HN68 ‘Sean Lynch’ initially infiltrated the Notting Hill branch of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. From 1969 onwards he attached himself to groups connected with campaigning on the political situation in Northern Ireland; the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (ICRSC) and Sinn Féin (London).
Lynch was described by other SDS officers as being Irish and a Gaelic speaker. He later held a managerial position as second-in-command of the SDS between 1981 and 1983 and retired from the Metropolitan Police in 1993. He is dead.
As Sean Lynch died before the Undercover Policing Inquiry began, the disclosure relating to him is predominantly Special Branch reports he wrote or signed as a manager. There are also some brief comments about him by fellow SDS officers.
Later, as an SDS manager, Lynch attended meetings with MI5, which were documented by the Security Service.
Disambiguation: There is a different Seán Lynch who is a retired Sinn Féin politician.
Nothing is known about HN68’s pre-SDS career. The only clue to Lynch’s role prior to 1968 comes in an opening statement made by David Barr, the Counsel to the Inquiry (CTI), where he drew attention to Lynch being refused entry to a closed meeting of the VSC Ad Hoc Committee.
That incident occurred on 16 July 1968, which was two weeks before the SDS was formed. Barr contrasted this with how, as an SDS undercover, Lynch went on to obtain access to private meetings.
Lynch was part of the first intake of undercover officers to the SDS, joining on 31 July 1968. Lynch’s initial targets were groups associated with mobilisation for the VSC demonstration on 27 October 1968 – the Camden branch of the International Socialists (IS) and Notting Hill branch of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC).
Lynch was then deployed into the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) , Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (ICRSC) and finally Sinn Féin (London) , intervening in decision-making and assuming positions of influence within those groups.
The 1971 SDS Annual Report described Lynch’s infiltration of Sinn Féin amongst the SDS’ most significant achievements. In Inquiry Chair John Mitting’s Interim Report, Lynch’s infiltration was described as one of only three SDS deployments between 1968 and 1982 that could be justified, due to Sinn Féin’s connection to the Provisional IRA.
HN68’s deployment ended in 1974, due to a possible compromise. His deployment of six years is one of the longest in the history of the undercover operations under examination by the Undercover Policing Inquiry.
Only HN60 'Dave Evans' of 6-7 years and EN12 Mark Kennedy’s NPOIU deployment of six years, nine months is known to have been longer.
Lynch first reported on the Camden branch of the International Socialists (IS) and the Notting Hill Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) between 6 August 1968 and 4 December 1968. There are 31 reports on these two groups based on intelligence provided by Lynch and other undercovers in the run-up to the 27 October 1968 anti-Vietnam war demonstration and five after the march.
Camden International Socialists
One Camden IS meeting features in three documents. The first is a police telegram sent by Lynch about a meeting he attended with HN334 ‘Margaret White’. It is significant, as it records information relating to the anti-Vietnam war protests but also mentions an unrelated industrial action; the Injection Moulders strike in north London.
A speaker suggests that IS members attend the picket line in support where ‘Workers, mostly Asian… occupied their factory for 18 days until forcibly evicted by police’.
A second report with slightly more narrative detail, including the fact that the meeting focused on a discussion on ‘The Negro [sic] Struggle in America’, was later submitted.
Although the SDS had been convened with the justification to collect intelligence on groups involved in the upcoming 27 October demonstration, these reports show it hoovering up all available information rather than sticking to its remit, something that persisted throughout the SDS’ history.
The third report recorded the car registrations of those who attended.
Notting Hill Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
When Lynch was attending the meetings of the Notting Hill VSC branch , he usually did so alongside other SDS officers. This was fairly normal during the SDS’ initial phase leading up to the 27 October demonstration. Lynch’s reporting on Notting Hill VSC included the influence of ‘Maoists’ on the branch and its confrontational attitude towards the police.
Another meeting of Notting Hill VSC on 30 August 1968 at which undercover HN331 and Lynch were present, included a discussion of court summonses for various members of the group resulting from a demonstration at Powis Square in Notting Hill, where activists were involved in defending it as a public park.
One of the activists, John Barker, wrote of the ‘…seizing of Powis Square, knocking down the railings of this private residential square and turning into a communal playground…’
Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign
From late 1968, marches on the streets of Northern Ireland focused on discrimination in housing, the franchise, and the drawing of electoral boundaries. The protests were violently opposed by both the paramilitary Protestant Volunteers and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC).
Part of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch existing remit was to monitor groups in the ‘Irish field’. The SDS’ attention, therefore, turned to the groups involved, which had a presence in London.
Lynch’s first report released by the Inquiry on these groups concerned the London branch of People’s Democracy and is dated 17 May 1969. At the meeting, founder-member Géry Lawless announced the formation of a new organisation, the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign (ICRSC) , which was to become a main target for Lynch and other undercovers.
A week later Lynch reported on a private meeting of People’s Democracy, so, presumably, had already gained the confidence of members of this group. A meeting date of 27 May 1969 was announced for the launch of the ICRSC.
Lynch reported on this as well – making him a founder-member alongside activists from People’s Democracy, IS and the Independent Labour Party (ILP) among other organisations.
HN326 ‘Doug Edwards’ who started his deployment in November 1968, referred to Sean Lynch as his ‘best mate’ and said that he received advice from him. In his written statement, Edwards recalled attending a demonstration, although not the date, outside the Northern Irish offices in Barclay Street and bumping into Lynch and going to the pub with him and member of the Independent Labour Party, Bill Turner.
Edwards related another incident, which may have involved Lynch, about sending a Metropolitan Police telegram as a member of ‘CI Dixon’s Squad’ [redacted] to the Commander [redacted] of Special Branch dated 12 August 1969 at 10.10pm. The telegram reads:
Whilst attending to another Matter at The Dolphin P.H., […] I overheard a meeting of the Irish Civil Rights Solidarity Campaign at which a decision was made to [go to] the Ulster Office […] to cause mischief.
No date is given for this event, although Lynch reported on a 12 August 1969 demonstration outside the Ulster Office.
Lynch wrote several more reports on the ICRSC, two of which, very unusually, were signed off by the head of Special Branch, Deputy Assistant Commissioner HN151 Ferguson Smith.
A feature of Lynch’s reporting is that it often includes information on rifts between personalities and organisations. Often, these would involve Géry Lawless.
On one occasion Lynch described Lawless as being the cause of a ‘heated argument’ ; on another he reported that animosity between Lawless and another ICRSC member might cause a split in the group.
Lynch also reported that a London Sinn Féin member had accused Bernadette McAliskey, formerly Devlin, of causing a ‘rift in the civil-rights movement’.
One issue the Inquiry addresses is the surveillance of elected politicians. McAliskey was an elected politician for the Unity Party between 1969-1974, as well as a prominent figure in the Northern Irish civil-rights movement.
The reports from 1968-1982 that mention McAliskey and other elected politicians in the documents disclosed by the Inquiry are reports on public meetings.
Lynch’s reports are often extremely detailed, listing those present, outlining their attitudes to various issues and organisational minutiae and reporting on the alleged misappropriation of funds.
Unlike other undercover officers, Lynch does not often include personal details, such as medical conditions. Nevertheless, in one of his reports, an activist is said to have suffered from ‘bouts of depression’ and Lynch labels the activist a ‘cannabis addict’. In another report Lynch writes that attendees at ICRSC meetings are, on occasion, drunk.
Lynch assumed roles within ICRSC and later Sinn Féin, and reported from a delegates-only meeting of NICRA on 4 April 1970. He was also part of the ICRSC steering committee.
He provided an overview of the branch structure of Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and stated that it had a membership of 650 people in London, suggesting he had access to the organisation’s records. One report on the ICRSC records the proposal to become the Irish Solidarity Committee (ISC).
Lynch’s membership of NICRA allowed him to gain access to the Hammersmith branch of (Provisional) Sinn Féin, on which he began to report on 26 January 1971. It is unclear whether this was by design or accident.
Irish Solidarity Campaign founding conference report
The report of 10-11 October 1970 that Lynch and HN340 ‘Andy Bailey’ co-authored on the ISC founding conference is singled out for much praise by SDS managers HN1254 Rollo Watts and Deputy Assistant Commisioner HN151 Ferguson Smith.
The report is extremely detailed. It includes names of individuals and organisations attending, accounts of delegate reports from across the UK, and the internecine disputes between the IMG and IS members present, notably involving Géry Lawless. Despite all this detail, it lacks any information relevant to the SDS’ public-order remit.
Significantly, copies of the report and the praise from senior Metropolitan Police officers were sent to the Home Office, as well as regular recipient MI5. This is a rarely documented instance when SDS intelligence – or at least knowledge of it – was communicated directly to the Home Office.
Explosives and firearms are scarcely mentioned in SDS reporting. Lynch is an exception; he once included information that guns were supposedly going to be supplied within the ICRSC and that the Irish government was setting up a military training camp for IRA volunteers.
The reports also suggest a target for a robbery of munitions – a props supplier to the theatrical world. However, Lynch casts doubt on the reliability of this information, stating he assessed the person who told him this ‘having difficulty distinguishing fact from fiction’.
Sinn Féin
During the 1970s, the SDS infiltrated groups connected with campaigns regarding Northern Ireland. Most of these groups, although often having Irish Republican sympathies, had no direct role in the armed conflict in Northern Ireland beyond peacefully campaigning for the British Army to withdraw.
Sean Lynch and one other undercover officer, HN344 ‘Ian Cameron’ , however, targeted groups that the SDS suspected were more directly involved, or at least aimed to be. Cameron operated within the little-known and short-lived Northern Minority Defence Force , which aimed to recruit volunteers for the IRA, although there is no evidence that it succeeded in this.
Lynch infiltrated London-based branches and districts of Sinn Féin, which was the political wing of the Provisional IRA. That said, on the evidence of Lynch’s reporting in 1971 and 1972, the London and other UK branches, ‘cumain’ in Irish Gaelic, were limited to supplying funds to the IRA, most often for prisoner support, and distribution of the Republican newspaper An Phoblacht.
The London Sinn Féin groups also organised demonstrations alongside other groups such as NICRA and ICRSC, although often there was disagreement with these groups. From Lynch’s reporting, it would seem that Sinn Féin activists wanted to align groups towards the Provisional IRA’s more nationalist line.
Brendon Magill and Derek Highstead were leaders of Sinn Féin in England during Lynch’s deployment. They appear in Lynch’s reporting and were connected to both the political and armed wings of the IRA.
Lynch’s influence on ICRSC and London Sinn Féin
The earliest report that records ‘Sean Lynch’ as one of a list of attendees at a meeting, rather than the police officer spying on it, is dated 19 June 1970. As noted, Lynch is the first SDS officer known to have a Registry File allocated to him.
This decision may have been made due to Lynch’s role as an undercover having become one of participant, rather than simply an observer – meaning that had another Special Branch officer been spying on the meeting Lynch’s presence would be certainly have been noted.
This report stems from HN135 Mike Ferguson’s deployment into the ICRSC. This report curiously misidentifies with another ‘Sean Lynch’, who had a Registry File opened on him in 1965.
Lynch took several positions of influence within London Sinn Féin. He was elected chairman of a west London branch of London Sinn Féin. In this role, he warned members not to attend an unauthorised rally.
He also took formal roles within London Sinn Féin as assistant treasurer of the south London branch and London District finance officer. The report recording this last post has a note attached to it from the Chief Inspector TN0035 , praising Lynch’s work.
In one meeting, Lynch also proposed a new chairman of London Sinn Féin, to which other members unanimously agreed. Lynch also unsuccessfully tried to change the political direction of NICRA by proposing a non-Sinn Féin person to take over as chair.
Convincing evidence of how Lynch, as an undercover officer, impacted the dynamics by criticising Lawless appears in a report on 5 October 1970 where Lynch ‘complained bitterly’ about Lawless not handing over money he had collected from selling tickets from a Frank Keane Defence Committee social event.
In Inquiry Chair Mitting’s Interim Report , Lynch’s infiltration of Sinn Féin was the only named deployment deemed justifiable. Mitting did not specify further whether Lynch’s intervention in the group’s decision-making was justified or whether using other groups like NICRA and the ICRSC as a stepping-stone into Sinn Féin was a legitimate tactic.
Mitting does comment that if the SDS had not existed, someone from B Squad , the section of the Special Branch dealing with ‘Irish Terrorism’, would have taken on Lynch’s role. Special Branch supplied intelligence on subversion to MI5, but it both collected and acted upon intelligence on the IRA.
Taken in isolation, therefore, Lynch’s active roles with London Sinn Féin might be seen as a result of this more extensive remit regarding ‘Irish Terrorism’. However, other SDS undercovers also adopted similarly active roles within their non-Irish target groups.
Lynch’s interference in decision-making processes with the groups he infiltrated has an added importance as it was so early in the SDS’ history. He can, therefore, be said to have set an informal precedent, as without formal training, SDS officers’ institutional memory of what and how things had worked in the past must have assumed greater importance.
Similarly, Lynch was the first SDS officer to be arrested and appear in court under his cover name.
Lynch’s influence extended further, as he went on to serve in the SDS as manager between 1981 and 1983. Another first, as mentioned, seems to be that Lynch was the first SDS undercover to be given a Registry File number.
1972 Aldershot Barracks Bombing
There is a significant gap in documents released by the Inquiry concerning Lynch, between a report mentioning he was a member of NICRA on 14 September 1972 and the next and final one to mention him, dated 26 January 1973.
Although disclosure of other undercovers is not complete, the hole in Lynch’s reporting might be due to intelligence or evidence that Lynch provided that led to Noel Jenkinson’s arrest and conviction for the Aldershot bombing.
HN34 Geoff Craft said that he had received information via the SDS, which contributed to the identification of possible suspect Noel Jenkinson, who was later convicted.
After a four-month gap, there is one final report attributed to Lynch. This is a meeting on 26 January 1973 at which a new branch of NICRA was formed, supplanting the existing London branch, and under the control of Sinn Féin.
Once again intervening in the organisation’s decision-making, Lynch unsuccessfully advocated for a more ‘neutral’ chairperson to take over from Sinn Féin member Brendon Magill.
Arrests and Court Appearance
As mentioned, Lynch is recorded to be the first SDS officer arrested in his cover name. It may have been that this arrest was even earlier, as HN329 ‘John Graham’ said that Lynch was arrested with HN331 , perhaps as early as 1968, for flyposting.
HN218 Barry Moss , undercover in the SDS in 1968, also says he was aware of Lynch being arrested for flyposting. Better documented is Lynch being the first SDS officer to be convicted in June 1970. This was for obstruction of the highway, alongside activist Bob Purdie and four others.
All the co-defendants pleaded guilty, but it is not known if Lynch had any influence in persuading them to do so.
In February 1971, Sean Lynch got into trouble again when he was stopped for taking part in an unauthorised collection for Irish Republican prisoners with three members of the London branch of Sinn Féin he was spying on. He had borrowed the car they travelled in from the Metropolitan Police carpool.
The trouble did not stop there, as one of the Sinn Féin members was later arrested for continuing to collect after the police had told him to stop. Within the chain of police communication there is ambiguity over whether Lynch himself was charged and cautioned for the street collection.
SDS chief HN1251 Phil Saunders refers to all three individuals as ‘defendants’ which suggests that Lynch did receive some form of formal reprimand in his cover identity, with a hand-written note by Assistant Commander HN585 Matthew Rodger stating that issuing a police caution for this type of offence is the normal policy.
However, there is no note clearly stating that Lynch was cautioned. The same note also recorded Rodger saying that the arresting officer had been directed to take no further action regarding the request to produce his driving documents. Saunders was involved in other instances of interference with the justice system.
Lynch remained as an undercover in the SDS until May 1974 leaving, according to HN103 David Smith , due to a possible compromise when a police officer from a different force publicly identified him during a demonstration.
Again, attention should be drawn to the lack of disclosed reporting by Lynch between January 1973 and his departure in May 1974. In the 1974 SDS Annual Report there is a reference to ‘some setbacks in the Irish field’. This would likely be Lynch’s forced withdrawal.
The effects of this in terms of SDS coverage can be seen in the SDS Annual Report the following year when it says that intelligence within the Irish field is now limited and ‘centred on the fringe organisations such as the Troops Out Movement’. The 1976 report confirms that, as a matter of policy, Sinn Féin and Clann na hÉireann are no longer targeted.
Between Lynch leaving the SDS and his return in 1981 as a manager, there is one more mention of the cover name, in an SDS report in a report dated 1 November 1977 on the mass picket during the Grunwick industrial dispute.
The report is almost entirely redacted, but the name of ‘Sean Lynch’, with his corresponding Registry File number is recorded as an activist who attended a mass picket on 17 October 1977.
There is no other evidence to explain the reappearance of the fictional ‘Sean Lynch’ three years after the false identity was apparently terminated. Without further evidence, any explanation would be speculative. However, as this is an SDS report, that would make a case of mistaken identity less likely.
In September 1980, an SDS report made by HN80 ‘Colin Clark’ was marked to be seen by ‘Detective Inspector HN68’. From this, it seems that HN68, at this point, is working within C Squad.
According to the timeline published by the Inquiry, HN68 – not known to colleagues as ‘Sean Lynch’ as he was no longer undercover – had taken the position of second-in-command of the SDS by the beginning of 1981. A detective inspector, he succeeded HN244 Angus Macintosh who was promoted to head of the unit.
Only one of HN68’s fellow managers, HN307 Trevor Butler mentioned him in his witness statement, describing him as ‘a tremendously capable officer and manager [who] had significant experience as a UCO [undercover officer], maintaining trust between the UCOs and our office’.
Two undercover officers who were managed by HN68 were complimentary about him. HN80 ‘Colin Clark’ said that he received advice from HN68 on how to deal with IRA supporters and that the management of the SDS during his deployment was ‘excellent’.
HN126 ‘Paul Gray’ said that as his detective inspector, HN68 gave him lots of advice and played squash with him, describing him and fellow manager HN135 Mike Ferguson as ‘absolutely brilliant, very experienced’.
HN308 Christopher Skey , a junior member of the SDS back-office team, described HN68 as an ‘outspoken Irishman’ who was concerned for his undercover officers’ welfare – and said Lynch checked in with them on a daily basis.
Other evidence published by the Inquiry relating to HN68’s time as a manager is either reports he signed as an SDS manager or notes made by MI5 on meetings with Special Branch managers. The first document signed by HN68 as a manager is dated 15 January 1981.
During his time as a manager in the SDS, undercover officers HN68 oversaw engaged in many different questionable behaviours.
These included officers proven to have or accused of having sexual relationships with members of their target groups; HN67 ‘Alan Bond’ , HN106 ‘Barry Tompkins’ , and HN85 Bob Lambert (‘Bob Robinson’) , who was also involved in a miscarriage of justice. You can read more about these issues in the relevant undercover officers’ profiles.
A report by another undercover officer managed by HN68, HN96 ‘Michael James’ , records him as sitting on the steering group of the Troops Out Movement.
In another report on the Socialist Workers Party undercover HN155 ‘Phil Cooper’ is listed as the national treasurer of the Right to Work Campaign. Having held several positions of influence in groups himself, it appears that HN68 did not see any problem with his undercovers assuming such posts.
The last report HN68 signed off is dated 8 December 1982 and authored by Phil Cooper. It is notable, as it reports on then Labour Party Euro MP Richard Balfe, who also had a Special Branch registry file.
Balfe planned to present a petition to parliament calling for the abolition of the 1974 Prevention of Terrorism Act on behalf of a New Zealand campaign group, Abolish the H-Blocks. Balfe now sits as a Conservative peer as Baron Balfe of Dulwich in the House of Lords.
As a manager in the SDS, HN68 features in several memoranda authored by MI5. Mostly, these are summaries of meetings between Special Branch and Security Service personnel on SDS deployments, and what use they can be to MI5.
The first of these mentioning HN68 is dated 3 February 1981. This meeting involved eight MI5 officers from F6 and F7 desks – F Department dealt with ‘subversive’ threats – along with HN68 and head of the SDS, HN307 Trevor Butler.
The document says that this was the first time that SDS senior officers and F7 desk officers had met and suggested that a similar meeting would take place on a bi-annual basis.
One MI5’s request recorded in the report was for the SDS to give notice when it withdrew an undercover from a group so that MI5 could ‘make alternative arrangements’. This is unambiguous evidence that MI5 and Special Branch targeted the same groups and individuals.
Many more meetings took place between the Security Services and SDS during HN68’s time as manager. One report raises the connection between SDS reporting and the blacklisting of left-wing activists. MI5 requested details on a Ministry of Defence civil servant and his wife, who were thought to be involved in the SWP.
Most of these documents do not mention HN68 by name as his interjections, if he made any, are not recorded. However, he is mentioned in some notes on MI5 and SDS discussions relating to the undercover Phil Cooper’s surveillance of the SWP.
During HN68’s time as manager, many of the meetings between the SDS and MI5 recorded the latter’s interest in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). For instance, one meeting took place on 20 October 1981 that reports that Phil Cooper and Colin Clark have ‘unrestricted access’ to SWP headquarters.
There is some discussion between DCI Trevor Butler, HN68 and MI5 about whether, when photocopying documents from the SWP office, the two undercovers had obtained prior permission from SDS management – with the implication that collecting information in this way was either a risk or ethically dubious.
If the latter, how genuine this concern was is a matter for debate, as this did not stop MI5 making further detailed requests for information on the SWP and other groups based on the same officers’ reporting.
For instance, a follow-up visit to the SDS office also in October 1981 by an MI5 officer was made just a few weeks later to collect a photographed document with a list of those who paid subscriptions to the SWP.
A report on the SWP’s move to new offices in June 1982 exemplifies the level of detail in the material SDS collected for MI5. This included a floor plan showing where the SWP staff sat, including SDS undercover HN155 ‘Phil Cooper’.
A follow-up meeting the same month suggests that there was a high degree of trust between SDS management and MI5. In it, the SDS asked MI5 about SWP policy to verify the information that Phil Cooper was providing them. This was as doubts had surfaced about Cooper’s behaviour and reliability.
In fact, HN68 stated that for these reasons Cooper would be removed from his deployment as soon as practicable. Remarkably, Cooper stayed embedded within the SWP headquarters for the next 18 months and still provided information that the Security Service was happy to receive.
All documents referred to below can be found in the Procedural section of the Documents page of this profile.
A restriction-order application regarding HN68’s real name was heard at the 21 Nov 2017 hearing and the restriction order was issued on 8 December 2017. In granting the order, Mitting followed the reasons set out in his Minded-To note of 3 Aug 2017.
Later, the Chair, John Mitting, ruled in December 2017 that the cover name ‘Sean Lynch’ would be released, but the real name would be restricted.