPI0000014264/7
- 83 A further SDS report on the march UCPI0000014610/6 even concedes the point. At paragraph 30: *On entering London (Southall) the mood of the march altered, becoming far more militant. This can be accounted for by the fact that the marchers were faced with larger numbers of police than they had previously experienced*
- 84 As outlined in https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf as at page 26. “jewish” finance of the *Anti-Nazi League*, a “negress” activist¹⁵⁶, an activist with a “large jewish nose” and “coloured hooligans”.

- 85 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/14 paragraph 33.
 86 MPS-0738528
 87 "Widow of the late Lord Christopher Birdwood M.V.O."
 88 [https://web.archive.org/web/20041212032828](https://web.archive.org/web/20041212032828/http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/index.php?link=template&story=80)
 /[http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/index.php?](http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/index.php?link=template&story=80)
 link=template&story=80
 89 1983 Bermondsey by-election as an "Independent Patriot".
 Fulham in 1986 for the "England Demands Repatriation"
 Party. Dewsbury in the 1992 General election for the BNP.
 90 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/33 paragraph 78.
 91 UCPI0000016793
 92 UCPI0000012924
 93 "White Riot" [https://www.imdb.com/video/vi3773677849?](https://www.imdb.com/video/vi3773677849?playlistId=tt8351520&ref_=tt_pr_ov_vi)
 playlistId=tt8351520&ref_=tt_pr_ov_vi
 94 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/65 paragraphs 172 – 174.
 95 Witness statement of Peter Hain: UCPI0000034091:
 paragraph 208.
 96 [https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/2021](https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf)
 0414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf
 Pages 3 to 4.
 97 HN96: Transcript P173: Q: *did the Troops Out Movement*
*ever actively promote violence at demonstrations? A: Did I...
 did I...no, of course not. Of course not.*
 98 UCPI000004459/2 "Home Office 'Terms of Reference' for
 Special Branch April 1970"
 99 UCPI000004459/1
 100 UCPI000004459/2 *Special Branch is responsible for*
acquiring security intelligence, both secret and overt (a)
to assist the Chief Officer in the preservation of public order, (b)
as directed by the Chief Officer to assist the Security Service
in its task of defending the realm from attempts at
espionage and sabotage and from actions of persons and
organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the
security of the State.
 101 UCPI000004459/2 and UCPI000004459/3: Fourteen
 specified tasks including:
 (a) *To provide the Chief Officer with intelligence affecting*
public order; and, on behalf of the Chief Officer, the
Security Service with intelligence affecting national
security.
 (d) *In consultation with the Security Service to collect,*
*process and record information about **subversive** or*
***potentially subversive** organisations and individuals.*
 (e) *To investigate or to assist in investigating offences*
having as their purpose the achievement of a
subversive or political objective especially those relating
to sabotage and against the Official Secrets Act,
consulting the Security Service as necessary.
 (f) *To investigate any subversive background to*
demonstrations and breaches of public order and, in
consultation with the Security Service, to certain
industrial disputes.
 (k) *At Airports and Seaports to make arrests of wanted*
*criminals, to detect offences and to gather **security***
***and criminal intelligence** in collaboration with the*
Ports Office of the Metropolitan Special Branch.
 102 UCPI000004459/4 para. 3
 103 "**Broadly speaking** these are any organisation or individual
 whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the
 established democratic order" UCPI000004459/4 para. 3
 104 Particularly because the Terms of Reference placed
 responsibility for MI5 related work clearly onto the shoulders
 of those Chief Constables UCPI000004459/4 para.1
 105 See the 1967 "Responsibilities of Special Branch"
 UCPI0000030040/1 in which "the prevention of crimes
 directed against the State" was an explicit focus.
 106 <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16195994>
 107 As at paragraph 230.
 108 The authority of the Denning Report, in terms of the role of
 Special Branch is also acknowledged by the Designated
 lawyers, as at paragraph 3.3.2. of their first opening
 statement to the Inquiry. [https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/](https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/20201028-Opening_Statement-DL_Clients.pdf)
 uploads/2020/11/20201028-Opening_Statement-
 DL_Clients.pdf
 109 As set out in the Category H submissions and legal
 framework.
 110 The full context of Denning's definition of subversion is as
 follows: "*[Security Service operations] are not to be used so*
as to pry into any man's private conduct, or business affairs;
or even into his political opinions, except in so far as they
are subversive, that is, they would contemplate the
overthrow of the Government by unlawful means. This
principle was enunciated by Sir Findlater Stewart in his
report of 27th November 1945, paragraph 37, which formed
the guide for the Service ever since. It was re-stated by Sir
David Maxwell Fyfe in a directive of 24th September 1952,
and re-affirmed by every Home Secretary since. Most people
in this country would, I am sure, wholeheartedly support this
principle, for it would be intolerable to us to have anything in
the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police, to snoop into all
that we do, let alone our morals."
 111 "Broadly speaking" is clearly a deliberate attempt to create a
 lack of focus.
 112 As at Witness statement of "Witness Z"
 (UCPI0000034350/3) paragraph 11: *The Maxwell Fyfe*
Directive... There was... an absence of supporting
guidance and consequently the interpretation and application
of the wording... was a matter for the Director General [of
the Security Service].
 113 Statement of "Witness Z" UCPI0000034250/4 at
 paragraph 13.
 114 UCPI000004459/2
 115 UCPI000004459/2 at (d).
 116 UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 15.
 117 UCPI0000034350/4 at paragraph 14.
 118 [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements)
 26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-
 fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements reference:
 speech of Viscount Coleville of Culross just prior to 4:17 pm.
 "I should have been fascinated to have the [Security Service]
 briefing of the noble Lord [Harris]".
 119 UCPI0000034265/2
 120 [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements)
 66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAnd
 ExtremistElements reference: post 9:49 pm.
 121 [https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/](https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements)
 66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAnd
 ExtremistElements
 As at 4:37pm: Lord Shinwell "I am a subversive element... I
 want to change the face of society...".

- As pre-6:10pm: Lord Soper *"I am an extremist in the Socialist sense. I am for the abolition of the capitalist system, not by violent means, for I am a pacifist, but by democratic means."*
- As at 6:55pm: Lord Wigg: *"I am just as subversive today as I was then...I do not think that the capitalist system works.. If there are extremists and if there are subversive people, they are called that because they mean what they say and they work for a better society not only for themselves but for others. That is a noble ideal and I should be very glad to be both subversive and an extremist...."*
- Pre-8:12pm: Lord Brockway: *"I am far to the Left of Communists. They want one revolution; I want two revolutions. I want revolution in the West which will bring social justice, equality and socialism, and I want revolution in the East which will bring freedom of thought, freedom of expression, the right of dissent and personal human development... the changing of Western capitalist society, the utter transformation of it, to end the injustices and inequalities which now abound, is my purpose as much as it is the purpose of any Communist."*
- 122 See Opening Statement on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" Tranche 1 Phase 2 pages 26-28.
- 123 MPS-0730718
- 124 MPS-0728981 paragraph 10
- 125 MPS-0728980 paragraph 14 and MPS-0728985 paragraph 7
- 126 Letter and paper prepared by the Home Office on Special Branches UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 2.
- 127 UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 3.
- 128 UCPI0000004437/2 paragraph 5
- 129 UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 6
- 130 UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(ii) and (v)
- 131 UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7(i)
- 132 UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7 (iii)
- 133 UCPI0000004437/3 paragraph 7
- 134 UCPI00000030051/1 paragraph 4.
- 135 UCPI0000004719/1 paragraph 2
- 136 UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 8
- 137 UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 8(a)
- 138 The Home Office cover letter is dated October 1980, a full ten years after the introduction of the Special Branch Terms of Reference.
- 139 UCPI0000004437/7 paragraph 21.
- 140 UCPI0000004715/4 paragraph 11(a)
- 141 UCPI0000034701 (Draft Revision to the Terms of Reference for a Special Branch).
- 142 UCPI000004437/5 paragraph 14.
- 143 See Opening Statement on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" Tranche 1 Phase 2 page 26.
- 144 MPS-0747104 paragraph 61.
- 145 Callaghan was Home Secretary between 30th November 1967 and 19th June 1970. The Terms of Reference were sent to Chief Constables on the 15th of June 1970 (see UCPI0000004459/1).
- 146 Repeated references in UCPI0000004437
- 147 Signature on UCPI0000034700/4 and UCPI0000034699/4
- 148 Recipient of MI5 letter UCPI0000034697, UCPI0000004715/1 and UCPI0000004437/1
- 149 UCPI0000004715/5 and UCPI0000004437/1
- 150 Sir James Waddell (MPS-0728973/1, MPS-0728971, MPS-0728970/7, MPS-0730906)
Robert Armstrong (MPS-0730742, MPS-0730718)
David Heaton (MPS-073088, MPS-0728964, MPS-0728963, MPS-0731871)
RJ Andrew (MPS-0729963/2, MPS-0730689)
- 151 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/42 paragraph 103, HN 304 Transcript of evidence page 63
https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/20210507-ucpi-t1_p2-evidence_hearings-transcript-AM.pdf
- 152 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/43 paragraph 106
- 153 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/52 paragraph 135
- 154 Hence the number of undercover officers that infiltrated it.
- 155 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/44 paragraphs 111 to 114.
- 156 Hence the number of undercover officers that took key positions.
- 157 The *Socialist Worker*, *Socialist Review* and *International Socialism*. Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/84 paragraph 221
- 158 UCPI0000015521: The Metropolitan Police Support Headquarters were listed as being subscribers for five copies of *The Socialist Worker*.
- 159 UCPI0000034739/32 Lindsey German paragraph 74
- 160 As at, for example, UCPI0000034739/79.
- 161 UCPI0000034739/95.
- 162 Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/8 – 9. Paragraphs 17-21.
- 163 UCPI 0000030069/1 MI5 expressed an interest in March 1973, as to whether the SDS were planning on deploying officers into SWP Headquarters.
- 164 In November 1973. UCPI0000030049 paragraph 2.
- 165 MPS-0729027
- 166 UCPI Transcript 13 May 2021
- 167 UCPI0000028840 and UCPI0000027519: MI5 was kept updated in respect of 'Clark's' eventual withdrawal and 'Cooper's' succession of him.
- 168 See above.
- 169 UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7
- 170 UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 6
- 171 "Industrial militancy is defined as readiness to use or threaten the use of strikes, sit-ins and other forms of aggressive action in the furtherance of industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or accept compromise solutions through negotiations, conciliation or arbitration" UCPI000004545/2.
- 172 It is perhaps noteworthy that MI5 also had an interest in the Troops Out Movement, including passing on information from the SDS to their own [redacted] "liaison partners" UCPI0000028816/1 paragraph 2(b)
- 173 See Richard Chessum Opening Statement T1P2 pages 6 to 11 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf
- 174 See Richard Chessum Opening Statement T1P2 pages 14 to 15 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf
- 175 UCPI0000011895: the perception of TOM: "too many splits within that movement... too busy fighting amongst themselves to do any good work on the troops out issue".
- 176 A liaison document between MI5 and the SDS notes that 'Cooper' was "brewing a row" at SWP HQ shortly before his exfiltration UCPI0000028728.

- 177 UCPI0000027529 SDS (Butler) providing MI5 with “a whole series of photographs taken by one of their hairies inside SWP HQ”.
- 178 UCPI0000016862
- 179 UCPI0000018091 “for all practical purposes Philip Cooper... signs the cheques and controls the account”.
- 180 UCPI0000014551
- 181 Attendees with Special Branch file references from for example, Barnsley, Edinburgh, Merseyside, Portsmouth, Southampton, Birmingham, Salford, Sheffield, Gloucester.
- 182 UCPI0000013961
- 183 UCPI0000013228.
- 184 UCPI0000013228.
- 185 UCPI0000013228 pages 114 to 115. 42 unions listed.
- 186 UCPI0000013228 pages 132 to 133. 64 universities and colleges with details of the number of members in each.
- 187 UCPI0000015888
- 188 See UCPI0000015487
- 189 See UCPI0000015483 “[Redacted], born circa 1966, black, of [redacted address] regularly receives the ‘Socialist Worker’ newspaper, although he is not a member of the Socialist Workers Party”
- 190 UCPI0000017453 (an SWP member’s “attractive appearance”), UCPI0000011140 (an SWP member’s “very large hips”, UCPI0000010970 (an SWP member described as a “Cypriot girl”).
- 191 UCPI0000011602, and UCPI0000016457: an SWP member who is “currently a paramour” of a Central Committee member
- 192 For example: UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000017540, UCPI0000017575 UCPI0000011166, UCPI0000011149 UCPI0000011181, UCPI0000011523, UCPI0000011621, UCPI0000011602, UCPI0000011838, UCPI0000011891, UCPI0000012000 etc. etc.
- 193 DCI Craft: MPS-0747446 : paragraph 152: “*The Security Service would have to answer the question of what the SDS did to assist them in its work. I would have thought the far-left intelligence provided them with a huge base of information for their vetting activity*”.
- DI McIntosh: MPS-0747578: : Para 98: RE: UCPI0000021047: The list of attendees at Blair Peach’s funeral: “*It was routine for UCOs to report the presence of anyone known to be on record at public events involving their group. Primarily this was to keep records updated concerning those persons’ activities.... My understanding was that it was for the Security Service and for vetting, and identification/tracing*”.
- DCI Butler: MPS-0747658 : paragraph 32: “*the reports which have been obtained from the Security Service would contain information generally of interest to them, specifically in relation to counter-subversion and vetting matters*”. Paragraph 139: “*I have no direct knowledge of the Security Service used this reporting but I imagine that it influenced their operational decision-making, including the deployment of technical means, as well as feeding into that organisation’s role in national security vetting*”.
- Superintendent Moss: MPS-0747797 : Paragraph 102: “*Negative reporting is also of use, it may help someone in later life, for example in relation to vetted jobs.*”
- DS Christopher Skey (HN308): MPS-0747952: paragraph 101: “*My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to... (b) vetting. Further, in reference to UCPI0000014184, a report detailing the breakdown of a relationship between two SWP members: “This may have been relevant information for association or vetting purposes*”.
- DS Richard Walker (HN368): MPS-0747527/47: In reference to UCPI0000017523 a report detailing a sexual relationship between two SWP members: “*My instinct is that the associations of persons of interest may be relevant to a) their activities and b) vetting.*”
- 194 Detailed in the 1967 “Responsibilities of Special Branch” (UCPI0000030040/1 “Positive Vetting and Vetting for Government Departments” were listed as responsibilities of “R” squad.)
- 195 MPS-0739241: HN45 report, providing details of an individual’s employment, at the request of Box 500, in January 1972.
- 196 Lindsey German: UCPI0000034739/52-53 paragraphs 133 and 138.
- 197 A specific example of an SWP member having her employment “terminated” because of her membership of the Party can be found at UCPI0000029219
- 198 The Economic League was an organisation established in 1919 to work for employers as a vetting service of workers for trade union activity, and thus blacklisting.
- 199 UCPI0000034739/55 paragraph 142.
- 200 (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 121) “*I applied for thousands of jobs... I calculated at the time about 1500 jobs over a period of five years in the 80s, applying for absolutely everything, jobs for which I was qualified, jobs for which I was well over qualified, in a desperate attempt to get work, and I just never seemed able to get an interview for anything. There were other factors at work, and I understand that. But I think the sheer longevity of my unemployment and the fact that it went on for so very long does give rise to suspicion in my mind... I was desperate for any kind of job just to keep in touch with my children... I applied for a job, just as a sorter with the Post Office... I more than excelled in the test. We were told that there would be feedback, to tell us why they weren’t employing us... I was told that in my case they couldn’t give any. And I said “Why not?” And the man said, “Well, I’m not at liberty to tell you”.*”
- 201 MPS-0735755 and MPS-0735757
- 202 MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 1: “*Over the years a convention has grown up whereby the Security Service is the normal channel for passing security information about their employees to Government departments, certain public corporations (see list at Annex) and List X firms... Although this is common practice, it does not appear to have been the subject of any formal communication and this note is intended to explain the reasoning behind this procedure*”. Paragraph 5: “*This, of course, in no way inhibits initial enquiries to identify a person or to discover where he is*

- working. But, once it is evident that he is employed in one of the categories specified in paragraph 2 above [i.e. Government departments, Civil Service, public corporations at Annex, List X firms or the armed forces], reference should be made at once to the Security Service".
- 203 MPS-0735757
- 204 MPS-0735757 paragraph 2 "I have taken quite some time in framing my reply following consultation with my senior colleagues in the Branch for the tenor of your paper has considerable importance in regard to future practical operations by Special Branch officers."
- 205 MPS-0735757/1 paragraph 5: "national Special Branch training centred on Scotland Yard, and the Standing Orders and procedures within the Metropolitan Special Branch, are designed to enforce strictly the rule that no security information is passed to employers about any employee...".
- 206 MPS-0735757/1 paragraph 5: "Such passing of security information, if it is to occur, is the concern of your Service".
- 207 MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 6: "As far as the Civil Service, armed forces and other organisations referred to are concerned... this branch has also built up its own contacts in these organisations, most of which have headquarters in London, and there exists generally a close and mutually profitable relationship between SB officers and the contacts which over the years has worked well and without prejudice. This might be because a considerable number of these contacts happen to be retired police officers, and as far as I am concerned these contacts (former policemen or otherwise) are usually well aware of our function and that of the Security Service".
- 208 MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 7: "Summarising, therefore, I would say that whilst we in Metropolitan Special Branch will continue to consult with members of your Service wherever necessary or advisable, any measure tending to restrict or inhibit our enquiry work cannot be acceptable to us".
- 209 Gwynoro Jones (Labour, Carmarthen), John Prescott: (Labour, Kingston upon Hull, East), Norman Atkinson (Labour, Haringey), Dennis Skinner (Labour, Bolsover), Brian Sedgemore: (Labour, Luton West) and James Wellbeloved (Labour, Bexley, Erith and Crayford).
- 210 See UCPI0000034700/1
- 211 UCPI0000034700/1-4: "[John Prescott] believed there were instances of the Special Branch taking photographs of people at meetings and demonstrations and composing lists of names of those participating, and there were exchanges of information between the Special Branch and employers and between the Special Branch and trade unionists... information was exchanged between trade unionists and the Special Branch which enabled the identification of people from photographs...".
[Norman Atkinson] "Special Branch activity in the industrial field seemed to have intensified in the last two years [i.e. since 1972]... Basic questions were whether this was the right use for a branch of the police force and whether employers were entitled to information about employees and potential employees from Special Branch sources."
- 212 UCPI0000034700/6: "c.c. Sir James Waddell".
- 213 UCPI0000034699: Addressed to "S of S" or Secretary of State.
- 214 UCPI0000034699/2 sub paragraph (iii)
- 215 For example the Economic League
- 216 UCPI0000034699/2
- 217 MPS-0735757/2 paragraph 6
- 218 See above
- 219 MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 2
- 220 Annex to MPS-0735755/4: further public corporations named include the Atomic Energy Authority, British Airports Authority, British Airways, National Research Development Corporation and Crown Agents for Overseas Governments and Administrations.
- 221 MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 2.
- 222 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-requirements-for-list-x-contractors#:~:text=List%20X%20contractors%20are%20companies,premises%20at%20a%20specific%20site>.
- 223 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1973-07-04/debates/15a91c0d-9fa1-4a18-a4b3-86deffd6034e/GovernmentContracts>
- 224 UCPI0000034699
- 225 UCPI0000034739/23 paragraph 51
- 226 UCPI0000034699 paragraph (a)(ii) Letter from Sir James Waddell to the Home Secretary 3 June 1974.
- 227 UCPI00000347000/5: Note of a meeting between the Home Secretary and certain Members of Parliament who were alleging Special Branch infiltration of the unions. "He was firmly advised that there was no question of Special Branch infiltration into trade unions *directly or indirectly*".
- 228 Unite the Union has recently established its own inquiry into the allegations that trade union officers were involved in blacklisting in collusion with company bosses and Special Branch.
- 229 UCPI0000014264 1980 Right to Work Campaign Report
- 230 See for example, the pages of photocopies of cheques of TU contributors, their personal and financial details at UCPI0000015888.
- 231 See for example: UCPI0000011559
- 232 UCPI0000015521
- 233 See for example UCPI000007920: Report on the SWP Industrial Conference in Manchester.
APEX (the Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff), is given the reference 400/73/155. It subsequently became part of what is now the GMB union.
ASTMS (the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs) has the reference 400/73/100. It merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.
AUEW (Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers) has the reference 400/73/194. It too merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.
TGWU (Transport and General Workers Union) has the reference 400/72/67. This is the third union cited which merged with other unions and ultimately became subsumed into Unite the Union.
CPSA (Civil and Public Services Association) (400/72/111) was a union which after mergers was subsumed into what is now PCS (Public and Commercial Services Union).
NALGO (National and Local Government Officers' Association) 400/55/98 is a union which merged to become what is now UNISON.

- UT (National Union of Teachers) 400/73/107 merged to become what is now the NEU (National Education Union).
- 234 See UCPI0000031256 MI5 policy file note detailing liaison between MI5 and MPSB re: obtaining information on industrial disputes via penetration of “subversive” groups.
- 235 UCPI0000013100, UCPI0000015005.
- 236 UCPI0000017789, UCPI0000012378, UCPI0000012378
- 237 UCPI0000021635, UCPI0000021636, UCPI0000011379, UCPI0000015483
- 238 UCPI0000012869, UCPI0000011565, UCPI0000016207
- 239 MPS-0728962
- 240 UCPI0000011692, UCPI0000013161, UCPI0000021645
- 241 UCPI0000021690
- 242 UCPI0000021245
- 243 UCPI0000013201
- 244 UCPI0000012000
- 245 UCPI0000013670 and UCPI0000015145
- 246 UCPI0000016795
- 247 UCPI0000031845
- 248 UCPI0000031845/18
- 249 HN80 received a DAC commendation for his attendance and full report about the 1979 SWP National Delegate Conference UCPI0000033626/21.
- 250 Designated Lawyers Opening Statement T1P1 paragraph 8.1.1
- 251 UCPI0000004437/4 paragraph 9.
- 252 UCPI000004719/1 paragraph 7: “At the meeting on 7 December [1978] Sir Robert Armstrong indicated that, although we should be in no hurry to re-open the questions of the existing [Special Branch] terms of reference...”.
- 253 UCPI0000004715/2 paragraph 7.
- 254 The Maxwell Fyfe Directive, and the firm direction “You will take care to see that the work of the Security Service is *strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task* [defending the Realm from subversives] UCPI0000034262/1
- 255 DI McIntosh MPS-0747578: paragraph 39 “As I understand it, decisions as to targeting and tasking were taken by other police departments and government departments... Tasking from external agencies, such as the Security Service of the Home Office would have come through senior Special Branch officers... I was aware that the Security Service was using SDS to gather information.”
- 256 MPS-0747797: Paragraph 104: “I understand subversion to be any attempt to undermine the power or authority of an established system or institution”.
- 257 HN354 Vincent Harvey (who himself went on to become a very senior officer): transcript page 24: “I’m not sure I can actually recall we ever had a defined comprehensive definition of subversion”.
- 258 HN353: “I would Hoover up everything, it wasn’t my job to analyse it, I would just report it” (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 8)
- 259 DI McIntosh: MPS-0747578: paragraph 41: “a lot of work at Detective Inspector and Detective Chief Inspector level was done without any real knowledge of ‘why’.” Paragraph 45: “Put simply, I would ask the UCO’s if they were able to report on the information requested rather than assessing the utility of the information they reported.” Paragraph 50: Para 50: “Assessment [of reports] was not part of my role. The assessment of the reports would come from the recipients, who are the people who asked for the information in the first place. I was not in a position to assess the intelligence because the intelligence was not gathered for the SDS, it was obtained for other police or security departments.” Paragraph 128: “There was no intrinsic value of a report to the SDS as the intelligence was not obtained for SDS’s purposes. I would have thought that the content of the reports would have been valuable to the SDS’s intelligence customers but I was never told of the value or significance of reports to intelligence customers.” Paragraph 189: “The SDS was a conduit and actioned requests for information. The SDS recorded info and did not filter the info gathered as the SDS was not gathering it for its own purposes. We acted on behalf of other persons, with no oversight of the broader purpose of the information... Special Branch or the Security Service would be better placed to answer it... they would have been the requesting customer”.
- 260 UCPI0000033626/36 paragraph 124.
- 261 UCPI0000033626/36 paragraph 122.
- 262 (MPS-0747215/10 paragraph 19)



Note: An issue has been raised in respect of our submissions potentially breaching Parliamentary Privilege. We have, for the time being, made redactions to our submissions accordingly. We will consider the law on the issue and return to these areas at the beginning of the Tranche 2 period.

Closing Statement in Tranche 1 Phase 4

on behalf of Richard Chessum, 'Mary', Lindsey German

Delivered to the Inquiry on: 22/02/2023

Introduction

We represent three core-participants in Tranche 1 of the Inquiry.

We addressed the key issues on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" in our Phase 2 opening statement.¹ In our Phase 3 Opening Statement² we focused on Lindsey German, who was a member of the *Socialist Workers' Party* from 1972 with roles on the Central Committee of that Party for more than thirty years. We ask that this closing statement is read alongside those documents.

We are grateful to the Inquiry for allowing us additional time to present our closing submission. However, we ask those who are listening to consider this statement alongside the published written version which is detailed, fully referenced and available on the Public Interest Law Centre website.

In this closing statement we will demonstrate:

1. The Rick Clark deployment was not simply an intelligence gathering exercise. It was designed, with the knowledge and approval of Special Branch managers and MI5, to undermine a democratic organisation.
2. The undermining of a democratic organisation was one of a range of "counter-measures" endorsed by Government.
3. Post 1972, the principle purpose of the SDS was not to assist with maintaining public order. Its task, in conjunction with MI5, was to spy on citizens who were politically active, particularly in the trade union movement.
4. Government knew and approved, encouraged and enabled the continuation of the SDS.
5. From as early as 1975, the SDS management knew of undercover officer sexual relationships with their targets.
6. The Public were continually deceived by Government, as to the function and tasking of Special Branch.

Part One: The Rick Clark deployment

This Inquiry started with a pre-conception that the deployment of HN297, Richard Clark ("Rick Gibson") was "unremarkable".

The evidence of Richard Chessum and "Mary" was critical in demonstrating that that pre-conception was misconceived. And that led to recognition from the Inquiry that a mistake had been made in that pre-judging of a deployment.³ That recognition was both welcome and encouraging.

The known facts about Clark's deployment are as follows:

- He dishonestly appropriated the identity of a child who had died.
- He was deployed directly into a university,⁴ with the Troops Out Movement as his pre-deployment target.⁵
- He established a branch of the *Troops Out Movement* where one had not previously existed.⁶
- He encouraged others to assist him in that endeavour.⁷ When they did so, he opened files on them and reported on them.⁸ In Richard Chessum's case that led to his life-long blacklisting.⁹
- Clark spent time in the home addresses of these people, abusing their hospitality,¹⁰ and embarking on sexual relationships with at least two of them.¹¹
- He rose, incrementally, to the top of the *Troops Out Movement*.¹² Taking ever higher positions of responsibility within the movement and undertaking executive actions that can only have de-stabilised it;¹³ and were plainly likely to de-stabilise it.
- He then attempted to use that position to decapitate the whole movement,¹⁴ whilst ingratiating himself with *Big Flame* and embarking on at least two further sexual relationships.¹⁵
- He only stopped because his activity was discovered; Big Flame activists confronted him with his birth and death certificates.¹⁶
- The outing of Richard Clark was so significant for the SDS that it went down in SDS folklore and was used as a cautionary tale for decades.¹⁷

All of that is now established. And because it is established, a more important set of issues arises. In respect of each one of Clark's actions and his objectives, the question is "Why?"

Ultimately, why was this officer put where he was, to do what he did?

Richard Chessum was able to come to educated conclusions¹⁸ about some of the reasons for what Clark did; basing those conclusions on his first-hand experience of the man and the Movement, and on the documents that have been disclosed.

But ultimately, he could not give any definitive answer as to Why? Nor of course, could Clark himself, because he died some years ago.

Geoffrey Craft was the SDS Inspector from early 1974¹⁹ until some point in 1976,²⁰ when he became the Chief Inspector, a role that he remained in until the autumn of 1977. He was, therefore, a managing officer of the SDS throughout Clark's deployment, which lasted from December 1974 to September 1976.²² In addition, from 1981 to 1983, Craft was Chief Superintendent of Special Branch, in charge of "S" Squad, with the SDS as his "biggest responsibility".²³ Craft was best placed to assist the Inquiry in respect of Rick Clark's "remarkable" deployment.

Anything that is "remarkable" is also likely to be memorable.

We submitted over seventy pages of questions for Counsel to the Inquiry to ask Geoffrey Craft. Each question was supported by referenced documentary evidence, setting a context, foundation and rationale for asking it. We have published the full set of questions on the Public Interest Law Centre website this morning.²⁴

Those questions were key to understanding both the Rick Clark deployment and, because it was so significant, all of the deployments that followed it.

Because of that significance, we submitted those questions to the Inquiry far in advance of the deadline for doing so,²⁵ to ensure that they could be properly considered and included in Counsel to the Inquiry's questions.

Many of the key questions were not asked. We do not know why. It may be that the Inquiry already has in mind the documentary evidence, and the strong inferences that can be drawn from them.

But, if there have been pre-conceptions about Geoffrey Craft, based perhaps on his career trajectory,²⁶ or the subjective character references of some of the officers who served under him;²⁷ we ask the Inquiry to exercise great caution.

The Rick Clark deployment is very important to this Inquiry. It has far-reaching implications in respect of the use to which the unit was put, and the tactics that it used. It would be very fortunate and convenient for many of the State Core-Participants, if the Inquiry were to find that Clark was a maverick officer, who was acting on his own.

On the evidence, that is not a realistic conclusion. It is not sustainable to conclude that Clark did what he did off his own bat, or was running wild.

We are going to reference as much of that documentary evidence, that we included in our questions, as we can in the time available. Then we are going to invite you to draw conclusions from them, that we suggest are inescapable.

Positions of Responsibility:

The key aspect of Rick Clark's deployment was that he set up a branch of the *Troops Out Movement*, and subsequently rose to the top of the Movement nationally.

Mr. Craft's position, as set out in his statement, was that he knew absolutely nothing about it.²⁸

In his oral evidence to the Inquiry, he conceded, as he had to, that if an officer were to take a position of high office in a political organisation, that would risk influencing the freedom of expression and political action of the group.²⁹

He was then asked³⁰ the following question:³¹

"Mr Craft, if you had known that Richard Clark had risen to high office in the Troops Out Movement, including becoming the convenor to the national secretariat, would you have approved?"

Unsurprisingly, following such a leading question, he answered "No".

That question is as interesting as the answer. It pre-supposes that Craft was telling the truth, when he said that he knew nothing at all. It also pre-supposes that Rick Clark did what he did, without approval.

These are dangerous pre-conceptions. They bury the truth. They set Rick Clark up; to take the fall for a deployment that *did* impact on the political action and freedom of expression of the Troops Out Movement. They are as wrong as the pre-conception that his deployment was "unremarkable".

Chief Inspector Craft *did* know that Clark had targeted the movement and set up the branch. He *did*

know that Clark had risen to the highest office in the movement. And he *did* approve it. He also *did* know that Clark undertook a number of actions that inevitably impacted on the political action and freedom of expression of the movement. He approved that too.

Of course, there is the obvious inconsistency, between the account of a Chief Inspector, maintaining that he employed the highest levels of monitoring and supervision,³²⁻³ whilst simultaneously not noticing an officer's 21-month meteoric rise through the movement's hierarchy. To accept that on face-value would be stretching credulity to breaking point.

It is all the more incredible when one looks at Craft's account of how often he looked at the reports of his officers. He would only see reports "if there was something particularly interesting in them",³⁴ and would not sign them, "unless there was something specifically to sign".³⁵

But the fact is that the report from Clark that dealt with his involvement in establishing the South-East London branch of the *Troops Out Movement*, was so particularly interesting, that Craft did indeed sign it off personally.³⁶

There are four reports, within a month of each other, dealing with Clark's elections as branch secretary,³⁷ as a delegate to the London Co-ordinating committee,³⁸ the All London meeting³⁹ and the National Co-ordinating Committee.⁴⁰ All of those were interesting enough to have been signed off by Craft's superior DCI Kneale. The next month Craft was signing off the reports that indicated Clark had achieved those positions.⁴¹

Craft then signed off the report dealing with Clark's further election as delegate to London Co-ordinating Committee.⁴²

Kneale signed off a further election as delegate to National Co-ordinating Committee⁴³ and Clark's attendance at a private meeting with Gerry Lawless, the head of the movement.⁴⁴ But Craft was back signing for the next delegate election two weeks later.⁴⁵

Kneale signed off the election to a National position on the Organising Committee for London,⁴⁶ his election as London Organiser,⁴⁷ his nomination for a position on the National Secretariat⁴⁸ and his role as organiser of the National Rally.⁴⁹

But it was Craft who signed off his election to a role on the Press Committee.⁵⁰

And, most importantly, when Rick Clark took Lawless's position as Convenor of the Secretariat⁵¹ and took charge of the whole movement,⁵² it is Craft's signature on the report.

Kneale signed off the reports, dealing with Clark's early attempts to create division and dissent, when he "severely criticised another section of the movement"⁵³ and launched a "scathing attack" on some members.⁵⁴

But once in place at the top, when he "insisted on the removal of TOM Press Officer from the Secretariat",⁵⁵ when as Convenor he delayed a long-planned Trade union delegation to Ireland,⁵⁶ severely criticised another member and prepared documents for circulation to the press,⁵⁷ Craft signed off every report.

When, as Convenor, Clark censured another very prominent member of the *Troops Out Movement*,⁵⁸ once again it was Craft who signed the report.

And when it was reported that four months into Clark's leadership, at least one prominent organisation withdrew its support for *Troops Out Movement* because the "atmosphere was increasingly reformist",⁵⁹ again it was Craft signing off.

When serious dissent was noted with the *International Marxist Group* over the postponement of the delegation to Northern Ireland⁶⁰ and, that by the time Lawless returned, two members of the Secretariat had resigned,⁶¹ there at the bottom of the report is Craft's signature.

Rick Clark conspired with members of *Big Flame* to plot opposition and resistance to the leadership of the TOM. He facilitated that, even to the extent of risking the security of the SDS by holding the meeting at his police cover flat.⁶² That critical report was also signed off by Craft.

On the 2nd of September 1976, shortly before his identity was discovered, Clark held a meeting at which the "major aim" of the nine attendees was "the defeat of the present leadership [of TOM] and the replacement of them by independent members".⁶³ Clark was described as "influential" and was named as the second of five proposed new leaders. It was a coup. Signed off by Geoffrey Craft.

In our first opening statement to the Inquiry,⁶⁴ we warned of the risk of individual officers being scapegoated and made to 'carry the can'. This was precisely why we did so.

None of those documents were put to Craft, and none of those questions were asked,⁶⁵ even though we spoon-fed the Inquiry with them. Instead, Craft was led by the hand, into saying that he neither knew nor approved. Craft should not have had his hand held on any issue, but certainly not one as important as this.

Craft *knew* that Clark went to the top of the *Troops Out Movement* and conspired to de-stabilise it. His

continued approval and authority for it, is stamped on the bottom of every report. His superior officers knew as well; their stamps of approval and authority are there too.⁶⁶ The dispersal of the knowledge and approval can be followed up the Metropolitan Police hierarchy just by looking at the minute sheets.⁶⁷

Critically, *every single one* of those reports was sent to MI5 at Box 500. They saw them all.

If they were asked, MI5 would not be able to pretend that they did not know that an SDS officer had rapidly risen through the ranks of the *Troops Out Movement*, right to the very top. They could not pretend that they did not know that an SDS officer was plotting to de-stabilise a democratic movement. They could not say that they were unaware of the source of the reports. Their knowledge that Rick Clark, as “Rick Gibson”, was an SDS agent is clearly stated in a Security Services minute sheet.⁶⁸ They knew who he was, and they knew what he was doing.⁶⁹

The likelihood is that that knowledge and approval went higher than that. We shall deal with that aspect more generally at a later stage in these submissions. Richard Walker, a detective sergeant in the SDS back office throughout Clark’s deployment was conscious that the reporting was likely to go not just to the Security Services, but to the Home Office as well.⁷⁰

This Inquiry cannot be complicit in scapegoating Rick Clark. Whether Craft remembers it or not, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Clark was not acting alone.

The Clark deployment conclusively demonstrates that the Metropolitan Police and the Security Services were using a secret police unit to de-stabilise and decapitate a democratic movement. The SDS was authorised and encouraged to do exactly that. That is a fact. The Inquiry cannot shy away from that. We do not expect it will do so.

That fact has far-reaching implications for every aspect of this Inquiry.

As a starting point, it raises questions about the true function of the SDS; it cannot be argued that it was simply an intelligence gathering organisation, when it plainly was not.

It raises questions as to the true state and purpose of the SDS; it is impossible to argue that this activity had any role in preventing disorder or countering subversion, however one chooses to define that conveniently fluid concept.

It casts a shadow over the credibility of any witness who protests that somehow the SDS was a protector of our right to free speech and our democratic right

to organise.⁷¹ It is a stark reminder that dishonesty is the life blood of these people. They sought out a career that was founded on deceit and their success or otherwise depended on how dishonest they could be.

And it puts a perspective on the tactics that were used by the SDS, be they the dishonest appropriation of dead children’s identities, the cultivation of false friendships or the sexual exploitation of activists. A State that is prepared to undermine the very democracy that it loudly purports to be protecting, is a State with very few qualms at all.

The Troops Out Movement

The *Troops Out Movement* was established in 1973.⁷² It was a campaign group whose aim was publicly stated and straightforward: self-determination for the Irish people and the withdrawal of British Troops from Northern Ireland.⁷³

Their methods were lobbying Members of Parliament,⁷⁴ drafting alternative legislation,⁷⁵ and raising awareness with the occasional low-key demonstration, talks and film-screenings.⁷⁶

It had already been infiltrated by the SDS, when Clark was sent in. HN298 ‘Mike Scott’ was reporting on the Movement in 1974 and was withdrawn⁷⁷ after he broke his finger punching Gerry Lawless in the face.⁷⁸ Very shortly after “Scott” stopped reporting on the TOM,⁷⁹ Rick Clark was sent in.⁸⁰

We know that there were other SDS infiltrations after Clark. Detective Inspector McIntosh, who served in the SDS between April 1976 and autumn 1979,⁸¹ noted the successful infiltration of the Movement, and implied infiltrations other than Clark in the period up to 1979.⁸²

The SDS were certainly supplying the Security Services with intelligence on the *Troops Out Movement* in the summer of 1980. The officer involved was involved enough to have been in closed meetings. It is referred to in a liaison file,⁸³ but no disclosure has been provided in respect of the officer who sourced the information, or his role in the Movement.

Towards the end of 1980,⁸⁴ HN96 “Michael James” began reporting on the *Troops Out Movement*, having been encouraged to do so by the SDS management. He was elected to the National Steering Committee⁸⁵ in November and December 1981, taking the position of National Membership Secretary, second only to the National Convenor.⁸⁶ He reported on the *Troops Out Movement* from that position well into 1983. “Mike Scott” concluded that the *Troops Out Movement* had no subversive objectives and did not employ or approve the use of violence.⁸⁷

There is nothing in any of Rick Clark's reporting to suggest subversion or any public order risk. The same is true of the reporting of "Michael James". More generally, there has been no reporting suggesting public disorder at any *Troops Out Movement* event.

Interestingly, Geoffrey Craft was the SDS Detective Inspector and Chief Inspector for both the "Scott" and Clark deployments. He was the Chief Superintendent of "S" Squad, with the SDS as his "biggest responsibility in that role", at the time of the "James" deployment.⁸⁸

Craft himself agreed that the organisation was not subversive⁸⁹ and the public order risk was "just in case" or trying, as he put it, "to be ahead of the game"⁹⁰ i.e. there was no public order risk, but it was conceivable that there might be, one day. That argument might have a shred of credibility for a one-year deployment, to assess a situation. But Craft had officers in there for, at least, seven of the ten years between 1974 and 1983.⁹¹ Clearly there was no "game to be ahead of".

It is worth noting, that under the "just in case" theory of public disorder prevention, Special Branch could try to retrospectively justify any infiltration of any protest or campaign group. There did not have to be a genuine risk of disorder or even the suggestion of one. Craft called this "*the ultimate defence line*"⁹² that would prevent any "embarrassment" if the SDS existence were ever to become public knowledge.⁹³ Another way of phrasing "ultimate defence line" is "ultimate excuse", and it is the excuse that we have heard repeated time and time again.

Absent a subversion or a public order justification; the fallback justification for the repeated infiltrations of TOM seems to be that it might have provided intelligence on Irish Republicans,⁹⁴ particularly in the light of a policy decision not to infiltrate any actual Irish Republican Movement.⁹⁵ It was a soft option, along the lines of the policy decision not to infiltrate fascists because they were too dangerous and criminal for a police officer to infiltrate.⁹⁶

An interest in possible Irish Republicans does not explain why it was that Richard Chessum, "Mary" and countless others had Special Branch files created on them, and the detail of the minutiae of their lives⁹⁷ passed on to the Security Services, with life-changing consequences.

It does not explain why authority and approval was given to undermine the *Troops Out Movement* to the extent that it was undermined. If *Big Flame* had not discovered and outed Rick Clark when they did, there would have been a coup. It may or may not have been successful, but it would inevitably have had consequences for the Movement.

What is clear is that the *Troops out Movement* was riven to the extent that it was widely viewed as being "too busy fighting amongst themselves to do any good work on the troops out issue".⁹⁸

It had had undercover officers running the Movement for at least five of its first ten years. By the time they left it was a shell of a Movement; its registered office was a council flat just south of Kings Cross.⁹⁹

Tragically, more than three and a half thousand people lost their lives in the Troubles before the troops eventually left.¹⁰⁰

"Mary"

There are a number of inconsistencies at the heart of Craft's evidence about sexual relationships.

On the one hand, Craft emphasises careful recruitment of SDS officers, based on the results of their vetting,¹⁰¹ and their good reputation¹⁰² within a small Special Branch, where "everyone had a reputation very quickly".¹⁰³

On the other hand, Craft claims not to have known about Richard Clark's reputation within that same small Special Branch, as a bit of a lad,¹⁰⁴ a womaniser and a "carnivore",¹⁰⁵⁻⁶ despite evidence of it being "*generally well known among the existing SDS officers*".¹⁰⁷

Craft then emphasises the "very close" officer supervision¹⁰⁸ and close camaraderie of the SDS¹⁰⁹ yet claims to have had no knowledge of any sexual relationships at all, despite the proliferation of them under his command¹¹⁰ and two officers being honest enough to say that managers knew, either with certainty,¹¹¹ or in all likelihood.¹¹²

Craft was asked about the "particular risk" of an undercover officer being put directly into a University situation, where he would inevitably be involved with young, single women.¹¹³ He replied that he "did not think of that at the time", but accepted that "with hindsight, of course" he recognised the risk.

That concession was inevitable. It is difficult to imagine how anyone could not recognise the risk. It is even more difficult to square his account that he, a 40 year¹¹⁴ old Detective Chief Inspector of the Metropolitan Police Special Branch, was too "naïve"¹¹⁵ to recognise it; but somehow since then, he acquired the necessary life experience to see what is already plain to the rest of us.

Craft put an undercover police officer into a university, at a time in history when the sexual revolution

was well underway and more permissive attitudes to sexual liberation, particularly in a university setting, were commonplace and common knowledge.¹¹⁶

He did so, in the full knowledge that his success or failure, as an undercover officer was dependent on him forming relationships with activists. Craft was also in the unique position of actually reading and signing off the reports that Rick Clark was generating; yet somehow, he did not see the red flags.

Clark's first six reports included personal details of single, female students¹¹⁷ and made it plain that he was spending time at home with them.¹¹⁸

You do not have to be a detective, let alone a Detective Chief Inspector, to have an alarm bell ring when those reports arrive on your desk. Every one of those reports was signed off by Chief Inspector Craft; at a time when he was closely monitoring his officers, particularly one who had only just entered the field.¹¹⁹

Those reports, along with all the others, went up to other senior officers who also signed them off, before being sent to the Security Service. It would be interesting to hear every one of them plead naivety.

The real insight into Craft's approach to sexual relationships came in the unguarded moments of his exculpatory, belittling assertions¹²⁰ that sexual activity does not require an exchange of CVs and that "these things happen".¹²¹ The truth about his recognition of risk came in his acknowledgement of what he actually saw as an inevitability: "how does one prevent it?"¹²² The line between an accepted inevitability and knowledge is very thin indeed, particularly for an organisation that mastered in deceit and had no qualms about using people generally.

"Graham Coates" (HN304) had "no doubt" that all of the SDS managers were aware of Rick Clark having had at least one sexual relationship¹²³ "It was made quite plain, with jokes and banter, that they knew, we knew, and management knew what was going on."¹²⁴

Craft, used repeated denial as his own ultimate defence line, in the same way that he denied all knowledge of the anti-democratic activity that he repeatedly signed off.

Big Flame and Rick Clark's discovery

A conspicuous hole in Craft's evidence was that in relation to the discovery of Rick Clark's identity by members of *Big Flame*.

Mr. Craft had a very close involvement in the creation of undercover officer identities,¹²⁵ and was

personally involved in the creation of Rick Clark's cover identity.¹²⁶

He was very aware of the "paramount" importance placed on the secrecy of the SDS and the need to avoid the political "embarrassment"¹²⁷ that would befall the Metropolitan Police and the Home Office should the operation become public. He cited his own recognition of the "political sensitivity"¹²⁸ when personally assuring the Home Office that officers were provided with "the strongest possible cover backgrounds compatible with the modern computer age".¹²⁹

Craft was also "very much involved in the exfiltration of SDS officers",¹³⁰ discussing with them how they would come out of the field, what their story would be and how it would be explained. He considered it to be a "serious matter".

The impact of *Big Flame's* discovery of Rick Clark's death certificate must have been ground-shaking for the Metropolitan Police.

Their "computer age" compliant security had been breached. The assurances they had given the Home Office in respect of it, were worthless.

The protracted police applications for anonymity in this Inquiry suggested danger to these officers in their undercover roles. If that were true, every SDS officer in the field would have been at risk. If, as Mr. Craft suggests, Clark's deployment into the *Troops Out Movement* involved intelligence on Irish Republicanism, the Police would have been fraught with concern about repercussions.

Most importantly, the compromise risked the public outing of the SDS, and the inevitable political fall-out.¹³¹ That political fall-out would have been all the more terrifying because Special Branch activity was, in any event, the subject of particular public scrutiny at the time.¹³² The impact would have been all the more significant, in the context of a deployment into a broad-based, single-issue movement, that could not be justified on either subversion or public order grounds.

It was also in the context of an officer who had been engaged in blatantly anti-democratic activity, within the knowledge of those who outed him, and with a paper trail that confirmed the knowledge and approval of both the Metropolitan Police and the Security Services.

There would have been heads rolling all the way up the hierarchy. How far up it went, would have only depended on the extent to which it could be covered up.

For Craft, as the Chief Inspector in charge, it would have been career ending. He would have been

remembered as the officer who presided over the demise of the unit.

A full decade later, in June 1986, Special Branch was so concerned about the details of Rick Clark's deployment being made public that the Commander issued a memorandum directing the attention of "all officers",¹³³ to Richard Chessum; warning them that he was speaking to a freelance investigative journalist about Clark and *Big Flame*.¹³⁴ We do not know exactly when in 1986 Mr Craft retired¹³⁵ but if he was still working in the summer of that year, he himself would have received the alert.

The incident was such a key moment in the SDS history that twenty years later, *every single officer* was "familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his "own" death certificate".¹³⁶

And yet the statements of the two officers in charge of the SDS at the time; Detective Chief Inspector Craft and Detective Inspector McIntosh, are silent on the issue; conspicuously silent.

The only reference Craft made to the compromise in his statement, was a single sentence in the middle of a paragraph on officer welfare; he referred to an "occasion Rick Clark thought that he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting in a pub".¹³⁷ In the section on the use of deceased children's identities,¹³⁸ there is no reference to it at all.¹³⁹

McIntosh started in the SDS in April 1976¹⁴⁰ and was well in place and working in September 1976.¹⁴¹ In his statement, about exfiltration generally, he said: "I do not remember one [exfiltration] causing any trouble at all".¹⁴² In the section of his statement where he was asked specifically about Rick Clark,¹⁴³ he makes no reference at all to the discovery of the death certificate or his exfiltration.

These are striking omissions.¹⁴⁴ Senior officers, who are, at best, being deliberately unforthcoming.

Coupled with that, is the bizarre insistence from both officers, that neither of them recalls ever having worked with the other. Despite there being an eighteen-month period when they were together in charge of the SDS,¹⁴⁵ Craft states that he did not overlap with McIntosh at all on the SDS¹⁴⁶ and McIntosh states that he does not remember ever working with Craft.¹⁴⁷

They clearly were working with each other. And they were definitely working together in September 1976, the very month of Clark's outing. There is documentary evidence to put that beyond question.¹⁴⁸

Craft maintained his memory block throughout his oral evidence and was unable to explain it but, con-

ceded in the face of the documentary evidence that they must have been working together.¹⁴⁹

McIntosh began by maintaining his memory block.¹⁵⁰ He put it down to being away for long training courses in the part of his deployment when he would have overlapped with Craft, particularly for "major incidents".¹⁵¹ That account does not correlate with the actual periods of training that McIntosh is recorded as having done; which only account for 4 months of the 18 month overlap and which took place in the year *after* the outing of DC Clark.¹⁵²

However, almost imperceptibly, Mr. McIntosh slipped in the middle of his evidence.¹⁵³ Having maintained his zero recollection of working with Craft, he was asked some questions about the management style of DCI Mike Ferguson. He was asked if he recalled Ferguson's rigorous testing of new officers on their identities. "*Was that something common? Did Mike Ferguson tend to do that with UCOs when they first started?*" His reply: "*Geoff Craft as well.*"

In a split second, he let it be known that he remembered working with Geoff Craft only too well. That slip was not followed up by Counsel to the Inquiry. That is unfortunate, because a contrived mutual memory loss is a very convenient thing. It prevents questioning and enquiry on the way in which management discussed, and decided to deal with, events as significant as Rick Clark's outing, or very shortly afterwards (in November 1976¹⁵⁴) the antics of HN300 "Jim Pickford".¹⁵⁵

Both Craft and McIntosh did expand on their recollections of the Clark outing in their oral evidence.¹⁵⁶ Both recalled going to a pub because Clark had been uncovered.

Craft said that he had gone with Derek Kneale, that Clark had given an excuse that *Big Flame* appeared to have accepted, all appeared to be well. He and Kneale had de-briefed Clark the following day and decided to withdraw him anyway. Essentially, Craft downplayed the problem and put himself with a more senior officer, who is now deceased and unable to assist.¹⁵⁷

McIntosh said he had gone with a surveillance team. He did not know any details of the potential compromise. He illogically prevaricated on Craft's presence or otherwise; presumed that Geoff Craft had dealt with it with another, unnamed, member of staff; which was why, he said, he did not remember working with Craft... before remembering it, at least to the best of his belief. He accepted that it was an event of "great significance operationally", that "without doubt [the SDS] would have been very concerned about". He just said it had nothing to do with him.

Both were reluctant to refer to the production of a death certificate. Craft did so, obliquely, when pressed.¹⁵⁸ McIntosh maintained that he was not aware of one being produced at the time.¹⁵⁹

Neither account was credible. But both were framed to ensure that any questions on the internal inquiry into the reason for the compromise, were not going to lead anywhere.

Fortunately, there is official confirmation of both the production of the death certificate and how “disturbing” the compromise was for the Metropolitan Police senior officers.¹⁶⁰

Mr Craft’s account that Clark came out of the pub, giving no indication of any concern, so they waited until the next day for a de-brief, and then decided there was “little point in leaving him out there”, does not fit any of the surrounding circumstances.

Mr Chessum’s account, albeit second hand,¹⁶¹ that Clark went “white as a sheet” and that his cover flat was stripped overnight¹⁶² is a response that is far more in keeping with the reality of the fear that must have gripped the SDS. This was the biggest risk to their security until the “True Spies” programme.

There must have been extensive internal inquiry. Clark must have been asked how it was that he came to be “rumbled” and his account must have been vigorously examined. Bearing in mind that Mr. Craft was aware that: “people did talk all the time”¹⁶³ and the SDS was much more open than Special Branch, they must have asked other officers what they knew.

Clark told several officers¹⁶⁴ that two sexual relationships had led to his compromise. At least two officers¹⁶⁵ gave evidence about that account in the closed hearings. One of them gave a character reference for Craft, unable to believe that he would have known.¹⁶⁶ Another believed that it was generally well known among the existing SDS officers,¹⁶⁷ including at least some of the managers. The latter would have been consistent with the “Graham Coates”¹⁶⁸ account, of wider managerial knowledge. HN126 “Paul Gray” confirmed that when he joined the SDS, just one year after Clark’s exfiltration,¹⁶⁹ the unearthing of the death certificate, was very much in the minds of all officers when they joined the Squad¹⁷⁰ and that he was aware that that security breach was said to have come about because Clark had an affair with an activist.¹⁷¹

A further, strong, indicator of wider managerial knowledge of the sexual relationships leading to the compromise comes from the method of Clark’s exfiltration. Commander Watts urged that Clark’s withdrawal must be “under suitable cover”¹⁷² i.e. using appropriate methods to ensure that his tracks were covered.

The key feature of that “cover” was Clark sending a note to one of the women that he had had a relationship with, giving a false explanation as to why he had suddenly left.¹⁷³

There was no exploration of that with Craft, despite his close involvement in exfiltration tactics.¹⁷⁴

The documentary evidence conclusively demonstrates that Clark was not a maverick officer, acting in isolation. A conclusion that this letter was unauthorised, and sent without managerial knowledge, would be as suspect as a conclusion that his anti-democratic activity was similarly unknown and unapproved.

The Rick Clark letter was not an outpouring of honesty, revealing his true status and expressing his heartfelt regret. It was a tactic, designed to reinforce the lie underlying the exfiltration; and therefore, to prevent further enquiry from activists. It was part of Clark’s “suitable cover”. Ultimately, the “cover” worked, of course. Despite what Craft referred to as the “ingenuity” of the “sinister” *Big Flame*,¹⁷⁵ Clark was not publicly uncovered as an SDS officer.

The letter writing tactic lived on; in the postcard¹⁷⁶ sent to “Madeleine” by Vincent Harvey, and the many, many letters that were sent to the victims of undercover officers thereafter.¹⁷⁷ In the circumstances of the Clark compromise, that letter is the evidence that breaks through the thin line, from inevitable risk of sexual relationships into *definitive knowledge* of them.

The Rick Clark deployment is indeed “remarkable”.

On a personal level, it demonstrates the extent to which the SDS were prepared to use people, to get into their homes, to deceive and sexually exploit them.

On a political level, it proves the lie that is the public order justification. There was none. It proves the lie that a “subversive” was anyone other than someone opposed to State interests; in this case the single issue of de-militarisation.

It demonstrates that SDS deployments were being used for far more than simply intelligence gathering. And finally, it shows who was pulling the strings.

Part Two: Masters and Servants:

Both Craft and McIntosh were unwilling to assist with the extent of their liaison with the Security Services during their time as managers.

Craft said that he “*did not have much communication with the Security Service whilst...on the SDS.*”¹⁷⁸

When MI5 wrote to him to “convey their gratitude for the flow of information [he was] sending [them] on the activities of the SWP”, there was no formality. Not only was Craft on first name terms with MI5, they used the diminutive of his first name, “Geoff”.¹⁷⁹ But Craft does not remember going to the party¹⁸⁰ that MI5 threw for the SDS. Nor does he remember taking DI Pryde to meet MI5 and introduce them to him.¹⁸¹ Nor does he remember being specifically called to a meeting with MI5 to be informed that the existence of the SDS was widely known amongst regional Special Branches.¹⁸²

McIntosh was also very reluctant to accept SDS engagement with the Security Services,¹⁸³ despite MI5 describing his last visit to them as “routine”.¹⁸⁴

Whether they remember them or not, SDS engagement with the Security Service was increasing steadily¹⁸⁵ from 1972, at the same time as the public order “ultimate defence line” for deployments was decreasing.¹⁸⁶

Roy Creamer described “80 percent, perhaps more” of “C” Squad’s work as being for MI5.¹⁸⁷ “It was the bread and butter work of most C squad officers”. That figure would be an underestimate on the face of the documents disclosed to the Inquiry; where reports dealing with public order are few and far between.

Creamer’s account that “*The relationship between “C” Squad and the Security Service is best described as ‘master-servant’... the Security Service was the master*”, is borne out by the MI5 briefings which the SDS were “very ready to accept.”¹⁸⁸

The primary objective was not public order, as Mr Craft stated.¹⁸⁹ It was to service MI5 requests for infiltrations into the *Troops Out Movement*¹⁹⁰ and for “*high grade political intelligence particularly on the SWP*”.¹⁹¹

The Ultimate Defence Line: the National Front

In our last opening statement, we addressed the *six* obvious ways in which the Metropolitan Police could have improved policing¹⁹² and eliminated the risk of public disorder between Fascists and those who opposed them.¹⁹³ Had those methods been adopted, the disorder at Red Lion Square, Southall and Lewisham *would not have happened*. Without those events, the Metropolitan Police would have lost their “ultimate defence line” for rationalising their infiltration and surveillance of the *Socialist Workers’ Party*.

There is no evidence of any intelligence from the SDS, impacting on the policing of those demonstrations. Recent disclosure to the Inquiry has shown that the

one piece of information reliably thought to have come from the SDS¹⁹⁴ in respect of Lewisham, actually came from a press release from the counter-demonstration’s Ad-hoc organising committee.¹⁹⁵ That press release was the basis of the Special Branch threat assessment¹⁹⁶ that the Home Office requested.¹⁹⁷ The only, solely SDS, intelligence that made it into the threat assessment was the possibility that “*smoke bombs... flour... paint and eggs*” might be used.¹⁹⁸

At Southall, the disorder and violence was not only predicted by the police, but in reality pre-planned by them. Undercover officers were warned off attending to avoid the police violence that ultimately killed Blair Peach.¹⁹⁹

The Government did not need the SDS to tell them that there was going to be trouble at Red Lion Square, Southall, or Lewisham. The “law of the land” may well have entitled the National Front to make use of those places at the time.²⁰⁰ But this was a fascist organisation with its roots in the party that supported Hitler’s rise to power, and the genocidal violence that followed.²⁰¹ It was staging deliberately intimidating marches in minority communities. The genocidal violence was fresh in the memories of the sons and daughters²⁰² of those who had fought against it. It was even more fresh in the memories of the communities who faced that violence day after day²⁰³ on the streets and in their businesses and homes.²⁰⁴ The violence was so extreme that it was apparently the basis for the high-level policy decision that stopped the SDS from infiltrating the *National Front*.²⁰⁵ *Special Branch were too frightened of violent crime to infiltrate the National Front*. Yet the people who were suffering that violence were expected to be silent and tolerate the *National Front* marching in their hundreds through their communities. It was obvious that those communities should have been listened to, and the marches should have been banned. Detective Inspector Roy Creamer felt so strongly that the Lewisham march should have been banned, that he refused to do the Special Branch threat assessment.²⁰⁶ Even the *Daily Express* and *Sun* newspapers called for the *National Front* march to be banned.²⁰⁷

Inevitably, the people of those communities, and those that supported them, were not going to let the fascists pass.

Those three demonstrations have become the “ultimate defence line” for the Metropolitan Police when trying to justify their infiltrations of the *Socialist Workers’ Party*. It was the focus of the State’s Rule 10 questions of Lindsey German, underpinning the theatrical repetition of the word “overthrow”.

There is no Metropolitan Police acknowledgment of expulsions²⁰⁹ of squadists, or the policies of disciplined stewarding that the undercover officers

themselves were sometimes involved in.²¹⁰ There is no acknowledgement of the contemporary police recognition that “*The Socialist Workers’ Party does not get involved in violence as an organisation*”.²¹¹

Of course, there is no reference to the community, campaigning and political work the Marxist-left did to counteract the fascist threat.²¹² There is certainly no acknowledgement that the threat of the *National Front*, only finally subsided because the *Anti-Nazi League* held firm against them.²¹³

The *National Front* had the destruction of any form of democracy as a primary intention. Their action throughout the Tranche 1 period²¹⁴ was a clear threat to public order. It was also politically violent. They were following the Nazi playbook from the early 1930s by attempting to dominate and control the streets.²¹⁵ Fascist activity therefore fell within Special Branch’s remit however it was defined; from the 1967 tasking and the Denning definition, to the 1970, 1972 and 1984 adaptations, all of which we deal with below.

The lack of SDS interest in fascists was doubtless in part due to fear. The institutionalised racism²¹⁶ at the Metropolitan Police inevitably also played a part. The racist language²¹⁷ used in many of the SDS reports firmly indicates a mindset that was shared by the *National Front*. Infiltrations of fascists, that generated the scale of personal data that was obtained on the left,²¹⁸ would have caused such vetting problems for the Metropolitan Police, that they would have struggled to fill their own ranks.

But the Cabinet Office disclosure points to a far more significant rationale for the lack of SDS infiltration of fascists. Fascists were anti-trade union.²¹⁹ They had no interest in furthering their aims in an industrial context. Following the successful strikes of the miners, dockers and building workers²²⁰ in 1972, the Government’s primary focus in relation to intelligence gathering, was on *trade unions and industry*.²²¹

The *Socialist Workers’ Party* and militant trade unionists campaigned for better wages, and against national wage restraint, unsafe working conditions, unemployment and poverty. Ultimately those campaigns led into national actions against wage restraint, and restriction of trade union organisations.²²² This inevitably impacted on the concerns of big industry and national Government.

Subversives

In our Opening Statement to the last Phase of the Inquiry, we undertook an analysis of the way in which the State shifted the role of the Metropolitan Police, away from policing duties²²³ into political policing duties.²²⁴

We emphasised the starting point in 1967, that Special Branch officers were tasked with “the prevention of *crimes* directed against the state”.²²⁵ A clear task, entirely consistent with the established principles of policing.²²⁶

That was followed by the shift in 1970, with new Terms of Reference,²²⁷ to “*defending the realm from... actions of persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State*”.²²⁸ This was a job description²²⁹ taken directly from the Security Service Directive of 1952, from the then Home Secretary David Maxwell-Fyfe.

The shift was accompanied by a definition of subversive behaviour that was *intention* specific and designed to be loose and capable of wide interpretation; “*Broadly speaking... any organisation or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the established democratic order*.”²³⁰ Those Terms of Reference were classified “Confidential” and never released to the public.²³¹

The emphasis on *potentially subversive organisations and individuals*²³² could at least, to some extent, be tempered by the careful application of the Denning definition of subversion.²³³ Under that, very public,²³⁴ definition, actions were only subversive if they were “*unlawful*”. A Chief Constable, concerned with real policing *could* apply that definition; if action was not unlawful it could not be subversive.

Crucially, the *public* perspective, was that it was MI5 who were tasked with dealing with subversives, in defence of the realm, against those breaking the law.²³⁵

In 1972, MI5 re-defined the concept.²³⁶ “Subversion” became “*activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means*”.

That definition was given some false legitimacy²³⁷ in 1975 when the Security Service briefed it for adoption by the House of Lords,²³⁸ branding it “*the Harris definition*”,²³⁹ a misnomer for what was in reality the “*MI5 definition*”. Importantly, that public re-branding included re-assurances that the definition only applied to those who *broke the law*,²⁴⁰ because the freedom to “*join together to express and further views*” was “*fundamental to our democratic traditions*”. People could sleep easily, secure in the knowledge that what was happening in the United Kingdom was so very different to what was happening with the STASI in East Germany.

Later, in 1979, Leon Brittan²⁴¹ attempted to calm concerns about a rampant Special Branch,²⁴² by stressing a strict application of the MI5 definition.²⁴³ Before they could be called “subversive” a person or

group had to have a desire to overthrow that State *and* be an actual threat to the State.²⁴⁴ Like Lord Harris, Brittan stressed that Special Branch was “concerned with offences against the security of the State”, implicitly equating subversion with terrorism.²⁴⁵ Thereby reinforcing the fallacy, for the consumption of the public, that in Britain, police only dealt with crime.

This was retrospective window-dressing²⁴⁶ and a cover-up; there had been no strict application, and neither would there be.²⁴⁷ The State was fully conscious that the reality did not match the façade.²⁴⁸

It was appropriately Orwellian, that the delayed²⁴⁹ Special Branch Guidelines²⁵⁰ were finally published, by the Thatcher Government, in 1984.

Those Guidelines were carefully constructed²⁵⁷ to continue the deception by once again implicitly equating subversion with terrorism, at least as far as the public were concerned.²⁵⁸

But, the confidential correspondence accompanying the Guidelines made it clear that the “MI5 definition” had never been read to include an actual threat to the State. The Home Office assured every Chief Constable that “an organisation currently operating *within the law* may nevertheless be subversive because *its long term aims* satisfy the definition.”²⁵⁹

Crucially, the Guidelines were widely drafted with the clear, but *secret*, intention of enabling the police to *continue* to target those who were “*not engaged in subversion*” as long as they “*may become subversive in the future*”.²⁶⁰ In other words, those who were *potentially, potential subversives*.

The truth is that the words “broadly speaking”, “may”, “undermine”, “well-being”, “political”, “industrial”, “operating within the law” and “long-term”, enabled the Metropolitan Police to be as flexible and intrusive, as MI5 and Government wanted them to be.

Back in 1975, and importantly for our Core-Participants, at the very moment that Lord Harris was releasing the MI5 definition,²⁶⁵ Rick Clark was engaged in inveigling his way into Richard Chessum’s home, the hierarchy of the *Troops Out Movement*, and “Mary’s” bed.

Government Connivance

Successive Governments were well aware that there was no “actual threat” to the State.

In January 1969 the “Official Committee on Subversion at Home” was established on the direction of the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.²⁶⁶ It was composed of key Government Departments²⁶⁷ and immediately concluded that at *no time* were the aims of “subversives” (as they were then defined) *within measurable distance of attainment*.²⁶⁸

Instead, the focus of the Committee was mainly on industrial issues and trade unions. Their “concern” more often than not, was about “*the size of recent wage settlements*” and “*the increase in their frequency*”²⁶⁹. It is telling that a Committee specifically designed to deal with subversion, spent much of their time worrying about people who were dedicated to improving standards of living.

The Wilson Government nevertheless encouraged the extension of intelligence gathering activity, and the existing “*intimate relations*” between the Security Services and Special Branch.²⁷⁰ That Government was *fully aware that those “intimate relations” included the SDS* and the work that they were doing. The SDS, and its continuation, had been raised in discussion at the Subversion at Home Committee in 1969,²⁷¹ in the presence of representatives from the main Government Ministries, many of whom remained in the Group, or its various incarnations, over the following years.²⁷² It is not realistic to suggest that that inter-departmental knowledge of the SDS’s existence was restricted to the individuals present or was forgotten without question over the following years.

The Government was also aware that the Security Service were reluctant to use “*their resources to investigate the behaviour of individuals who, however politically repugnant and socially objectionable they may be, are not seeking to overthrow the established Constitution by extra-political means.*”²⁷³

The solution to that conundrum was to expand the role of Special Branches. One of the last acts of the Wilson Government, just four days before the 1970 General Election, was the introduction of the 1970 Special Branch Terms of Reference,²⁷⁴ which made the relationship with MI5 and the SDS ever more “intimate”.

In March 1972, a Security Service report sent to the Prime Minister, Edward Heath, concluded that “troublesome though these groups are, they do not constitute anything in the nature of an organised conspiracy against the State”.²⁷⁵

The following month, a letter from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Minister,²⁷⁶ expressed the view that there was no “genuinely subversive threat to society”, instead there was a “**pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority... not necessarily a conscious and organised threat.**”²⁷⁷

That letter concerned a Ministerial meeting, instigated by the Prime Minister himself, for “consideration to be given to the question of subversive activity in society, particularly in the **industrial context.**” The nation’s ruling elite attended; the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President and the Secretary of State for Employment.²⁷⁸ The Cabinet Office raised two areas for consideration. First, as there was no subversive threat to the security of the State; MI5 were limited in the help they could offer.²⁷⁹ So, could MI5 be persuaded to adopt a more “aggressive” approach? Secondly, could the Government respond to the “reluctant” conclusion that there was no threat, with “pervasive, oblique and unattributable” action, “sometimes supplemented by more covert forms of activity”?²⁸⁰

The conundrum was the same as that faced by the Wilson Government two years before. The response this time was to change the definition of subversion.²⁸¹ The “MI5 definition” combined with the 1970 Terms of Reference ensured that Special Branch, and in particular the SDS, would be doing MI5’s dirty work for them, pervasively, obliquely, covertly and of course, unattributably.

By August 1972, the slightly re-named “Group on Subversion in Public Life” (“SPL”)²⁸² was formed “to improve the co-ordination of intelligence on [the re-defined concept of] subversion”. **Its formation was directed by the Prime Minister, Edward Heath.**²⁸³ It included the same departments of State as its predecessor.²⁸⁴ **But for the first time, in recognition of the change in role provided by the new definition of subversion, it also included the Metropolitan Police Special Branch.**²⁸⁵ The first Special Branch attendee at SPL meetings was Deputy Assistant Commissioner Gilbert.²⁸⁶ He was promptly informed of the new definition, including the brand-new emphasis on the **political and industrial.**²⁸⁷

The SDS were not being tasked with infiltrating organisations to counter a genuine threat to the State. They were being tasked to infiltrate in order to counter “opinion”,²⁸⁸ be it **political opinion or industrial opinion.**

The role of the SPL was “to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence... particularly in industry”.²⁸⁹ The Chairman was Sir James Waddell.

In case there is any doubt about the origin of the intelligence that was being collected; the oversight of the SDS Annual Reports and the decision to continue funding them, was signed off in 1969,²⁹⁰ 1971,²⁹¹ 1972²⁹² and 1974,²⁹³ by Sir James Waddell.

Government knowledge of the SDS role in gathering that intelligence is graphically illustrated by an MI5 policy note from December 1972.²⁹⁴ Those who attended the “Waddell Group” meetings, **knew** that Special Branch and MI5 “were under increasing pressure from Whitehall for more and more detailed information about... subversive influence in trades unions”. They **knew** that Special Branch and MI5 were being pressured “to increase agent coverage of industrial affairs, particularly in the Metropolitan area”.²⁹⁵ “What [was] needed was **long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informant sources.**” Waddell’s continued authorisation of the SDS guaranteed that “long-term penetration”.

As an aside, that policy note made it clear that it was not only the SDS who used long term undercover officers. “Provincial forces” also had “some success in [that] field”. Regional Police forces not only knew of the existence of the SDS²⁹⁶ but were using the same method, from at least 1972. That is of particular importance for the infiltrations of the constituency office of the former Member of Parliament, Dave Nellist,²⁹⁷ by the West Midlands Police.

The Prime Minister, Edward Heath, attached “particular importance to Ministers receiving comprehensive reviews... at regular intervals”.²⁹⁸ The existence and the work of the SPL was to be regarded as “entirely secret”.²⁹⁹ It is little wonder, that the SDS repeatedly re-assured the Home Office of their awareness of the “political sensitivity” of their existence, as well as their “computer age” compliant security.³⁰⁰

The close association between the SPL and the SDS continued after Edward Heath’s Government.³⁰¹ In 1975 Sir James Waddell was succeeded as Chair by Robert Armstrong,³⁰² who signed off the SDS Annual Reports in 1976 and 1977.³⁰³ Special Branch retained membership of the SPL Group.³⁰⁴ The “peculiar sensitivity of the subject” and Prime Minister Wilson’s “close interest”³⁰⁵ in it, ensured that it remained classified as “Top Secret”.³⁰⁶

We have not been provided with the SPL documents that cover Wilson’s Government nor that of James Callaghan, who had been the Home Secretary who both co-created the SDS³⁰⁷ in 1969 and oversaw the introduction of the 1970 Terms of Reference. The

Inquiry has seen them; and the limited gist evidence that we have had disclosed³⁰⁸ confirms that DAC Gilbert consistently attended the SPL meetings from March 1974 to June 1977, often with James Waddell chairing. Special Branch senior officers, with responsibility for the SDS,³⁰⁹ were recipients of the SPL reports and minutes.

The Inquiry is not in possession of any documentation from the Group between 1979 and 1982, although it clearly remained operational.³¹⁰ However, in December 1979, the Security Service rebuffed any discussion about amendments to the Special Branch Terms of Reference, by arguing that the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, had no doubts about the work carried out by Special Branches, including the work for MI5.³¹¹ Whitelaw, was de facto Deputy Prime Minister³¹² to Margaret Thatcher.³¹³

Whitelaw's successor Leon Brittan had a very strong interest in the 1984 Special Branch Guidelines.³¹⁴ His role in both their drafting,³¹⁵ and the tactical considerations surrounding their disclosure to the Home Affairs Select Committee,³¹⁶ suggests that the appetite for intelligence on potential subversives had certainly not declined.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Security Service had repeatedly vetoed³²¹ any attempts to amend the 1970 Special Branch Terms of Reference and the Home Office had delayed consideration because there had been “no public pressure” in respect of Special Branch in the early 1980s.³²² That changed in early 1984 when a Working Party of the Police Panel of the Association of Metropolitan Authorities started asking awkward questions about Special Branch conduct.³²³ Chief Constables became “increasingly nervous”.³²⁴ The pressure was on and work on the guidelines commenced.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The key difference between the 1970 Terms and the 1984 replacement was the section on the Special Branch relationship with MI5.

The 1970 Terms read:³²⁹ *In consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about subversive or **potentially subversive**³³⁰ organisations or individuals.* In practice, as we have heard from almost every officer, that meant “hoovering up” every possible piece of information about anyone who so much as bought a copy of the *Socialist Worker* newspaper.³³¹

The 1984 Terms read:³³² *A Special Branch provides information about extremists and terrorist groups to the Security Service.*

The latter draws attention away from the wholesale collecting and recording of personal information and distracts with the word “provides”; as if to suggest that intelligence was just a by-product of other work (a line that SDS witnesses have been trying, unpersuasively, to hold firm on). Most importantly, it hides the words “potentially subversive” and instead suggests that only *extremists*, who are equated with *terrorists*, have their information passed on.

It is extraordinarily dishonest subterfuge, to try to hide fourteen years of *sinister persecution of harmless citizens for political reasons, and nefarious activity* conducted for their masters at MI5.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Branch officers deciding whether militant trade unionism constituted subversion.

[REDACTED]

The Home Office, Security Services and Police con-
vived to ensure that those engaged in “law-abiding,
non-violent” activities could continue to be
infiltrated.

We ask the Inquiry to be conscious of this all-per-
vading duplicity³⁴⁹ when engaging with Government
about their authorisation and knowledge of the SDS.

“Counter-subversion” and anti-democratic “assistance”

The reality was very different. At the time Special
Branch Records division held files on *over a million
individuals*.³⁴⁰

The acknowledged lack of any subversive threat, cou-
pled with the expansion of Special Branch
intelligence gathering capability, raises an obvious
question, to what use was the SDS intelligence put?

[REDACTED]

It has been a key feature of the SDS evidence, that
first, they gathered everything they could and sec-
ondly that they never received complaints about the
intelligence they were gathering. They generated vast
amounts for the benefit of their “customers”, many of
whom have been the subject of redactions.

[REDACTED]

What is clear from the Cabinet Office disclosure is
that the various inter-departmental groups in govern-
ment were “customers”; be they direct as a result of
Special Branch membership of those groups from
1972 or circulated via the Security Service as a prod-
uct of their “intimate” relationship”. The purpose of
these groups was not simply to gather intelligence but
to use it for what they called “counter-subversion”.³⁵⁰

[REDACTED]

Bearing in mind, the lack of any threat, the organisa-
tions targeted and the methods adopted,
“counter-subversive” activity would be more appro-
priately termed “anti-democratic” activity.

[REDACTED]

That activity took a number of different forms,³⁵¹
many of which are mirrored in the deployments of
undercover officers.

When the Guidelines were sent to constables they
were accompanied by a confidential covering letter
Paragraph 5 of that letter had been specifically
included by the Security Service³⁴⁷ and included
widening of the subversion definition to include
“long term aims” applicable to those “*who may
become subversive in the future*”.³⁴⁸ Paragraph 7
dropped any mention of threat at all, for Special

Disruption

It was widely recognised in Government, that inter-
nal quarrels and dissent were a “great disabling
factor” for political groups.³⁵² In August 1968, the
Official Committee on Communism (Home) Work-
ing Group on Counter Measures held a meeting³⁵³ in
respect of the upcoming October demonstration. The
first two “main points” of discussion were a recogni-
tion of “*dissension within the organising committee*”
and then a **stated aim to exploit that dissent**; “*The
object should be to allow it to be a demonstrable fail-
ure, by encouraging the process of disruption among*

the organisers and thus minimising its chances of success”.³⁵⁴ Bearing in mind the primacy of that aim in the discussion, there must have been additional consideration on the methods that could be used to achieve it. What is the best way of encouraging disruption in a group and minimising its chances of success? The participants in that meeting, like those that followed, included representatives of the Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, Departments of Education and Employment and of course the Security Service;³⁵⁵ all united in their aim of encouraging disruption.

The SDS had been founded in the preceding month.³⁵⁶ The chances of undercover officers having a disruptive impact on the organisers, i.e. those at the higher levels of the organisations involved, were limited by the short time available before the demonstration. However, the *potential* must have been noted.

The key Ministerial representatives at that 1968 meeting were also present at the meeting of the Subversion at Home Committee the following year, in which the continuation of the SDS was discussed.³⁵⁷ Sir Burke Trend, Richard Thistlethwaite from MI5, John Tyrer from the Foreign Office, David Heaton as Secretary and of course, the Home Office representative Sir James Waddell.³⁵⁸ The growing *potential* that came with longer deployments and deeper infiltrations cannot fail to have been noticed by individuals who had been specifically tasked to “counter-subversion”.

There may not be evidence of disruption being caused by undercover officers in 1968. But there is the clearest possible evidence of disruption being caused in 1975 and 1976, by Rick Clark’s deployment into the *Troops Out Movement*.³⁵⁹ The paper trail from that deployment leads to the inescapable conclusion that the disruption was known of, and approved by, Special Branch management and the Security Service.³⁶⁰ At the time of Clark’s deployment, Commanders Rollo Watts and Matt Rodger were on the recipient lists of the SPL reports and minutes, and DAC Gilbert was a frequent attendee at the meetings.³⁶¹

The focus of the Inquiry so far, has been on SDS intelligence gathering. However, since at least 1972, the Metropolitan Police Special Branch was directly involved via the SPL with those involved in using intelligence for “counter-subversion”. Further, and very importantly, at some point between 1970 and 1984 the general remit of Special Branch in respect of subversion, changed. In 1970, Special Branch was tasked with gathering intelligence for the Security Service;³⁶² by 1984 the tasking was widened to include not only intelligence gathering, but also *assistance*.³⁶³

The Clark deployment stands out as a demonstrative example of *assistance* in “counter-subversion”,³⁶⁴ by

disruption and de-stabilisation. There is nothing comparable in any of the other undercover deployments in Tranche 1. It may be that as an over-confident deployment, that nearly ended in disaster for everyone from the SDS up to Government, a decision was taken to tone down that kind of activity. It may simply be that the example stood out because the Troops Out Movement, as an umbrella organisation, was an easier target for disruption than others. The larger, democratic centralist, *Socialist Workers’ Party*, for example, would have been a much harder target.

The Clark deployment is not the only example of assistance.³⁶⁵

Another, much more proximate to the 1984 Guideline drafting, is a Security Service liaison note detailing a meeting between MI5 and Chief Inspector Short of the SDS in 1983. MI5 passed on a brief to the SDS on instructions in respect of the *Socialist Workers’ Party*. Short, informed MI5 that “Phil Cooper” (HN155), who had infiltrated the *Socialist Workers’ Party* Headquarters, “is brewing a row at HQ”.³⁶⁶

That line, though short, is important. First, it is directly indicative of *assistance*, rather than intelligence gathering. Secondly, it is an example of *disruptive assistance* aimed at the SWP. Thirdly, it was relevant enough to the SDS/MI5 relationship for a Chief Inspector to refer to it, and MI5 to note and record it. Fourthly, the fact that the “row” was “brewing”; demonstrates that it was an ongoing action; the reference to it, and noting of it, are plainly indicative of approval. Fifthly, for a Chief Inspector to know of the disruptive assistance, it must have been reported to him. The lack of additional supporting evidence does not mean it did not happen. It shows that the reports have not been disclosed, by the Metropolitan Police or MI5. The best way to ensure that the Inquiry concludes there is “no evidence” of an activity or tactic, is to provide no evidence of it.

Membership, Propaganda and Electoral interference

It is no coincidence that Special Branch membership of the Committee on Subversion in Public Life immediately followed the introduction of the “MI5 definition” and its focus on “political” and “industrial” activity.

The very first report³⁶⁷ that Special Branch received from the SPL, was titled “The impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activity”.³⁶⁸ It was sent to Deputy Assistant Commissioner Gilbert,³⁶⁹ as well as a number of other recipients who were specifically tasked with “counter-subversion” via their Committee memberships.³⁷⁰ A significant focus, from the perspective of Special Branch and the SDS, was on

the Socialist Workers Party.³⁷¹ In particular their “main objective... to attract *new recruits* by the virulence of their propaganda”.³⁷² This was followed by some detail on the circulation and “influence” of the *Socialist Worker* newspaper, which “contributed to the propagation of militant³⁷³ attitudes in industry generally”.³⁷⁴ The emphasis was on: first, the ability of the *Socialist Workers Party* to increase its membership and secondly, the quality and effectiveness of its media.

The membership figures of the *Socialist Workers Party* were a constant fixation of Government.³⁷⁵ Equally, the media more generally was a fascination for the various “counter-subversion” groups. The Cabinet Office documents detail a number of examples of Government manipulation of the mainstream media to further its ends.³⁷⁶

It is not a surprise that Government was so fixated. The *Socialist Workers’ Party* were not advocating a “putsch”, they were advocating a process, of heightening awareness and winning people over “to try to achieve a more democratic society”.³⁷⁷ A significant part of that campaigning work in and around 1972, was in industry and was proving very effective.³⁷⁸

A study of “the range of possible counter-subversion measures”³⁷⁹ must have included consideration of methods to limit Party membership and newspaper circulation. It is no co-incidence that post 1972, a large number of the many³⁸⁰ SDS officers who infiltrated the *Socialist Workers’ Party*, took positions as either Membership Secretaries or Newspaper organisers.³⁸¹ The officer tendencies to downplay these roles as menial,³⁸² are in conflict with the Government’s preoccupation. They were key roles.

The role of a Membership Secretary in any organisation is not to simply record membership, but to engage with and encourage that membership. The role of the ‘Paper Organiser’ in the *Socialist Workers’ Party* was to promote the sales of the newspaper which was the foundation on which the Party was built.³⁸³ It was a “very, very central role.”³⁸⁴

The SDS taking positions of responsibility within organisations, fitted the Government requirement for pervasive, oblique and unattributable action.³⁸⁵ It is self-evident that it would be de-stabilising and anti-democratic, whether it led to orchestrated disruption³⁸⁶ or simply put an un-committed individual in a role that would have been more productively taken by someone else.³⁸⁷ The latter was consistent with the Government view that “low-level” “counter-action” was “often effective”.³⁸⁸

Trade Unions:

The main concern in Special Branch’s first SPL briefing was the extent to which “the influence and standing of many right-wing [trade union] leaders had been reduced”. It bemoaned a “general swing in major unions away from moderate or right-wing policies”³⁸⁹ and the “difficulties” that “national officials” were having in controlling shop stewards and the wider trade union membership.³⁹⁰ The Government problem was with trade union militancy, and the challenges it raised to their social policy and State legislation.³⁹¹ Government’s clear aim was to put an end to it.³⁹²

Secret “counter-subversion” documents boasted about the success that Government had had in 1971, including in influencing “certain key trade union elections”.³⁹³ But the successful strike action of 1972³⁹⁴ had shown that electoral interference in the trade unions was not enough. The rank and file and unofficial, factory based, leadership were immune to it. The Government had difficulty putting agents directly onto the shop floor. Certain Parliamentarians and trade unionists were very alive to the threat.³⁹⁵ Strike action, sit-ins and unwillingness to negotiate were not unlawful.

But the extension of Special Branch powers via the “industrial” addition to the subversion definition allowed for widespread indirect infiltration and monitoring of the trade union rank and file. Any organisation that MI5 said was “potentially subversive”³⁹⁶ could be infiltrated; and so any campaign designed to challenge Government policy³⁹⁷ could be dealt with as if it were designed to overthrow the State. Militant trade unionism was the target behind the pretence of dealing with subversion.³⁹⁸

The specific exclusion of any “subversive” threat in relation to infiltrations of militant trade unionism in the 1984 Guidelines,³⁹⁹ cannot have been an accident of drafting. It was a simply a continuation of what had been happening since 1972.

The *Socialist Workers’ Party* Campaigns such as the *Rank and File Organising Committee* and the *Right to Work Campaign* were, in the words of the SDS themselves, “to fight for the rights of Trades Unions, individuals and groups of workers, against the oppression of management and Government, in particular at this time of high unemployment and anti-union legislation”.⁴⁰⁰ The aim, again in the SDS’s own words, was for “pressure [to] be brought to bear against management and... government, when fighting short time working, redundancies and unemployment, or demanding improved pay and/or conditions”.⁴⁰¹

That was exactly what Government was worried about and their various groups were designed to deal with. That was why the *Socialist Workers’ Party* was infiltrated at the Headquarters level on the direct

orders of MI5,⁴⁰² and why the *Right to Work Campaign* was specifically targeted.

‘Colin Clark’ and ‘Phil Cooper’ harvested intelligence on the organisational structure of the *Socialist Workers Party*, its administration, finances and membership. They used their attendance at almost every National Delegate Conference and Annual Skegness Rally from 1977 to 1983 to gather and capture personal details of hundreds of attendees. They used their access to the Party Headquarters and computer system to steal the organisation’s data, and the data of its members, even going so far as controlling finances.⁴⁰³ As ordered by MI5.

Blacklisting

The focus of all the reporting⁴⁰⁴ was employment,⁴⁰⁵ education⁴⁰⁶ and trade union⁴⁰⁷ related.

When Government wrings its hands about trade union militancy and orders “*positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals*”;⁴⁰⁸ What possible explanation is there for the repeated, targeted and obsessive harvesting of that specific information?

The ultimate anti-democratic counter measure is blacklisting. We dealt with the evidence on this topic extensively in our last opening statement.⁴⁰⁹

Lindsey German was questioned by Counsel to the Inquiry on the apparent inconsistency between the *Socialist Workers’ Party* being an open organisation⁴¹⁰ and the need for security measures at the 1978 National Delegates Conference. It was a State led line of questioning, designed to suggest that there was something sinister about the Party taking security measures.⁴¹¹ It was somewhat ridiculous bearing in mind that the State had comprehensively infiltrated the Conference and was fully aware that there was nothing remotely sinister going on.

The principle reason for the security was fear of the threat of blacklisting.⁴¹² By the late 1970s it was common knowledge that people were being sacked and could not find work because of their political opinions.⁴¹³ Blacklisting was a counter-measure. Not only did it take politically active people out of the workplace,⁴¹⁴ it made people afraid to be politically active or militant, there or indeed anywhere else.

We recognise the step in the right direction that Counsel to the Inquiry has taken on this topic⁴¹⁵ but the conclusions do not go far enough on a considered analysis of the evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it.

1: There is no doubt that SDS intelligence reports were used for “vetting” purposes. The evidence

from the managing officers was clear on the vetting value to MI5 of the SDS reporting.⁴¹⁶

Vetting did not only apply to work in Government departments. It also applied to public corporations and “List-X firms”; private corporations engaged on Government security contracts.⁴¹⁷ The list of those private corporations was extensive;⁴¹⁸ and they covered all sectors of the economy.

2: There is no doubt that SDS reports were used for blacklisting.

Government accepted and excused the inevitability of it.⁴¹⁹ Employers “pleaded” for intelligence and “*when a Special Branch officer is... seeking help from an employer, or from a union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in a one-way traffic.*”

It should not be asking a “good deal to expect” a police officer to abide by the criminal law on bribery and corruption.⁴²⁰ It is interesting that Sir James Waddell thought that it was; and that he was prepared to share that view so openly with the Home Secretary himself.⁴²¹



Unsurprisingly, the Government’s own approach was consistently duplicitous. The rules may prevent it but “*Where there was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations, it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk.*”⁴²² The Government simply directed employers to “*non-official organisations such as the Economic League*”⁴²³ or “*Industrial Research and Information Services Limited*” (IRIS).⁴²⁴ IRIS was the unofficial body that the Governments’ “counter-subversion” groups had liaised with to influence trade union elections.⁴²⁵ They were all working hand in glove.

The SDS reporting on the national membership and trade union affiliations of the *Socialist Workers Party* was ordered by the Security Service. The details were provided to the Security Service and from there, there was no limit on the onward dissemination.

Conclusion

In the early 1970’s there was a fundamental change in what the SDS was to be, and what it was expected to deliver. It would no longer be a case of an officer

sitting at the back of a public meeting and taking notes. It was a squad that was driven to be deep undercover; to draft reports on anything and everything.⁴²⁶ Officers were assigned to organisations for four to five years, using the names of dead children to establish their ‘legend.’ It was a squad that would report extensively on trade unionists, socialists, anti-apartheid activists, communists, and those who wanted troops out of Ireland.

Officers such as Rick Clark not only entered an organisation, he instigated and helped establish a branch of that organisation – the *Troops Out Movement*. Following the new direction of what was expected of an SDS officer, he then fought his way to the top of the movement. Along the way he was happy use people as stepping stones. He invaded peoples’ lives, and used sex as a tactic to build his credibility. He abused friendships, and undermined activists who were genuinely committed to the cause. Rick Clark was not a rogue officer. He was a foot soldier to the new strategy. His activities were understood, known and crucially, directed.⁴²⁷ They became a blueprint for officers, as they joined campaigns and political parties and moved their way into positions of influence.⁴²⁸

Rick Clark is important to this Inquiry as an example of what was to come from the early 1970’s. He represented the new strategy of not just the SDS but the British establishment. An establishment that had already opened a million files on its citizens.

The disclosure we have reviewed demonstrates that political policing was organised on a scale that should shock everyone; not just because of what was being done, but the impact it had on the lives of ordinary people. It was surveillance and spying on an industrial scale.

The new strategy was built on deep infiltration of campaigns and political parties by SDS officers; funded and directed by a cabal of state institutions from Special Branches to the Security Services, from the Home Office to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It included a cast of senior civil servants and outside bodies such as the Economic League.⁴²⁹ This army of surveillance lead all the way from the door of successive Cabinet Ministers and successive Prime Ministers.⁴³⁰

In their defence the British establishment claimed to be defending democracy, but it was not a defence of democracy, it was the undermining of democracy in defence of the establishment.

[James Scobie KC | Garden Court Chambers](#)
[Piers Marquis | Doughty Street Chambers](#)
[Paul Heron | Public Interest Law Centre](#)

10th February 2023.

Section notes

- 1 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-richard-chessum-and-mary-for-tranche-1-phase-2/>
- 2 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/>
- 3 Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 132: *“I’m also deeply indebted to you for the care and thoughtfulness of the written and oral evidence that you’ve provided. My knowledge of the events of 1975 and 1976 in which you participated when I started the Inquiry was very little, as I demonstrated by saying that the deployment of “Rick Gibson” was unremarkable. Plainly it wasn’t. I’m grateful -- very grateful to you for all you’ve done to help put me right about that.”*
- 4 UCPI0000012122.
- 5 UCPI0000012122 and Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).
- 6 MPS-0728678
- 7 MPS-0728678 and Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).
- 8 Both Richard Chessum and “Mary” were recorded as “no trace” on Special Branch records when Clark named them in reports from 30th of January 1974 UCPI0000012122/3 and UCPI0000012136/1. Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 30): *I had really decided to bow out of active politics a little bit. And it wasn’t until Gibson arrived on the scene that -- that I got involved again.* See also Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 64-65).
- 9 Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 121 to 123.
- 10 Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 69-70). “Mary” statement January 2018 paragraph 12.
- 11 “Mary” statement January 2018 paragraphs 8 and 9.
- 12 See chronologically: MPS-0728710, MPS- 0728718, MPS-0728721, MPS-0728730, MPS-0728667, MPS-0728669,

- MPS-0728697, MPS-0728755, MPS-0728736, MPS-0728762, MPS-0728772, MPS-0729779, MPS-0728785,
- 13 MPS-0728730, MPS-0728761, MPS-0728774, UCPI0000012332, UCPI0000012328, UCPI000009684, UCPI000009733, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790, UCPI000009790.
- 14 UCPI0000010775, UCPI0000021388,
- 15 Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 104).
- 16 Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 109 - 113).
- 17 SDS Tradecraft Manual MPS-0527597/8 para 3.1.2. The Manual was authored in February 1995 and updated in March 1996 (MPS-0527598/2).
- 18 See for example Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 80, 91, 101, 126-127, 128, 129.
- 19 Geoffrey Craft joined the SDS as an Inspector in "the very early part of 1974" (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 7).
- 20 Craft's Central Record of Service (MPS-0734949: not disclosed on OPUS) records his promotion to Detective Chief Inspector in November 1976 (see Craft statement MPS-0747446/8 paragraph 21). However, it appears that he took on the role of Head of SDS prior to that time (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 7), as reports as early as February 1976 (see MPS-0728678) and July 1976 (see UCPI0000010719) are signed off "Chief Inspector GTM Craft". In any event, Craft describes the roles of Inspector and Chief Inspector in the SDS as "interchangeable" (MPS-0747446/8)
- 21 He left the SDS in approximately September 1977 (see Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 8).
- 22 The first reports associated with HN297 commence in November 1974 (see UCPI0000015053, UCPI0000014979, UCPI0000015060). Richard Chessum believes he first met HN297 in December 1974 (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 38). The first report attributable to HN297 was from February 1975, referencing a meeting on 30th January 1975 (see UCPI0000012122). Clark's withdrawal was discussed between (HN357) Chief Superintendent Bicknell and Commander Ops (HN1254 Rollo Watts) in September and October 1976 (see MPS-0732910 and MPS-0732916).
- 23 First Witness statement of Geoffrey Craft MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12.
- 24 The full Rule 10 question submission, listing all questions and referencing all sources, can be found annexed to these submissions at www.pilc.org.uk/tranche-1-closing-statement.
- 25 Craft gave evidence on 18th of May 2022. Rule 10 questions were due to be submitted on behalf of Non-State Core Participants on 11th of May 2022. The questions template on behalf of Richard Chessum and "Mary" was submitted to ILT on 3rd of May 2022 at 13:52.
- 26 Craft retired as Chief Superintendent of "B" Squad (MPS-0747446/61).
- 27 See for example Closed officer evidence MPS-0748061/45 "Geoff Craft's attitude was sort of conservative and straight down the line"
- 28 MPS-0747446/41 : paragraph 97: *"I am told Rick Clark [took senior roles]. I did not know that he was prominent in establishing the SE London branch of TOM, nor did I know anything about his positions of responsibility. I would be very surprised if he did play such a senior role in the group"*.
- 29 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 78.
- 30 Unfortunately, much of the evidence that followed on this topic fell under the Restriction Order that was granted at 12:32.
- 31 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 82.
- 32 Craft witness statement: MPS-0747446/14 paragraph 32: "I had day to day involvement in the deployments of SDS undercover officers. We held 1:1s with officers as and when required and there were twice weekly group meetings.... At the twice-weekly meetings everyone would discuss their deployments, who did what with [sic] where, and what was developing in certain areas".
- 33 Craft witness statement: MPS-0747446/48 paragraph 113: "We kept in close contact with the officers, met regularly with them and they met regularly with us; we would spot signs of difficulty. I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot".
- 34 MPS-0747446/17 paragraph 35.
- 35 MPS-0747446/16 paragraph 35.
- 36 MPS-0728678/2
- 37 MPS-0728710 18th March 1975
- 38 MPS- 0728718 2nd of April 1975
- 39 MPS-0728721 7th April 1975
- 40 MPS-0728730 21st April 1975
- 41 MPS-0728731, MPS-0728734, MPS-0728735: May 1975
- 42 MPS-0728667 16th of June 1975
- 43 MPS-0728669 23rd June 1975
- 44 MPS-0728675 27th of June 1975
- 45 MPS-0728697 7th of July 1975
- 46 MPS-0728755 19th of September 1975
- 47 MPS0728736 20th of October 1975
- 48 MPS – 0728762 17th of November 1975
- 49 MPS-0728772
- 50 MPS-0729779 11th of February 1976
- 51 MPS0728785 March 1976
- 52 Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 129
- 53 MPS-0728730 21st April 1975
- 54 MPS-0728761 13th of October 1975
- 55 MPS-0728774 January 1976
- 56 UCPI0000012332 and UCPI0000012328
- 57 UCPI000009684
- 58 UCPI000009733
- 59 UCPI000009790
- 60 UCPI000009790
- 61 UCPI000009790
- 62 UCPI0000010775 25 July 1976
- 63 UCPI0000021388
- 64 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-the-core-participants-represented-by-paul-heron/> Page 22 of 26.
- 65 After Craft's main evidence, the lack of questioning was raised as a matter of concern with CTI. One document was then put; the unsatisfactory answers were not engaged with. See Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 pages 146-147.
- 66 See for example: UCPI0000021388, MPS-0728676/4, UCPI0000021388, UCPI000009733, UCPI0000010775, UCPI000009790.
- 67 Where minute sheets of the reports have been disclosed, it is apparent that Craft was forwarding them on to Chief Superintendents of both "C" Squad and "B" Squad and others. See as an example: MPS-0728668/2

- 68 See UCPI0000030059 a Security Service minute sheet, from September 1977, confirming that MI5 knew that SDS had an agent in Big Flame in the autumn of 1976, and that they knew who he was. *"I have found MPSB unwilling in the past to admit they are able to provide information in certain fields of interest even when they provide detailed reports on them (which may often indicate the identity of their agent). I am thinking particularly of my interest in covering the Big Flame National Conference in October 1976, which I thought might be possible through an SDS agent then in Big Flame.* (REDACTED)."
- 69 Because they had seen every report, from Clark's establishing the South-East London branch, through his rise to the top and to his conspiring in respect of the coup.
- 70 (HN368) SDS Sergeant from September 1974 to April 1978: Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 2 to 4.
- 71 See for example Geoffrey Craft himself, at MPS-0747446/26 paragraph 66: *"The concern from the SDS was to provide the quality of intelligence which would enable the policing of public order activities to preserve our right to free speech and to demonstrate our views, within the rule of law, based upon parliamentary democracy. That was always the guiding light of what we did."*
- 72 Statement of Richard Chessum UCPI0000034182/13
- 73 Troops Out Movement Constitution MPS-0728728/6
- 74 MPS-0728728/3
- 75 MPS-0728728/3
- 76 MPS-0728734
- 77 from the TOM, his deployment continued elsewhere
- 78 HN298 Statement MPS-0746258/48: paragraph 169 to 171.
- 79 It is not clear exactly when HN298 stopped reporting on the TOM. There is a report authored by him on the 22nd of August 1974 UCPI0000016345. Thereafter, there is a gap in his reporting (see IDX058/3) until January 1975 by which time he was infiltrating the WRP. Logically he must have stopped reporting on TOM in the autumn/early winter of 1974.
- 80 Richard Chessum believes he first met Rick Clark in December 1974 (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 38) after Clark had previously written to the TOM National Office (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 36).
- 81 Statement of HN244 McIntosh: MPS-0747578/4 paragraph 6: "I left the SDS in the autumn of 1979", paragraph 14: "I was posted to the SDS in April 1976".
- 82 Statement of HN244 McIntosh: MPS-0747578/28 paragraph 89(a) "Troops Out was successfully infiltrated. Over the course of my service in the SDS, a number of individuals – I cannot remember precisely- were at one stage or another part of Pro-Irish organisations."
- 83 See UCPI0000028816/1 paragraph (b)
- 84 Statement of HN96: MPS-0745772/38 paragraph 184
- 85 UCPI0000016711, UCPI0000016769, UCPI0000016816.
- 86 UCPI0000018793/3
- 87 HN298 Statement MPS-0746258/48: paragraph 167: *"It had no subversive objectives and as far as I am aware did not employ or approve the use of violence to achieve its objectives"*.
- 88 1981-1983 MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12
- 89 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 108
- 90 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 108
- 91 HN298: 1974, HN297: 1975-1976, HN96: 1980-1983. Unknown officer(s) some point in 1977-1979.
- 92 MPS-0728980 page 5.
- 93 MPS-0728980/5 Annual Report 1976: "The political sensitivity of the SDS operation is fully recognised by all officers concerned and, to protect the ultimate defence line, great care is taken to ensure that penetration of an organisation can be fully justified on the basis of the Commissioner's responsibility for the preservation of public order in the Metropolis". Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 63: *"if the operation was to become public, the Commissioner had a strong defence. That we were acting, as police are sworn to act in preservation of the Queen's peace... It would be an embarrassment if the Commissioner didn't have the defence, and the defence was quite clear, I think."*
- 94 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 106.
- 95 MPS-0728980/3 paragraph 3.
- 96 Angus McIntosh Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 38
- 97 See MPS-0728938, UCPI0000012136, UCPI0000012136, MPS-0728205, UCPI0000012135, UCPI0000006936, UCPI0000012737, MPS-0728938 and <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-richard-chessum-and-mary-for-tranche-1-phase-2/> page 5.
- 98 UCPI0000011895
- 99 MPS-0748355/42
- 100 <https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Year.html>
- 101 MPS—0747446/9 "All of Special Branch had to be vetted and anything out of the ordinary could cause questions with vetting".
- 102 MPS—0747446/9 "we were looking for people had a good reputation within the Branch in terms of the enquiries they did and the way they conducted themselves"
- 103 MPS—0747446/9 paragraph 24.
- 104 MPS-0748061/44
- 105 MPS-0748061/47
- 106 Closed officer gist transcript: MPS-0748061/47 and Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 13
- 107 MPS-074806/61 *"Rick had a certain reputation and it gradually came out he had a sexual relationship which led to his being compromised, and that was, to my way of thinking, generally well known among the existing SDS officers"*
- 108 MPS-0747446/8 "The principle aspect of this role [Chief Inspector and Detective Inspector] was the supervision and care of the people in the field". "It was very much a case of supervision, in the real sense". MPS-0747446/9 "Supervision had to be very close".
- 109 MPS-0747446/41 "We, the team, were so close that I am sure somebody would have picked something up".
- 110 That we know of: HN297, HN300, HN354 and (when Craft was Chief Superintendent at "S" squad) HN155 and HN 106.
- 111 HN304 statement MPS-0742282/42 paragraph 146 (a)
- 112 MPS-0748061/61
- 113 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 73.
- 114 MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12. Geoffrey Craft retired in 1986 at the age of 49.
- 115 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 143
- 116 See Richard Chessum (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 104).
- 117 "Mary" and her flatmate.

- 118 On the 11th of February 1974, Richard Clark submitted his very first report (UCPI0000012122) arising from his deployment. It dealt with a meeting on the 30th of January 1974, at Goldsmiths College. It included mention of a woman who had chaired the meeting, and included a physical description of her and an approximate age. A week later, on the 17th of February 1974, DC Richard Clark submitted five reports, at the same time, to the SDS management (MPS-0728678, UCPI0000012136, MPS-0728205, MPS-0728938, MPS-0728206 and UCPI0000012135). The first of the five (MPS-0728678) related to a meeting, on the 6th of February, in the student union bar at Goldsmiths college, to discuss the formation of the South-East London branch of TOM. The five attendees at that meeting were noted as Richard Clark, Richard Chessum, his girlfriend "E", "Mary" and a male member of the IMG. The second report (MPS-0728205) provided details on Richard Chessum; including a detailed physical description, his address, and the fact that he was "understood" to be co-habiting with his named girlfriend. The third report (MPS-0728938) provided details of that girlfriend, including a detailed physical description and the "understanding" that she lived with Richard Chessum. The fourth report (UCPI0000012136) provided details of "Mary", including a detailed physical description and her address. The fifth report (UCPI0000012135) provided further details on the woman who had chaired the 30th of January meeting. This time it included a more detailed physical description, a revised assessment of her height, a different (exact) age, and the fact that she shared her flat with "Mary"; implicitly stating that both she and "Mary" were single. Also included in the physical description was the fact that she suffered from "frequent" asthmatic attacks. ***But "Mary's flatmate" had not attended the meeting on the 6th of February. There had been no meeting at which Clark could have ascertained her exact age or height, or her more detailed physical description, or the frequency of her asthma attacks, or the fact (rather than an understanding) of her flat share with "Mary".***
- 119 "I do not think any police officers were more carefully monitored than this lot" Statement of Geoffrey Craft MPS-0747446/48 paragraph 113.
- 120 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 71: Q: And what is your view so far as the activist or member of the public who is deceived into sexual relationships by one of your undercover officers? A: I'm not happy about it, but what is the alternative? Because accepting that rape is not involved, does all sexual activity in terms of modern moral attitudes require a legally endorsed exchange of CVs before sexual activity takes place? And so to the extent to which the man concerned was operating under false colours, is that something which one could prevent? I don't know. That is the way my mind is working. It's wrong, but how does one prevent it?
- 121 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page: I don't know. All I can say is that perhaps one – it needs to be emphasised regularly with the -- before it starts and also regularly while the operation is continuing, because I don't think there is any way of preventing it because these things happen, but it – it is a problem.
- Q. Did you ever take the view that "these things happen" whilst you were leading the SDS?
A. No, I did not.
- 122 See above.
- 123 Statement of HN304: MPS-0742282/44 paragraph 146 *"jokey remarks were occasionally made in SDS meetings which I took at face value and believed to be based on truth. I assumed that the women involved were activists, but cannot say whether this was the case or not. My supervising officers would have been aware of these remarks because they were present at the meetings when they were made."* T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 40 "Q. Can I move now to what you heard in terms of joking and banter about Richard Clark and sexual activity in his undercover role. Could you tell us what you can recall, please? A. I can tell you simply that although I cannot recall the conversation -- any conversation verbatim, I can tell you that what I heard left me in no doubt that the management were aware of that officer's behaviour. Q. And when you say "that officer's behaviour", what behaviour are we talking about? A. Sexual -- sexual relations". Page 41: Q. And in terms of the detective inspectors, are you including in the circle of knowledge Detective Inspector Craft? A. I'm including anybody who was in that management structure at that time. They could not have failed to have drawn the obvious conclusions from the comments that were being made."
- 124 T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 42
- 125 MPS-0747446/13 Para 30 *"I was very much involved in the invention, development and assessment of cover identities... We felt very secure on birth... knew it was a pretty secure method. I very much oversaw this"*.
- 126 Transcript T1P3 Day 8 page 13: *"I didn't recruit him personally, but I -- I was involved assisting his undercover background". Although at page 18 he retracted this: "Do you recall whether or not you assisted him to build his cover legend? A: No not specifically"*.
- 127 MPS-0728981 SDS Annual Report, paragraph 10, authored by Craft's successor, Pryde.
- 128 MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 14.
- 129 MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 13.
- 130 MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 15.
- 131 See for example: UCPI0000035264: February 1973: Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister: *"Ministers should be warned of the importance of maintaining secrecy about this enterprise. Very great political damage indeed could be done if it became known that the Government maintained an organisation which could easily be mis-interpreted as "spying" on good, honest trade unionists and others who claim to defend the liberty of the subject!"*
- 132 UCPI0000035100 Labour MPs raising concerns with the Home Secretary about Special Branch activity in April 1974. See also UCPI0000035101 and UCPI0000035102: Sir James Waddell's advice to the Home Secretary (Roy Jenkins) as to how to approach the matter.
- 133 MPS-0731077: Commander's Memorandum No.309, dated 25th of June 1986: "The attention of all officers is directed to the under-mentioned persons:- Richard Chessum [and others redacted for privacy]."
- 134 See also MPS-0731078 and MPS-0731075
- 135 MPS-0747446/5 paragraph 12 "retiring in 1986 aged 49."

- 136 SDS Tradecraft Manual MPS-0527597/8 para 3.1.2. "We are all familiar with the story of an SDS officer being confronted with his "own" death certificate." The Manual was authored in February 1995 and updated in March 1996 (MPS-0527598/2).
- 137 MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 33: "It was the same for welfare: when things went wrong, I was there to be on hand to discuss where we went. Welfare was always our responsibility as the most senior officers in the SDS. On one occasion Rick Clark thought that he had been rumbled and was called to a meeting in a pub; Derek and I both went and kept observation. This is the only time I remember having to do that."
- 138 MPS-0747446/49
- 139 In fact Craft maintains that "It was inconceivable that the bereaved family would become aware. I can be accused of being naïve...".
- 140 MPS-0747578/6 paragraph 14.
- 141 See for example MPS-730729/1 and MPS-730728/1
- 142 MPS-0747578/16 paragraph 48
- 143 MPS-0747578/50 to 51.
- 144 Interestingly, DS Richard Walker (HN368), who was the Detective Sergeant in the SDS back office from September 1974 to April 1978 (Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 2-12) also makes no reference to the discovery of the death certificate or exfiltration in his statement (MPS-0747527). His references to Rick Clark are restricted to a denial of knowledge of sexual activity (MPS-0747527/39).
- 145 McIntosh became DI in April 1976 (MPS-0747578/6 paragraph 14). Craft left the SDS, as DCI, in around September 1977 (MPS-0747446/7 paragraph 18).
- 146 See MPS-0747446/22 paragraph 51(vii) "Angus McIntosh: we did not overlap at all on the SDS" and paragraph 99 "I do not remember Angus [McIntosh] ever being my Inspector".
- 147 HN244 statement MPS-074578/8 paragraph 23: "I do not remember working with Geoff Craft" and paragraph 114: "I do not remember ever working with Geoff Craft".
- 148 MPS/730728/1 3rd of September 1976 memo from DCI Craft to Chief Superintendent "S" Squad requesting that DI McIntosh and DS Walker accompany SDS officers to Blackburn. MPS/730729/1 20th of September 1976 Letter of thanks to Commissioner Gilbert from Lancashire Chief Constable, noting McIntosh's attendance in Blackburn [in connection with that SDS work] on the 11th September 1976.
- 149 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 151.
- 150 Transcript 19th May 2022 page 18: "Q: By the Inquiry's calculation, when you first joined the SDS, the unit was headed up by Geoffrey Craft, and we understand you have no memory of serving at the same time as him; is that right? A: That's correct, yes."
- 151 Transcript 19th May 2022 page 18: "Yes, I do. I remember going there [to Blackburn], and I really can't understand why I can't recall working with Mr Craft. I can only presume that the major incidents which may have occurred during that time was during a period I was on other courses."
- 152 HN244 statement MPS-0747578/8 paragraph 21: 21st February 1977 to 18th March 1977 and 22nd June 1977 to 23rd of September 1977.
- 153 See Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 53. "Q. He [HN155] describes Mike Ferguson firing questions at him prior to his deployment to ensure that he was prepared for it. A. Yes. Q. Was that something common? Did Mike Ferguson tend to do that with UCOs when they first started? A. Geoff Craft as well. I mean, that was -- part of the job was to make sure they're prepared to go out and test their cover story and all the aspects with it, yes."
- 154 Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 87 and CTI Opening Statement T1P2 176/275 paragraph 30
- 155 T1P3 Transcript 19th May 2022 pages 92-93 questioning from the Chair.
- 156 McIntosh Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 pages 62 to 67. Craft Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 pages 21 to 23.
- 157 Derek Kneale had left the SDS office some months before (IDX096/2: the last SDS reports associated with Kneale are from March 1976). At the time of Clark's uncovering, Kneale was the Detective Superintendent.
- 158 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 23.
- 159 Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022 page 63.
- 160 MPS-0732910: Internal memos between Chief Superintendent Bicknell and Commander Watts, with the Deputy Assistant Commissioner copied in
- 161 Big Flame members reported the events in the pub to Richard Chessum. He was shown the Big Flame file on Clark, which included copies of the birth and death certificates and the note. Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 113
- 162 Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 112
- 163 MPS-0747446/11 paragraph 26
- 164 MPS-0748061/46: Excerpts from Closed officer evidence: "*there were a group of us, four or five or six in this pub, chatting away and I assumed everyone else had heard it [Clark's account that two sexual relationships had led to his compromise] as well*".
- 165 Possibly a third at UCPI0000034307/5 paragraph 23; however, because the evidence is unattributed it is difficult to tell.
- 166 MPS-0748061/45
- 167 MPS-0748061/61: "*Rick had a certain reputation and it gradually came out that he had had a sexual relationship which led to his being compromised and that was, to my way of thinking, generally well known among the existing SDS officers. I wouldn't know if they [managers] knew or if it was just a rank and file thing. I should imagine that some [of the managers] did [know].*"
- 168 i.e. T1P2 Transcript 7th May 2021 page 40, as above.
- 169 September 1977: MPS-0740761/7 paragraph 18
- 170 HN126 Transcript T1P2 12th May 2021 page 54: "Q. Did you consider at any stage the possibility that you might be presented with the death certificate of the individual whose identity you were going to select? A. It wasn't something that I'd thought about, but I was very aware of one of my predecessors having had that done to him a couple of years earlier. It was very much in all our minds when we joined the Squad".
- 171 HN126 Transcript T1P2 12th May 2021 page 55: "I was assured by the staff in the office that it would be okay; and there were other parts of his deployment that I would never have got into, so in my mind it didn't matter. Page 56: "Q.

- And then just going back to your previous answer, that you became aware that Richard or Rick Clark had had his death certificate presented to him, you said that there were parts of his deployment that you would never have gotten into and so it didn't concern you; what bits of his deployment were parts that you would never have gotten into? What were you referring to there? A. I think you probably know what I'm talking about. Q. Well, 126, forgive me, I need to elicit the evidence from you, so that you can explain what it is you mean. A. Well -- Q. So was there something in particular that you were referring to? A. From -- yes, I was talking about the fact that he'd obviously had an affair whilst he was undercover. And as a result of that, suspicions had been brought about, and they had passed -- they'd found his death certificate, or the death certificate of the child, which ..."
- 172 MPS-0732910/1
- 173 See Richard Chessum Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 pages 106, 107 and 112.
- 174 MPS-0747446/15 paragraph 34.
- 175 MPS-0728980/4 paragraph 7.
- 176 UCPI0000034819
- 177 See for example: <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-category-h-core-participants-represented-by-bp-hr-and-hja/> Paragraph 39: Bob Lambert letter to Belinda Harvey. Paragraph 50, 58, 59, 61, 63, 68 and 69: "John Barker" letters to Helen Steel. Paragraph 92: "Bobby Lewis" to "Bea". Paragraph 110: Mark Jenner to "Alison". Paragraph 132 and 134: Jim Boyling postcards and letter to "Rosa", Paragraph 160 and 161: "James Straven" postcards and letter to "Sara".
- 178 Craft first statement MPS-0747446 page 18 paragraph 40
- 179 MPS-0730700 23rd of June 1977
- 180 HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 129
- 181 HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 8
- 182 UCPI0000027451/1 and HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May page 34.
- 183 McIntosh statement: MPS-0747578/14 paragraph 41: "For this reason, I can say with confidence that between 1976 and 1979, the Security Service would have liaised with the SDS at a higher level [than Detective Inspector]."
- 184 UCPI0000028810
- 185 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 4
- 186 MPS-0730099/8: 1975 SDS Annual Report from Chief Inspector Derek Kneale notes, at paragraph 31, that "there has, over the past years, been a decline in the disorders associated with political demonstrations"
- 187 MPS-0748287/8 paragraph 16
- 188 UCPI0000030893.
- 189 HN34 Transcript T1P3 18th May 2022 page 120
- 190 UCPI0000028816: MI5 interest in TOM.
- 191 at UCPI0000030893/1
- 192 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> see pages 9 – 17 of 42.
- 193 See Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 pages 121-122.
- 194 About the intention of those opposing the NF march to gather in Clifton Rise.
- 195 MPS-0748275.
- 196 MPS-0748286/2 paragraph 7.
- 197 MPS-0748278
- 198 MPS-0748286/2 paragraph 7: *that information coming from "a secret source which requires to be protected"*.
- 199 MPS-0748064/4 – 5: HN41 referred to aspects of the police planning at Southall as a "disastrous mistake" and provided evidence of a pre-planned violent clampdown on demonstrators.
- 200 See the Chairman's questioning at transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 128.
- 201 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 16.
- 202 UCPI0000034313/3 Statement of "Madeleine" paragraphs 9-11.
- 203 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 119.
- 204 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 123.
- 205 Transcript T1P3 19th May 2022: Angus McIntosh page 38: *"It [the National Front] was a very violent section and it was often involved in crime, so to put an undercover officer into that would be very, very, very difficult"*.
- 206 MPS-0748287/23 paragraph 43: *"I was of the view that the demonstration should be banned, but I did not share that view publicly. I thought I had washed my hands of Lewisham because I declined to do the assessment as I thought the demonstrations should be banned"*.
- 207 MPS-0748271/3
- 208 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 120-121.
- 209 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 118.
- 210 UCPI0000034739 paragraph 216, UCPI0000014610/5 paragraph 25, and UCPI0000013228.
- 211 See UCPI0000035151/4 paragraph 12. 1981.
- 212 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 123.
- 213 Witness statement of Peter Hain: UCPI0000034091: paragraph 208.
- 214 1968 to 1982
- 215 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May page 16 and page 120.
- 216 <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5802/cmselect/cmhaff/139/13903.htm>
- 217 https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf as at page 26
- 218 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 6 and pages 28-32.
- 219 <https://www.counterfire.org/article/why-fascists-hate-trade-unions/>
- 220 UCPI0000034739/9 Lindsey German
- 221 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 27.
- 222 For example the Industrial Relations Act
- 223 Peelian Principles: see Category H Opening Statement T1P3 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-cat-h-cp-t1p3/> and <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/policing-by-consent/definition-of-policing-by-consent>
- 224 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> See pages 17 to 26 of 42.
- 225 See the 1967 "Responsibilities of Special Branch" UCPI0000030040/1 in which "the prevention of *crimes* directed against the State" was an explicit focus.
- 226 MPS-0748337: The Preface to the Met Police and General Orders 1979:

- 1829 quote from Sir Richard Mayne: *The primary object of an efficient Police is the prevention of crime: the next that of detection and punishment of offenders if crime is committed.*
- To these ends all the efforts of Police must be directed. The protection of life and property, the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime, will alone prove whether those efforts have been successful, and whether the objects for which the police were appointed have been attained.*
- 227 UCPI0000004459/1-2 "Home Office 'Terms of Reference' for Special Branch April 1970". Sent to Chief Constables nationwide on the 15th of June 1970.
- 228 see UCPI0000034262 and UCPI0000035253/4
- 229 Rather than a definition of subversion, see for example CTI's Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Modules 2B and 2C paragraph 34 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/> and CTI's Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Phase 2 paragraph 113 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/counsel-to-the-inquirys-opening-statement-for-tranche-1-phase-2/> Note: Also Sir John Hunt at UCPI0000035311 "*The Directive does not define "subversive"*".
- 230 Terms of Reference for Special Branch UCPI0000004459/4 para. 3
- 231 See for example UCPI0000004455/1 paragraph 2.
- 232 Task of Special Branches: UCPI0000004459/2 and UCPI0000004459/3
- 233 '[...] *[subversives are those who] would contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means.*' as at paragraph 230 <https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C16195994>
- 234 The Profumo judgment was widely published, with much press interest <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/private-lives/relationships/collections/1/parliament-and-the-1960s/lord-dennings-report---profumo-scandal/>
- 235 The full text of paragraph 230 of the Denning report is worth repeating: "*No one can understand the role of the Security Service in the Profumo affair unless he realises the cardinal principle that their operations are to be used for one purpose, and one purpose only, the Defence of the Realm. They are not to be used so as to pry into any man's private conduct or business affairs; or even into his political opinions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is they would contemplate the overthrow of government by unlawful means. This principle was enunciated by Sir Findlater Stewart in his report of the 27th of November 1945... which has formed the guide for the Service ever since. It was re-stated by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in a Directive of the 24th of September 1952, and re-affirmed by every Home Secretary since. Most people in this country would, I am sure, whole-heartedly support this principle, for it would be intolerable to us to have anything in the nature of a Gestapo or Secret Police, to snoop into all that we do, let alone our morals.*"
- 236 Statement of "Witness Z" UCPI00000034250/4 at paragraph 13.
- 237 UCPI0000035240 The Lords debate, in which the "MI5 definition" was first given a public airing, was initiated by Lord Chalfont, with assumed assistance from the IRD. Internal Cabinet Office correspondence (from JM Moss, who was also the Secretary of the suggested that the Cabinet Office (Sir John Hunt, Cabinet Secretary 1973 -1979) "tip-off" the Security Service of the forthcoming debate (Sir Michael Hanley, Director General of the Security Service 1972 – 1978).
- 238 UCPI0000034350/4 at paragraph 14. "*formally adopted by Lord Harris of Greenwich, Minister of State at the Home Office in a debate in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975.*"
- 239 UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 15.
- 240 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements> reference: post 9:49 pm. Lord Harris: "*It is fundamental to our democratic traditions that people should be free to join together to express and further their views, whatever others may think of those views, provided they do not break the law*".
- 241 Then a Minister of State at the Home Office, before becoming Home Secretary in June 1983.
- 242 The occasion was the third annual "Robin Cook debate".
- 243 UCPI000004431/7 7th of November 1979 and later for example: UCPI0000034268 in 1985
- 244 See for example CTI's questioning of Barry Moss: Transcript T1P3 13th May 2022 page 97: *Q: Well, let's take on your watch in 1980. Are you asking yourself -- are you actually addressing your mind to: does the group my officer is infiltrating not only want to overthrow the state but actually is threatening the state now?*
- 245 UCPI000004431/6: "It needs stressing that the role of the Special Branch is less dramatic than its critics make out. It is concerned with offences against the security of the State, with terrorist or subversive organisations..."
- 246 UCPI0000035107/2: paragraph 3: This strict application was not considered until formulated as an answer to criticism of Special Branch in discussion between Sir Hayden Phillips and Leon Brittan "*You will recall that before the debate on SBs on 7 November, Mr Brittan and I discussed how that definition [i.e. the MI5 definition] fitted with the argument that SBs in carrying out their State security functions were acting properly within the police objectives of maintaining the peace and preventing and detecting crime. The answer which Mr Brittan used in the debate was to say that the "definition is such that both limbs must apply before an activity can properly be regarded as subversive". In other words, there has to be an actual or potential threat to the safety or well-being of the State which in police terms will mean the detection of an illegal act or the prevention of a possible illegal act.*"
- 247 See for example UCPI0000004584: 19 December 1984 the confidential letter from Roy Harrington to Chief Constables in which the focus is on intention and not actual threat. As at paragraph 7: *The actions of industrial militants only become subversive when their intent is to threaten the safety and well-being of the State and to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy.*
- 248 UCPI0000004719/1 paragraph 2: "*HMCIC had expressed the view on an earlier occasion that the Security Service sought more information from Specila Branches than they really needed*". 1979

UCPI000004437/4: paragraph 8: *“There have in the relatively recent past been indications that some chief constables are not entirely at ease about the work of Special Branches... whether there was Ministerial approval for the work done by Special Branches on behalf of the Security Service; the nature of the work done on behalf of the Security Service and its potential for creating difficulties in ordinary police work and damaging relations between the police and the public”.* 1980

UCPI000004437/7 paragraph 21: *Home Office awareness in internal documents that there was not “a water-tight basis on which to justify the work of police officers in investigating and recording the activities of subversives”.* 1980

UCPI000004715/4 paragraph 11(a): *“How can the work of police officers (which all members of Special Branches are) in investigating subversion, as currently defined, be justified given that the definition covers some activities which are not, as such, unlawful?”* 1980

249 There had been “no hurry to re-open the question of the existing term of reference” (Sir Robert Armstrong

UCPI000004719/1) and the Security Service blocked attempts to change them (UCPI000004437/5 paragraph 14 and UCPI000004426)

250 UCPI000004538



257 See for example at UCPI000004412/3: in respect of the use of the word “extremists” in paragraph 7 of the Guidelines (see footnote below): *“It is difficult to think of an alternative formula that quite gets the flavour we [the Home Office] want – activities going beyond normal political activism but stopping short of actual terrorism-without raising too many awkward questions”.*

258 UCPI000004538: Guidelines: Paragraph 6: *“A Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks of defending the Realm against attempts at espionage and sabotage or from the actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country which may be judged to be subversive of the State. A large part of this effort is devoted to the study and investigation of terrorism, including the activities of international terrorists and terrorist organisations.*

Paragraph 7: *A Special Branch provides information about extremists and terrorist groups to the Security Service (or, in the case of Irish Republican extremists and terrorist groups, to the Metropolitan Police Special Branch).*

259 UCPI000004584 paragraph 5. *Under the definition of subversion given in the Guidelines (paragraph 20) [i.e. the MI5 Definition], an organisation currently operating within the law may nevertheless be subversive because its long term aims satisfy the definition and therefore be a proper subject of investigation.*

260 UCPI000004542/1: In respect of the free rein to target potential subversion, Roy Harrington wrote to Maurice Buck, Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police and Honorary Secretary of the ACPO Crime Committee: *“I doubt however whether it would be wise to draw this out specifically in Guidelines, which it looks increasingly will be made public. I believe that the existing reference in paragraph 6 to ‘defending the Realm... from the actions of persons or organisations... which may be judged to be subversive of the State’ is wide enough to cover those who it is reasonably believed may become subversive in the future, even if it is not engaged in subversion.”*





- 265 The 26th of February 1975.
<https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1975-02-26/debates/66805980-058a-42cc-b571-fcfd518d301f/SubversiveAndExtremistElements>
- 266 UCPI0000035225
- 267 Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department of Employment and Productivity, Home Office, Department of Education and Science and the Security Services. The secretary was D. Heaton from the Cabinet Office.
- 268 UCPI0000035229 January 1969 Security Service note on 'Subversion in the United Kingdom'.
- 269 UCPI0000035226: March 1970: Minutes of a meeting of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home (attendees: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (GFN Reddaway), Department of Employment and Productivity (AS Kerr), Home Office (JH Waddell), Department of Education and Science (R Toomey), and representatives of Security Services. *"In discussion concern was expressed not only about the size of recent wage settlements but also the increase in their frequency"*. See also UCPI0000035227/3 paragraph (c).
- 270 UCPI0000035225: January 1969: *"intelligence coverage is essential and needs to be maintained if not extended. This means the maintenance by the Security Service of the existing intimate relations with Police Forces, particularly the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police..."*
- 271 UCPI0000035230: February 1969: Minutes of a meeting of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home discussing Security Service note on 'Subversion in the United Kingdom': *"In general, intelligence coverage of subversive groups would at least be maintained, and the close co-operation of Security Service with both police and West European security services would continue"*.
 And re: the SDS itself, at paragraph (b): *"...there was no reason for complacency, and the defensive arrangements made last year [i.e. the 1968 foundation of the SDS] should continue at least until the summer"*. Note: the participants at this meeting were: Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office), JH Peck and J Tyrer (Foreign and Commonwealth Office), AS Kerr (Department of Employment and Productivity), JH Waddell (Home Office), RJ Guppy (Department of Education and Science), CAG Simkins, R Thistlethwaite and an un-named other (Security Service). The Secretary was D. Heaton.
- 272 CTI OS 2B and 2C Annex C.
- 273 UCPI0000035225/2
- 274 UCPI000004459/1 Special Branch Terms of Reference dated 15th of June 1970. Harold Wilson was Prime Minister until 19th of June 1970.
- 275 UCPI0000035255: March 1972: Letter from Sir Burke Trend to the Prime Minister enclosing a Security Service report on 'Subversion in the U.K. - 1972'.
- 276 UCPI0000035253: April 1972: From Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Office.
- 277 The full pertinent text: *"Are we facing a genuinely subversive threat to society in the sense which the Security Service understand the phrase, namely a deliberate, conscious and organised attempt by a number of identifiable individuals to overthrow Parliamentary democracy in this country? Or have we to try to deal with something much more indefinable and elusive in the form of a pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority in this country but although it may be exploited from time to time by individuals concerned to foment particular instances of industrial unrest, is not necessarily in itself a conscious and organised threat to society? I think that most people, having considered the evidence in the memorandum by the Security Service and studied the terms of MI5's "Charter" are driven, however reluctantly, to the latter conclusion.*
- 278 Reginald Maudling, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, Lord Carrington, Robert Carr and Maurice MacMillan respectively.
- 279 Because the Security Service were governed by their "Charter" (which was attached to the letter at UCPI0000035253/4) which limited their engagement to issues concerning "Defence of the Realm" and which were "subversive to the security of the State" (see paragraph 2).
- 280 The letter continued: *If so [i.e. a conclusion that there was no subversive threat], however, certain consequences follow. In particular:- (a) The "Charter" implies certain limits to the assistance which the Security Service can provide in dealing with the problem with which we are concerned. The Home Secretary will probably seek an opportunity to make these limits clear to his colleagues. Even so, it is for consideration whether, without infringing them, MI5 could perhaps adopt a rather more "aggressive" attitude in this field; it is possible to detect between the lines of their memorandum that they would not be wholly averse from an invitation to do so. (b) The Government's main response to the threat, however, must be tailored to the nature of the threat itself, i.e. it must take the form of activity which is pervasive, oblique and "unattributable" as the influences which it is seeking to combat... these efforts could sometimes be supplemented by more covert forms of activity; and after discussion with Mr. Donald Maitland I suggest that Ministers should adopt the proposal at the end of the memorandum by the Security Services and should constitute a small interdepartmental team whose purpose would be to keep subversive developments under review, to improve our information about them and to promote a greater flow of information and guidance to the many bodies - in industry, in the world of the Press and TV and society at large - who are concerned to expose and to withstand "subversion" but are uncertain about the means of doing so and would welcome discrete guidance in this respect"*.
- 281 Discussions were held as to the exact scope of the definition before settling on the wide "MI5 definition". See for example UCPI0000035250: June 30th 1971: Note for the Record of

- a meeting held by Sir Burke Trend to discuss Security Service papers on subversion in industry and the mass media: Reddaway (FCO), also CF Heron from Dept of Employment, Sir Philip Allen (HO), Sir Denis Barnes (DEP), Lord Rothschild (Cabinet Office), D Maitland (10 Downing St) and the Director General of the Security Service. *"In discussion it was suggested that subversion should be defined as the attempt to overthrow constitutional government by non-parliamentary means. There were no signs of highly organised subversion in this sense in the country, but on the other hand there was evidence of political motivation in the seamen's strike of 1966, for example, and in more recent times there had been reports, which could not be entirely refuted, of groups of militants moving from site to site during industrial troubles."*
- 282 UCPI0000035268
- 283 UCPI0000035268/1
- 284 Home Office, Department of Employment, Security Service, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet Office UCPI0000035268/1.
- 285 UCPI0000035268/1.
- 286 UCPI0000035262: October 1972.
- 287 UCPI0000035263/4 October 1972: paragraph 5 includes the new definition. The distribution list of the document, including to DAC Gilbert is at UCPI0000035263/2.
- 288 UCPI0000035253: *"pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most forms of established authority"*.
- 289 UCPI0000035269: Terms of Reference of the Group "To supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned".
- 290 MPS-0728973
- 291 MPS-0728971
- 292 MPS-0728970/7
- 293 MPS-0730906
- 294 UCPI0000031256
- 295 UCPI0000031256 Security Service note for policy file entitled "Relations with MPSB about Industrial Subversion" signed by JL Jones (Deputy Director General of the Security Service 1976-1981, Director General of the Security Service 1981-1985. Member of the Dean Committee. Member of the Interdepartmental Group on Subversion in Public Life). *"On 6 December 1972 I discussed with Colin Woods (AC Crime) and Vic Gilbert the possibility of our obtaining increased assistance from MPSB in our coverage of subversion in industry. F4 [redacted] was present. I explained to Woods that we were under increasing pressure from Whitehall (as Vic Gilbert knew from his membership of the Waddell Group) for more and more detail information about subversive activities in industrial disputes and the degree of subversive influence in trades unions. We needed to increase our agent coverage of industrial affairs, particularly in the Metropolitan Area. I said that although our industrial desk had a useful liaison with MPSB C Squad about industrial activity it was mainly productive of overt information about demonstrations and public meetings. What was needed was long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informant sources. We had some success with Provincial forces in this field."*
- 296 UCPI0000027451/1
- 297 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/opening-statement-from-the-core-participants-represented-by-paul-heron/pages-19-20>.
- 298 UCPI0000035269
- 299 UCPI0000035269
- 300 MPS-0728980/5 paragraph 14.
- 301 Despite a lull post the 1974 General election when the Group's activity (along with that of the Industrial Assessments Group) were suspended until the "wishes of the new Prime Minister" were known UCPI0000035259
- 302 UCPI0000035249 23rd of December 1975
- 303 MPS-0730742, MPS-0730718
- 304 UCPI0000035248: January 1976: Now DAC "Jock" Wilson.
- 305 UCPI0000035248/2
- 306 UCPI0000035248/3
- 307 MPS-0747104 paragraph 61
- 308 UCPI0000035307.
- 309 Victor Gilbert (DAC), Matt Rodger (Commander), R Wilson, Robert Bryan (DAC), Rollo Watts (Commander), Alan Dickinson, HN294 (seniority unclear in 1978 when he was a named recipient, was SDS DS in 1969, DI in 1970 and DCI in 1974) and an officer named as "Low".
- 310 CTI's Opening Statement to Tranche 1 Modules 2B and 2C: Annex A paragraph 6: Sir Hayden Phillips was the Group's Secretary in those years, but does not recall any detail. <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/>
- 311 UCPI000004426: *"My understanding was that he [Sir Robert Armstrong] was anticipating a need to face possible questioning from a new Home Secretary who might have doubts about the work carried out by Special Branches including that for the Security Services. There are, as far as we are aware, no such doubts in the mind of the present Home Secretary. Therefore, we see no need now to revise the terms of reference and no virtue in re-opening the matter with ACPO."*
- 312 And Home Secretary from 4th May 1979 to 11th June 1983.
- 313 There has been limited disclosure, in this Tranche, about the extent of Margaret Thatcher's interest in the subject matter, beyond a note from her Principle Private Secretary to Sir Robert Armstrong, in February 1982, noting that she "was very interested to read the report by the Security Service on exploitation by subversive groups of last year's civil disturbances". UCPI35276/2.
- 314 UCPI0000004539/1
- 315 UCPI0000004412/2 to 3 paragraph 6.
- 316 UCPI0000004412/2 paragraph 3.

321 UCPI0000035095/2 paragraph 7 *"The Security Service have objected to this [amending the 1970 Terms of Reference] in the past, and would probably object vigorously now on the grounds that it will increase public interest at a time when the subject is relatively quiet and has been for some time"* (31st March 1983).

322 UCPI0000035094/1 paragraph 2.

323 UCPI000004455

324 UCPI000004455 paragraph 3: *"Our impression is that the AMA have their teeth firmly into the subject of Special Branches and that they will not let go easily. There are some signs that chief constables are increasingly nervous and waiting anxiously to receive advice and help from the Home Office"*.

[REDACTED]

329 UCPI0000004459/2 (d)

330 Whether potentially "Subversive" as defined in the Terms "Broadly speaking these are any organisation or individual whose purpose is the undermining or overthrow of the established democratic order" or as later defined by the "MI5 definition".

331 See for example UCPI0000015483 and UCPI0000015487.

332 UCPI0000004538/2 at paragraph 7

[REDACTED]

334 UCPI0000004672/1

[REDACTED]

340 MPS-0748348: Correspondence between the Security Service and Special Branch, explaining the Special Branch Records section. *"it is essential that the records are kept in such a way that a "no trace" reply to an enquiry can be confidently given if such is the case...As a rough guide to the scope of the records there are about 300,000 files in existence and the Nominal index contains over 900,000 slips"*. *"There are no over 2300 binders each of which holds between 350 and 400 slips. The basic idea of the system is that each individual will only have one slip in the index."* That correspondence was from 1966, before the SDS was even set up. Our 1984 estimate of one million is conservative in the circumstances.

[REDACTED]

347 UCPI0000004651

348 See UCPI000004542/1 above. Note: the Chief Constable in question, Maurice Buck, was one of those who gave evidence to the HASC.

349 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chesssummary-t1p3/> page 24 of 42.

350 See for example UCPI0000035225: January 1969: Composition and Terms of Reference for the Official Committee on Subversion at Home: *"to focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the UK, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures... to counter these activities and to co-ordinate such counter-measures"*.

351 UCPI0000035277/4: *"The proposed group might aim to encourage and support: (a) the dissemination of information, as an extension of the existing work done by the FCO (IRD) under the auspices of the SH (b) the enlivening of the home information machine, especially in relation to the press, the BBC and the ITA. (c) positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals on the basis of informed appraisal of the problems involved"*. IRD noted as *"enjoying close liaison with SyS and with its existing outlets"*.

352 See for example UCPI0000035252: November 1970 Report on the Extreme Left in Britain: Recognition that internal quarrels (among Trotskyists) are as great a disabling factor.

353 UCPI0000035233/2 paragraph (a)

354 UCPI0000035233/2 paragraph (b)

355 UCPI0000035233/1

356 July 1968 DOC061/4

357 See above and UCPI0000035230/3 paragraph (b)

358 UCPI0000035230/1

359 See above.

360 See above and UCPI0000030059.

361 UCPI0000035307

362 UCPI0000004459 1970 Terms of Reference paragraph (d) *"In consultation with the Security Service to collect, process and record information about subversive or potentially subversive organisations and individuals"*.

363 UCPI000004538/1: Paragraph 5: *A Special Branch gathers information about threats to public order.... Paragraph 6: A*

- Special Branch assists the Security Service in carrying out its tasks of defending the Realm against... from the actions of persons and organisations... which may be judged to be subversive of the State*”.
- It is noteworthy that in an earlier draft of the “Guidelines” (see UCPI0000035286/2 July 1983) recognised the expansion of the role beyond intelligence gathering “... providing the Security Service with information and support for its task of defending the nation...”.
- 364 The Security Service’s role was governed by the wording of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive (UCPI0000034262). Tasking in “defence of the Realm” was not limited to intelligence gathering. “*The interpretation and application of the wording in the MFD was a matter for the Director General [of the Security Service]*” (Witness Z UCPI0000034350/3 paragraph 11). There is some evidence that from December 1977 (UCPI0000034350/4 paragraph 16) to July 1979 (UCPI0000035311/1) the “counter-subversive role of the Security Service” was focused on providing intelligence, but the wider presence of the Security Service on Committees such as the Dean Committee, Official Committee on Subversion at Home and Official Committee on Communism (Home) suggests indicates an active role in counter-subversion activity. Their covert assistance in “counter-subversion” was considered “vital” (UCPI0000035277/5 paragraph 6). See also: UCPI0000035255: March 1972: To the Prime Minister: “*a certain amount of useful counter-subversion work is already done – unattributably – by IRD in conjunction with the Security Service.*”
- 365 See also, another Craft deployment, in respect of the potential use of disruption as a tactic. There is evidence that an SDS officer ‘Roger Harris’ (HN200) infiltrated the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists* in 1975 and became Contacts Organiser there (UCPI000007328). The Twickenham branch was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the Workers’ League. The “opposition”, “dissident” members, most of whom were based at Twickenham, called a Special Conference of IS to raise “inadequacies” within the organisation. The request was refused and the Twickenham branch was suspended which prompted them to vote to break away. (UCPI000009608). HN200 as Contacts organiser at a branch with an average of 15 members was one of those who voted on the break-away. He does not remember how he voted but after the vote he became a member of *Workers’ League*. (Transcript T1P2 5th May 2021 page 169-170 and see Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 98).
- 366 UCPI0000028728
- 367 October 1972
- 368 UCPI0000035263
- 369 And anyone else at Special Branch who “needed to know”: UCPI0000035263/1
- 370 including Reddaway (Co-founder of the Information Research Department (IRD), Official Committee on Subversion at Home, Dean Committee, Home Regional Committee) and Barker (IRD), Waddell (Home Office, Dean Committee, Official Committee on Communism (Home) Working Group on Countermeasures, Chairman, Official Committee on Subversion at Home, Official Committee on Communism (Home)) and Security Service representatives including Hanley and Jones (also Dean Committee). Full distribution list at UCPI0000035263/2. 1972.
- 371 International Socialists, at the time.
- 372 UCPI0000035263/8
- 373 Note: “militant” not “subversive”.
- 374 “*through the SW Litho Press it has produced a number of effective broadsheets and propaganda pamphlets covering industrial situations*”. “*The influence of their press has contributed to the propagation of militant attitudes in industry generally... the “Socialist Worker” with a circulation of 25,000 give(s) considerable coverage to industrial affairs*”.
- 375 Assessments of membership figures were a principle feature of Committee reports throughout the Tranche 1 period and continued into the Tranche 2 period (see for example December 1984 National Archives CAB 301-485 page 62). They were also a primary feature of SDS reporting, see for example UCPI000009608 and UCPI0000013228.
- 376 See for example: UCPI0000035227/3 paragraph (b), UCPI0000035279/4, UCPI0000035279/8. See also: the role of the IRD and IRIS Ltd in the ITV production “Red under the Bed” which was broadcast during the trial of the “Shrewsbury 24”. As at <https://www.pilc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/20201002-RT-AM-Grounds-of-Appeal-Against-conviction-page-ref-1.pdf> from page 35.
- 377 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 125.
- 378 UCPI0000034739/22 Lindsey German paragraphs 47 to 53.
- 379 UCPI0000035277
- 380 24 that we are aware of. See <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chessum-mary-t1p3/> page 6.
- 381 That we know of:
 ‘Roger Harris’ (HN200) Contacts Organiser for the Twickenham branch of the *International Socialists* (UCPI000007328), a branch which was then involved in a de-stabilising break-away from the main group to form the *Workers’ League* (UCPI000009608).
 Vincent Harvey, known as ‘Vince Miller’ (HN354) District Treasurer and on the social committee of the Outer East London District branch
 ‘Geoff Wallace’ (HN296) the “Flame” organiser for the Socialist Workers Party (Hammersmith and Kensington branch) (UCPI0000017698) and a Socialist Workers Party Organiser (UCPI0000016921).
 ‘Jeff Slater’ (HN351) Socialist Worker Newspaper Organiser for the North London District of the *International Socialists* (UCPI0000012014)
 ‘Bill Biggs’ (HN356) Branch Treasurer and *Socialist Worker* Organiser of South West London SWP (UCPI0000011996), chaired meetings (UCPI0000013021), a delegate to an aggregate meeting of the South East District where he voted on a proposal to condemn a Central Committee decision (UCPI0000013229), spoke as a Guest speaker at another branch’s meeting (UCPI0000013688) and Branch Treasurer of the Brixton branch (UCPI0000015441)
 ‘Paul Gray’ (HN126) *Socialist Worker* Organiser for Cricklewood branch and then the North West District (UCPI0000011354). On the District Committee which had control over all of the branches the District covered (UCPI0000013123). Re-elected in 1979 and 1980

- (UCPI0000013536 and UCPI0000013949). In his role as an SWP District Committee member, he was on the Organising Committee of the West Hampstead ANL (UCPI0000011497) and the North-West London ANL Co-ordinating Committee (UCPI0000013135)
- 382 See for example: MPS-0740761: HN126 statement paragraph 167
- 383 Statement of Lindsey German UCPI0000034739/12
- 384 Lindsey German Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 99
- 385 UCPI0000035253
- 386 As in the case of Rick Clark, "Phil Cooper" and potentially HN200.
- 387 See for example HN126 "Paul Gray" who did such a poor job as District Newspaper Organiser that the National Organiser had to rebuke him publicly for it UCPI0000013435.
- 388 UCPI0000035277/2
- 389 UCPI0000035263/4 paragraph 4.
- 390 UCPI0000035263/5 paragraph 8.
- 391 UCPI0000035263/4 i.e. *"the legislative proposals contained in 'In Place of Strife' and the subsequent passage of the Industrial Relations Act"*
- 392 Hence the focus on industry in every one of the "counter-subversion" groups see for example UCPI0000035268.
- 393 UCPI0000035277/2: Memorandum to Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office) from G. Reddaway (FCO/IRD). "[the counter-subversion groups] *have a record of some success, especially in the publicity field and, via, IRIS Ltd, in certain key trade union elections. This is useful support activity which should be both continued and encouraged.*"
- 394 UCPI0000035263/1: *"a year of exceptional militancy"*
- 395 See UCPI0000034699 Home Office correspondence about the concern raised by Labour MPs in 1974; which internally expressed certainty of no direct trade union infiltration by the Security Services; *"and although we have not gone around checking with every chief officer, it would be very surprising if there was any infiltration for ordinary police reasons"*. NOTE: the surprise would be limited to infiltrations for "ordinary" police reasons, not those directed at post 1972 "potential subversion".
- 396 Roy Creamer MPS-0748287/7 paragraph 15 *"we were guided entirely by what MI5 felt to be subversive"*.
- 397 Such as the National Wage restraint policy or the Industrial Relations Act.
- 398 UCPI0000035277: May 1971: Cover letter to Sir Burke Trend enclosing a memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 'Counter-Subversion' *"National industrial stoppages in which subversive forces have played a part, have underlined the need to fill a gap in our existing defences"*.
- 399 UCPI0000004584/2 paragraph 7
- 400 UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7
- 401 UCPI0000014610/2 paragraph 7
- 402 UCPI 0000030069/1 MI5 expressed an interest in March 1973, as to whether the SDS were planning on deploying officers into SWP Headquarters. The *"ideal would be a permanent well-placed employee in... headquarters, not necessarily too high up in the organisation"*. November 1973. UCPI0000030049 paragraph 2. UCPI0000028840 and UCPI0000027519: MI5 was kept updated in respect of 'Clark's' eventual withdrawal and 'Cooper's' succession of him.
- 403 UCPI0000018091 "for all practical purposes Philip Cooper... signs the cheques and controls the [RTWC] account".
- 404 Not only Cooper and Colin Clark, it was a feature of every SWP deployment.
- 405 See for example For example: UCPI0000017518, UCPI0000017540, UCPI0000017575 UCPI0000011166, UCPI0000011149 UCPI0000011181, UCPI0000011523, UCPI0000011621, UCPI0000011602, UCPI0000011838, UCPI0000011891, UCPI0000012000.
- 406 UCPI0000013228 pages 132 to 133. 64 universities and colleges with details of the number of members in each.
- 407 UCPI0000013228 pages 114 to 115. 42 unions listed.
- 408 UCPI0000035277/4
- 409 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/os-german-chesssummary-t1p3/> pages 32 to 40.
- 410 UCPI0000034738/42 paragraph 103.
- 411 Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 33: *But there comes a point, doesn't there, where not everything is done out in the open, and we drew your attention when you were asked to produce a witness statement to the 1978 National Delegate Conference, where a number of security measures were taken, weren't they, to ensure the confidentiality in particular of various documents about party affairs; is that right?*
- 412 Transcript T1P3 12th May 2022 page 34
- 413 Lindsey German: *we were very worried about that, and we were worried about people's names being -- you know, their proper names being given, or exactly where they worked being given, because we knew people were being sacked, we knew people were not getting jobs even though they seemed very well qualified for these jobs.*
- 414 See for example Brian Higgins <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/25/brian-higgins-obituary>
- 415 <https://www.ucpi.org.uk/publications/cti-opening-statement-t1-m2b-m2c/> paragraph 91: *SDS intelligence reports on individuals, once filed in Special Branch records, may have been consulted for vetting purposes. It cannot be ruled out that some were leaked to organisations which used them for blacklisting purposes. The concerns that Richard Chessum and Roy Battersby have raised are plausible. Any such leaks were contrary to established rules. However, it is striking that the rules conflicted with the desire within Government to counter subversive individuals and groups.*
- 416 See as one example: DCI Craft: MPS-0747446 : paragraph 152: *"I would have thought the far-left intelligence provided them [SyS] with a huge base of information for their vetting activity"*.
- 417 MPS-0735755/1 paragraph 1: *"Over the years a convention has grown up whereby the Security Service is the normal channel for passing security information about their employees to Government departments, certain public corporations (see list at Annex) and List X firms... Although this is common practice, it does not appear to have been the subject of any formal communication and this note is intended to explain the reasoning behind this procedure"*. Paragraph 5: *"This, of course, in no way inhibits initial enquiries to identify a person or to discover where he is working. But, once it is evident that he is employed in one of the categories specified in paragraph 2 above [i.e.*

- Government departments, Civil Service, public corporations at Annex, List X firms or the armed forces], reference should be made at once to the Security Service”.*
- 418 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1973-07-04/debates/15a91c0d-9fa1-4a18-a4b3-86deffd6034e/GovernmentContracts>
- 419 UCPI0000034699/2: Home Office correspondence: *The Members expressed fears that information obtained by Special Branch officers about trade unions might be given either to other trade unionists or to employers. This is difficult ground. We know ourselves that some employers plead to be given warning if known agitators seek or obtain employment with them. The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies which might help. But when a Special Branch officer is himself seeking help from an employer, or from a union official, it is asking a good deal to expect him to insist invariably that he is engaged in a one-way traffic. Only good and experienced officers can maintain this position and the most we can do is run the point home whenever there is a chance.*
- 420 See Archbold 2011 Chapter 31 that deals with the criminal law that was applicable at the time i.e. the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 (31 – 150) and the current law i.e. the 2010 Bribery Act (31-171).
- 421 UCPI0000034699 was a letter to the Secretary of State for the Home Office, Roy Jenkins, signed by Sir James Waddell.
- 422 UCPI0000035279/7: The Prime Minister’s PPS had been asked by the Dunlop Group, among others whether there was any way in which a firm could be warned when it was in danger of employing an individual who was known to have been a subversive influence in some other part of industry; he had advised Dunlops to seek help from non-official organisations such as the Economic League. There followed discussion on the prohibition of MI5 passing official information on in these circumstances, however the final conclusion at (c) *“Where there was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations, it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk”*
- 423 UCPI0000034699/2: *The official response has always been refusal, sometimes with a hint that there are unofficial bodies which might help*
- 424 UCPI0000035279/5: *“The Group invited Mr Maitland [Edward Heath’s Principle Private Secretary] to arrange for the two industrialists concerned – (i) the suggestion that, after considering precisely which elements in industry they wished to exert influence, they should seek the help of the Economic League or Industrial Research and Information Services Ltd (IRIS); (ii) the Prime Minister’s gratitude to them for raising the matter and his readiness to consider it further, if necessary, in the light of their discussion with one of these non-official organisations”.*
- 425 See above: UCPI0000035277/2: Memorandum to Sir Burke Trend (Cabinet Office) from G. Reddaway (FCO/IRD). *“[the counter-subversion groups] have a record of some success, especially in the publicity field and, via, IRIS Ltd, in certain key trade union elections. This is useful support activity which should be both continued and encouraged.”*
- 426 HN353: *“I would Hoover up everything, it wasn’t my job to analyse it, I would just report it” (T1P2 Day 10 Transcript of evidence page 8)*
- 427 MPS-0732954
- 428 See pp14-18 of our submissions showing officers in leading positions in TOM, SWP etc. - https://www.ucpi.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/20210414_Opening-Statement-Richard-Chessum-Mary.pdf
- 429 UCPI0000034308, Paragraph 56
- 430 HN354 statement paragraph 175.



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