HN333 was an undercover officer in the SDS, probably between December 1968 and August 1969, when his deployment was ended because of ill health. He infiltrated a single, small left-wing group that he characterised in his witness statement as ‘extremist’ and ‘advocat[ing] the encouragement and instigation of others to commit violence which was seen as necessary’.
Mentored by HN3093 Roy Creamer, he described his training as ‘rudimentary’ but gave useful information about on how SDS undercovers and management exchanged information and planned work at weekly meetings at the SDS safe house.
After leaving the SDS, he had a ‘long and distinguished career’ in the Metropolitan Police, including working as a close-protection officer. HN333 has been allowed to maintain complete anonymity by Inquiry Chair John Mitting, who made both his real and cover name and the name of the group he spied on subject to restriction orders.
Unless otherwise indicated, the following material is taken from HN333's witness statement to the Inquiry.
Born in the 1940s, HN333 joined the Metropolitan Police in the early 1960s. In 1968 he joined Metropolitan Police Special Branch , working on C Squad. He notes that at the time Special Branch was small, but was increasing its intake. As a junior officer in Special Branch, he dealt with files and paperwork and learned about the scope of its work.
He was not at the March 1968 anti-Vietnam war demonstration organised by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VSC) , but attended the 27 October 1968 one as a plain-clothes officer where, he wrote, he ‘mingle[d] in the crowds to listen to pick up what the demonstrators intended to do next’.
HN333 joined the SDS in late 1968. In HN325 Conrad Dixon’s November 1968 strategy paper, ‘Penetration of Extremist Groups’, Dixon lists HN333's planned start date as 10 December 1968. According to HN333, the SDS dealt with the same issues as the rest of Special Branch, differing only in its approach and work routine. He wrote in his witness statement that the ‘SDS was unique in that SDS activities dominated your whole life'.
He had not heard of the SDS until he was approached to join it and said that, at the time, it was referred to as S or X Squad. The approach to join was an informal one and HN333 wrote he ‘joined the SDS because I was asked to, and it seemed like a logical progression… I was a very junior member of Special Branch and enthused about joining without fully knowing what it was’. Unlike most of the other male undercovers in the SDS, at the time he joined HN333 was single.
During HN333's time at the SDS the unit was run by Detective Chief Inspector Conrad Dixon and his deputy Detective Inspector HN1251 Phil Saunders. They were supported by three detective sergeants including HN3093 Roy Creamer and HN332 Cameron Sinclair. He also recalled HN294 , an undercover officer before becoming an SDS manager in 1969, and PN1748/HN3990 Riby Wilson being part of the SDS management.
HN333 claims his understanding was that the SDS’ objective 'was to anticipate violent public disorder that could cause damage and injury by getting closer to those most likely to perpetrate such a state'. While acknowledging that Special Branch was formed explicitly for ‘countering subversive activity’ and was the 'prime police resource for this purpose’, HN333 maintained his undercover work was primarily done to to assist the policing of public events . He says he had no knowledge of whether his reports were shared with MI5 and had no personal contact with the Security Service.
He provided considerable insight into the structure of the early SDS meetings at the safe house, which he says took place between one and three times a week. Contradicting the evidence of many other undercover officers, in his witness statement, HN333 stated they routinely shared information about their deployments with each other:
In the time I was deployed, the meetings which took place at the safehouse were catch-ups over the designated geographical areas and subject matters. Conrad Dixon and/or Phil Saunders would have been present, along with other SDS colleagues. As many of the unit that could attend would do so. We would report around a table.
The meetings began with a debrief about what had happened before. We would then talk through how to approach what was coming up, and get tips from others. The managers of the day would talk us through it. We would discuss the different factions we were looking at.
Training
As with other SDS officers at the time, HN333 said he received no formal training, but relied on discussions with other undercovers. ‘There were no written instructions on how to carry out my tasking. Any guidance would have been verbal. Much of it was common sense.’
At the start of his deployment he says he was given some instruction: ‘Initially you were given more guidance. It was suggested you take this route, or go to this meeting, say this or that. But I was not specifically tasked from week to week. I used my initiative instead.’
Tactics for infiltration were discussed at weekly meetings, where HN333 says managers gave some guidance. ‘I could pre-announce what I was going to do at our meetings, and the management would say if they thought it was a good idea’, he wrote in his witness statement, although he noted that ‘given that the objective was to gain intelligence, the management could not be too prescriptive’.
HN333 recalls that he was mentored by Roy Creamer, who shared information with him and gave him support. ‘He and I would chat at the safehouse. He would make sure that I was OK, not feeling threatened, and that I had enough expenses. I would have seen him every week.’
Tradecraft
HN333 made up a cover name, grew his hair and bought a second-hand coat, desert boots and wore dirty T shirts. He recalls: ‘You had to maintain a certain front at all times. My walk and voice changed. I found myself being a chameleon among my targets. My accent became more [redacted] and this just felt natural.’
He tried unsuccessfully to obtain a passport in his cover name, as he thought his background story was 'rudimentary' and 'would have fallen apart quite rapidly' if anyone had looked into it. He arranged cover employment with someone who he says was unaware he was an undercover police officer. As part of his cover, HN333 rented a bedsit and later a basement flat on a month-by-month basis. He could not drive.
After spending about a month in the back office, HN333 was deployed into a single target group, the name of which has been restricted by the Inquiry. The group was chosen by a member of SDS management who suggested he answer a public advertisement it had posted. HN333 thinks he was ‘thought suitable for my targets perhaps because I was quite young’. He went along to a meeting where he says he was 'partially greeted and partially grilled', but remained with the group, spying on it until the end of his deployment about nine months later.
HN333 described the group as ‘small and extremist’ – a loose association with no formal membership. He attended some but not all of its meetings which took place every two to three weeks, often in pubs, where he drank socially with members. Most weekends he went to demonstrations organised by groups supported by his target organisation.
He wrote that he ‘would try to report on the identity and activity of all of the group, but I did not always succeed. This was because people do not reveal all their details in ordinary social interaction, and I would not risk becoming conspicuous by trying to find out’.
He says he avoided any positions of influence, but rather ‘drifted along. I was a waif and stray that they wanted to indoctrinate. I was simply a member, and an irregular visitor’. He gained credibility by helping to make posters and visited a squat with the group to show solidarity. At the same time, he says: ‘There were other squats going on whose existence I came to know about, and I passed on their locations to my managers.’
HN333’s claims he was trusted to some degree by the group because he was asked to look after an item whose details – and much else –have been redacted by the Inquiry. He kept this item in his possession for several days, taking it to the SDS safe house. No further details about this were requested by the Inquiry.
Elsewhere in his witness statement, HN333 said he did not provide evidence for criminal prosecutions or become involved in legal proceedings and did not participate in any criminal activity, so one can infer that the item he looked after for the group was not proscribed by law.
HN333 says he withdrew from his undercover deployment in consultation with his managers because of health issues. He gave an excuse to his target group then broke off contact with them. This was not long after May 1969 and probably around July 1969.
He was debriefed by a senior manager in the SDS, and wrote up notes, which included issues around his welfare. Immediately after leaving he attended some courses and then went back to Special Branch where he had a long and successful career, including a stint working on protection duties.
In May 2017, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) applied to restrict HN333’s real and cover name. It provided a risk assessment, dated 2 May 2017 that concluded the physical risk from members of the group HN333 spied on or current people with the same beliefs was ‘minimal’. The likelihood of HN333 being attacked if his undercover pseudonym was made public was also deemed ‘very low’.
It did note, however, that HN333 believed there would be negative consequences for him and his children from being associated with the SDS. Supplementary submissions were made by the MPS' Designated Lawyers on 17 July 2017, followed by an impact statement on 27 July 2017.
On 3 August 2017 Inquiry Chair John Mitting issued a 'Minded To' notice that he planned to restrict HN333’s real and cover names on the grounds that: ‘There is, however, a small – in my judgement, very small – risk that if his cover name were to be associated with the valuable duties which he performed subsequent to his deployment, he would be of interest to those who might pose such a threat.’
The non-state, non-police core participants made submissions on 5 October 2017 and a hearing was held on the anonymity orders on 21 November 2017. On 5 December 2017 Mitting published his reasons for granting anonymity in respect of both HN333’s real and cover names, even though he accepted that: ‘No real threat to his personal safety or to that of his family would arise from surviving members or associates of his target group.’ HN333’s cover name and real name were made subject to a restriction order by Mitting on 8 December 2017.
On 20 November 2018 HN333 provided an updated witness statement to the Inquiry, a short summary of which was read out at the Inquiry on 19 November 2020. Given the restriction order over HN333's identity, the Inquiry did not release material relating to him, other than his witness statement, into the public domain and his evidence to the Inquiry was held in closed session.
The documents referred to on this page can be viewed on the Procedural tab of the documents page on this profile.